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I. Introduction
Should a sixteen-year-old person who intentionally axe-
murders his mother, father, and two younger siblings have his
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. B.A., University of Penn-
sylvania, 1966; J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1969; Ph.D.(sociology),
Harvard University, 1973. I benefitted greatly from the critical comments of col-
leagues who reviewed an earlier draft of this article, most notably Professors Phil
Frickey and Bob Levy. They, of course, bear no responsibility for my failure to
heed fully their wise counsel. This research was supported by the University of
Minnesota Law Alumni Association's "Partners in Excellence" program. I received
exceptional research assistance from Ms. Marit Westman Zosel, University of Min-
nesota Law School, class of 1990.
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freedom curtailed longer than the two and one-half year maxi-
mum sentence which could be imposed if he were tried as a juve-
nile? For most people, the answer is easy and obvious. Yet three
courts' applying the Minnesota juvenile waiver statute2 to this sce-
nario reached dramatically divergent results based on three differ-
ent and inconsistent rationales. Despite the Minnesota Supreme
Court's purported clarification of the waiver statute in In re
D.FB.,3 members of the Minnesota Court of Appeals could not
agree upon either the result or the rationale in the next factually
similar case that arose.4
Between the nominally rehabilitative sentencing policies of
the juvenile justice system and the punitive policies of the adult
criminal justice system lies a mechanism for prosecuting some ju-
venile offenders as adults: waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction.5
Consistent with the juvenile court's traditional emphasis on reha-
bilitation of offenders, waiver legislation in Minnesota and in most
other states typically requires juvenile court judges to make indi-
vidualized determinations as to a young offender's amenability to
treatment and danger to society.6 As the case of David F. Brom
illustrates, however, application of such transfer legislation is sur-
prisingly difficult.
Why does such a common and recurring application of sen-
tencing legislation in Minnesota's juvenile courts produce such in-
consistent and disparate results? One explanation is that the
legislation fails to acknowledge, much less reconcile, two funda-
mental but contradictory bases for sentencing policies-the charac-
teristics of the offender and the characteristics of the offense. The
legislative failure to harmonize these contradictory sentencing pol-
icies, in turn, leaves every juvenile court judge in the position of
deciding transfer cases on ad hoc discretionary bases devoid of any
underlying principle or rationale.
The appropriate disposition of serious but isolated offenders
1. See In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955 (Olmsted County, Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 21,
1988); In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); In re D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d
79 (Minn. 1988); see infra notes 149-250 and accompanying text.
2. Minn. Stat. § 260.125 (1988); see infra notes 135, 137.
3. 433 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1988); see infra notes 219-250 and accompanying text.
4. See In re J.L.B., 435 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); see infra notes 251-
276 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Barry Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prose-
cution: The Legislative Alternative to Asking Unanswerable Questions, 62 Minn. L.
Rev. 515 (1978) [hereinafter Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders].
6. See generally Barry Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Of-
fense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminol-
ogy 471 (1987) [hereinafter Feld, Principle of Offense] (statutory survey and
analysis of juvenile court waiver legislation).
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is one problematic aspect of judicial waiver. This article will de-
scribe the genesis of the current legislative and judicial morass and
analyze the recent appellate court decisions that did violence both
to the statute as written and to the proper role of appellate review.
An empirical examination of juvenile court transfer practices in
Minnesota identifies some additional problems inherent in ad-
ministering vague, discretionary sentencing statutes. The article
recommends legislation to address the problems of sentencing seri-
ous young offenders. These recommendations reflect changes in
waiver legislation occurring throughout the nation.
II. Waiver of Juvenile Offenders for Criminal Prosecution
The transfer of some serious young offenders from juvenile
courts to criminal courts for prosecution as adults has received ex-
tensive legislative, judicial, and academic scrutiny.7 A waiver deci-
sion is a sentencing choice between the punitive dispositions of
adult criminal court and the nominally rehabilitative dispositions
of juvenile court.8 The theoretical differences between juvenile
and criminal courts' sentencing philosophies become most visible
in juvenile waiver proceedings. Traditionally, juvenile courts as-
7. See, e.g., Barry Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform and the Serious
Young Offender: Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," 65 Minn. L. Rev. 167
(1981)[hereinafter Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal']; Barry Feld, Delin-
quent Careers and Criminal Policy: Just Deserts and the Waiver Decision, 21
Criminology 195 (1983) [hereinafter Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Pol-
icy]; Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6.
8. Barry Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for Juve-
nile Court, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 141, 269 (1984) [hereinafter Feld, Criminalizing Juve-
nile Justice]. See generally Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5;
Donna Hamparian, Linda Estep, Susan Muntean, Ramon Priestino, Robert Swisher,
Paul Wallace & Joseph White, Youth in Adult Courts: Between Two Worlds (1982)
[hereinafter Between Two Worlds]; Readings in Public Policy 169-377 (John Hall,
Donna Hamparian, John Pettibone & Joseph White eds. 1981) [hereinafter Read-
ings in Public Policy] (series of articles on the prosecution of juveniles in adult
court); Charles Whitebread & Robert Batey, The Role of Waiver in the Juvenile
Court Questions of Philosophy and Function, in Readings in Public Policy, supra,
at 207-26.
Minnesota courts have repeatedly affirmed that the waiver decision is appro-
priately regarded as a sentencing decision. See, e.g., In re S.R.J., 293 N.W.2d 32, 35
(Minn. 1980) ("A reference hearing is a dispositional hearing .. "); In re T.D.S.,
289 N.W.2d 137, 139-41 (Minn. 1980); In re D.M., 373 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985).
In In re Hartung, 304 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 1981), the court stated:
A reference hearing is a dispositional type hearing which is forward
looking: that is, the purpose of it is to determine on the basis of the
offense charged and the present conditions 'whether, upon an adjudi-
cation of guilt, a juvenile can be retained within the juvenile justice
system with benefit to himself and without danger to the public.'
Id. at 624 (emphasis in original) (quoting In re T.D.S., 289 N.W.2d 137, 141 (Minn.
1980)).
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signed primary importance to individualized treatment, whereas
adult criminal law accorded far greater significance to the serious-
ness of the offense committed and attempted to proportion punish-
ment accordingly. 9 Transfer decisions reflect and supposedly
resolve tensions-between rehabilitation and retribution, and be-
tween focusing on the offender and the offense-that underlie
much of the contemporary debate about sentencing policies. In-
creasingly, the "Principle of Offense" has dominated this sentenc-
ing decision, as "just deserts" based on the offense prescribe the
appropriate disposition, rather than the "real needs" of the
offender.10
Nearly all legislatures have adopted a statutory mechanism to
transfer some juvenile offenders from the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile courts to that of adult criminal courts.'" Of these, two legisla-
tive vehicles-judicial waiver and legislative offense exclusion-
pose the alternative sentencing policy choices most starkly.12 The
9. See, e.g., In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955 (Olmsted County, Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr.
21, 1988). Judge Gerard Ring, the trial judge, notes:
Perhaps the major difference between a juvenile delinquency proceed-
ing and an adult criminal proceeding is the focus on the individual. In
adult court where the guidelines apply, the severity of the sentence is
determined largely by the offense itself. In juvenile court, the focus is
on the child. A juvenile judge can legally give the same consequence
to a shoplifter and a bank robber, depending upon the characteristics
of the child in court.
Id., Memorandum at 2 (emphasis added); see also Feld, Principle of Offense, supra
note 6, at 487-88.
10. See Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 472-73 ("The waiver of a se-
rious offender into the adult system on the basis of [the] offense rather than an in-
dividualized evaluation of a youth's "amenability to treatment" or "dangerousness"
is both an indicator of and a contributor to the substantive as well as procedural
criminalization of the juvenile court.").
11. Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 523 n.22; Between
Two Worlds, supra note 8, at 96-97.
12. A third mechanism for removing juvenile offenders from the juvenile sys-
tem is prosecutorial waiver, or concurrent jurisdiction between juvenile and crimi-
nal courts over certain offenses. See generally Donna Bishop, Charles Frazier &
John Henretta, Prosecutorial Waiver: Case Study of a Questionable Reform, 35
Crime & Delinq. 179 (1989); Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at
521 n.20; Between Two Worlds, supra note 8; Charles Thomas & Shay Bilchik,
Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 439, 456-70 (1985). In concurrent jurisdiction states-e.g.,
Nebraska, Wyoming, Arkansas, and Florida-the prosecutor's charging decision de-
termines whether a case will be heard in a juvenile or adult forum. Because this
article focuses primarily on the differences between the juvenile and adult justice
systems and their respective emphases on offenders and offenses in sentencing, a
separate discussion of prosecutorial waiver will be omitted. To the extent that the
prosecutor's decision to charge certain offenses in criminal courts divests the juve-
nile court of jurisdiction, however, this waiver mechanism will be treated as a sub-
category of offense-based decision-making. See Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offend-
ers, supra note 5, at 557-61 n.139; Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 511-19.
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prevalent practice in virtually all jurisdictions is judicial waiver; a
judge may waive juvenile court jurisdiction on a discretionary ba-
sis, after a hearing about a youth's amenability to treatment and
threat to public safety. The juvenile court judge's case-by-case
clinical evaluation of a youth's amenability to treatment or danger-
ousness to the public reflects the individualized, discretionary sen-
tencing practices which are the hallmark of the juvenile court.
The other transfer mechanism may be termed legislative
waiver, or offense exclusion, in which the legislative definition of
juvenile court jurisdiction excludes youths charged with certain of-
fenses. Legislative exclusion reflects the retributive, offense-ori-
ented values of the criminal law.13
Both judicial waiver and legislative offense exclusion statutes
attempt to answer essentially the same questions: Who are the se-
rious juvenile offenders? How are they identified? Which system
will deal with them? Each type of waiver mechanism emphasizes
different information-the characteristics of the offender or those
of the offense-in determining whether certain juvenile offenders
should be handled as adults. In so doing, they reflect the tension
between punishment and treatment.
Punishment and treatment can be conceptualized as mutually
exclusive goals because the focus of punishment is retrospective
whereas the emphasis of therapy is prospective.14 Punishment im-
poses unpleasant consequences on offenders because of their past
offenses.15 Therapy, on the other hand, seeks to alleviate undesir-
able conditions and thereby improve the offender's life in the fu-
ture.16 Treatment assumes that certain antecedent factors are
responsible for the individual's undesirable condition and that
13. See, e.g., Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 556-71;
Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy, supra note 7, at 202-05; Feld, Prin-
ciple of Offense, supra note 6, at 494-99.
14. Martin Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual Frame-
work for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 Vand. L. Rev.
791, 793 n.16, 815-16 (1982); Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 8, at
248 n.415; Barry Feld, Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment
Treatment and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U.L. Rev. 821, 833 (1988)[hereinafter
Feld, Punishment, Treatment].
15. Gardner, supra note 14, at 793 n.18. Punishment involves state-imposed
burdens on an individual who has violated legal prohibitions. See H.L.A. Hart,
Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law 4-5 (1968). See
generally Andrew Von Hirsch, Doing Justice (1976).
16. Gardner, supra note 14, at 793 n.18. Treatment focuses on the mental
health, status, or welfare of the individual rather than on the commission of prohib-
ited acts. See Francis Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy
and Social Purpose 2-3 (1981)[hereinafter Allen, Decline of the Rehabilitative
Ideal]; Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 25; Herbert
Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 23-28 (1968).
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steps can be taken to alter those conditions. Indeed, this assump-
tion is one of the central tenets of the positive criminology under-
lying the rehabilitative ideal of the juvenile court.17
In analyzing juvenile court waiver/sentencing practices, it is
useful to examine whether the sentencing decision is based on con-
siderations of the offense or of the offender. When the sentence is
based on the characteristics of the offense, the sentence is usually
determinate and proportional, with a goal of retribution or deter-
rence. In the case of waiver to criminal courts for punishment, of-
fense-based considerations dominate when the seriousness of the
present offense and/or the prior record control the transfer deci-
sion. The decision is based on an assessment of past conduct.
A sentence based on the characteristics of the offender, how-
ever, is typically open-ended, non-proportional, and indeterminate,
with a goal of rehabilitation.1s In the context of waiver decisions,
this sentencing policy is reflected in clinical assessments of the in-
dividual offender's "amenability to treatment" or "dangerousness."
The decision is based on a prediction about an offender's future
course of conduct. Thus, waiver statutes reflect the same disposi-
tional tensions between individualized evaluations of the offender
and more mechanistic dispositions based on the characteristics of
the offense that pervade the adult sentencing policy debate about
indeterminate or determinate sentences and the use of sentencing
guidelines.
It is also useful to distinguish the bases on which such sen-
tencing decisions are made. Professor Matza has described the
Principle of Offense as a principle of equality: treating similar
cases in a similar fashion based on a narrowly defined frame of
relevance.19
The principle of equality refers to a specific set of substantive
criteria that are awarded central relevance and, historically, to
17. David Matza, Delinquency and Drift 3 (1964); see infra note 44 and accom-
panying text.
18. "The distinction between indeterminate and determinate sentencing is not
semantic, but indicates fundamentally different public policies. Indeterminate sen-
tencing is based upon notions of rehabilitation, while determinate sentencing is
based upon a desire for retribution or punishment." In re Felder, 93 Misc. 2d 369,
377, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528, 533 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1978). See generally Norval Morris, The
Future of Imprisonment 13-20 (1974); Packer, supra note 16, at 54-55; Von Hirsch,
supra note 15, at 11-26 (1976); Andrew Von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes: Deserv-
edness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals (1985). In analyzing ju-
venile dispositions, it is useful to contrast offender-oriented dispositions which are
indeterminate and nonproportional with offense-based dispositions which are deter-
minate, proportional, and related directly to characteristics of the offense. See gen-
erally Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 14, at 847-91.
19. Matza, supra note 17, at 113-14.
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a set of considerations that were specifically and momentously
precluded. Its meaning, especially in criminal proceedings, has
been to give a central and unrivaled position in the framework
of relevance to considerations of offense and conditions closely
related to offense like prior record, and to more or less pre-
clude considerations of status and circumstance. 20
By contrast, the Principle of Individualized Justice differs
from the Principle of Offense in two fundamental ways.
First, individualized justice is much more inclusive: it contains
many more items in its framework of relevance.... The prin-
ciple of individualized justice suggests that disposition is to be
guided by a full understanding of the client's personal and so-
cial character and by his "individual needs."21
Rather than being confined to characteristics of the offense, indi-
vidualized justice encompasses every characteristic of the offender.
Second, because "the kinds of criteria it includes are more diffuse
than those commended in the principle of offense,.. . [t]he conse-
quence of the principle of individualized justice has been mystifica-
tion."22 By including all personal and social characteristics as
relevant, without assigning controlling significance to any one fac-
tor, individualized justice relies heavily on the "professional judg-
ment" and discretion of juvenile court administrators.2 3
In the adult dispositional framework, determinate sentencing
based on the offense has increasingly superseded indeterminate
sentencing in the past decade, as "just deserts" replaces rehabilita-
tion as the underlying sentencing rationale. 24 The "just deserts"
advocates reject rehabilitation as a justification for intervention
because of the discretionary power an indeterminate sentencing
scheme vests in presumed experts, the inability of such experts to
justify treating similarly situated offenders differently, the failure
of rehabilitation in general,2 5 and the inequalities, disparities, and
20. Id. (emphasis in original).
21. Id. at 114-15 (emphasis in original).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 116.
24. See generally American Friends Service Committee, Struggle for Justice 45-
53 (1971); Allen, Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 16, at 7 (Struggle
for Justice "signaled the wide and precipitous decline of penal rehabiitationism
that was to characterize the years ahead."); David Fogel, We Are the Living Proof:
The Justice Model for Corrections 285-95 (2d ed. 1979); Morris, supra note 18, at 45-
50; Richard Singer, Just Deserts: Sentencing Based on Equality and Desert (1979);
Von Hirsch, supra note 15, at 49-55.
25. Earlier and excessively optimistic assumptions about human malleability
have been challenged frequently by observations that rehabilitation programs do
not consistently rehabilitate and by volumes of empirical evaluations that question
both the effectiveness of treatment programs and the "scientific" underpinnings of
those who administer the enterprise. See Robert Martinson, What Works?--Ques-
tions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 Pub. Interest 22, 25 (1974) ("With few
1989]
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injustices that result from individualized sentences. "Just deserts"
sentencing, with its strong retributive foundation, punishes offend-
ers largely according to their past criminal behavior rather than on
the basis of who they are or may be predicted to become. Simi-
larly situated offenders are defined and sanctioned equally on the
basis of relatively objective characteristics such as seriousness of
the offense, culpability, or criminal history.
These same shifts in sentencing philosophy are appearing in
the juvenile process as well, as "just deserts" supersedes individu-
alized sentencing.2 6 The "just deserts" critiques of individualized
sentencing practices raise troubling questions about the validity of
the clinical diagnoses or predictions relied upon in waiver deci-
sions, and about the propriety of delegating fundamental issues of
sentencing policy to the discretionary judgments of social service
personnel and judges. These critics contend that there are no valid
or reliable clinical bases upon which juvenile court judges can
make accurate amenability or dangerousness predictions, and that
the effectively standardless discretion the criteria afford to judges
results in inconsistent and discriminatory applications.27 These
criticisms have persuaded legislatures to modify the waiver criteria
and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far
have had no appreciable effect on recidivism."). See generally The Rehabilitation
of Criminal Offenders: Problems and Prospects (Lee Sechrest, Susan White & Eliz-
abeth Brown eds. 1979); David Ward, Daniel Wilner & Gene Kassebaum, Prison
Treatment and Parole Survival (1971). In another survey of correctional evalua-
tions, David Greenberg, The Correctional Effects of Corrections: A Survey of Evalu-
ations, in Corrections and Punishment 111 (David Greenberg ed. 1977), Greenberg
concludes:
This survey indicates that many correctional dispositions are failing to
reduce recidivism, and it thus confirms the general thrust of [Martin-
son]. Much of what is now done in the name of "corrections" may
serve other functions, but the prevention of return to crime is not one
of them. Here and there a few favorable results alleviate the monot-
ony, but most of these results are modest and obtained through evalu-
ations seriously lacking in rigor. The blanket assertion that "nothing
works" is an exaggeration, but not by very much.... I never thought
it likely that most of these programs would succeed in preventing
much return to crime. Where the theoretical assumptions of programs
are made explicit, they tend to border on the preposterous. More
often they are never made explicit, and we should be little surprised if
hit-or-miss efforts fail.
Id. at 140-41.
Further, "either because of scientific ignorance or institutional incapacities, a
rehabilitative technique is lacking, we do not know how to prevent criminal recidi-
vism by changing the characters and behavior of offenders." Allen, Decline of the
Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 16, at 34.
26. See Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6; Feld, Punishmen Treatment,
supra note 14, at 851-79.
27. Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 529-56; Feld, Princi-
ple of Offense, supra note 6, at 489; see also infra notes 83-121 and accompanying
text noting the geographic variations in Minnesota's judicial waiver practices.
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by automatically excluding from juvenile court jurisdiction those
youths who possess certain combinations of present offense and
prior record, and/or increasing emphasis on the offense as a dispo-
sitional criterion in a judicial waiver proceeding.28
Analyzing waiver as a sentencing decision addresses two in-
terrelated policy issues: (1) the bases for sentencing practices
within juvenile courts, and (2) the relationship between juvenile
court and adult criminal court sentencing practices. The first im-
plicates individualized sentencing decisions and the operational
tension between discretion and the rule of law. The second fo-
cuses on harmonizing social control responses to serious or chronic
offenders across the two systems. By constraining judicial sentenc-
ing discretion and improving the fit between waiver decisions and
criminal court sentencing practices through the Principle of Of-
fense, legislatures may use offense criteria to address both issues
simultaneously.
A. Judicial Waiver and Individualized Offender-Oriented
Dispositions
The juvenile court is the product of changes in two ideas in
the nineteenth century: strategies of social control2 9 and the cul-
28. Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 489.
29. The Progressives introduced a number of criminal justice reforms at the
turn of the century-probation, parole, indeterminate sentences, and the juvenile
court--all of which emphasized open-ended, informal, and highly flexible policies
to rehabilitate the deviant. Francis Allen, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, in Borderland of Criminal Justice 25-27 (1964) [hereinafter Allen, Rehabilita-
tive Ideal]; David Rothman, Conscience and Convenience 43 (1980). A pervasive
feature of all Progressive criminal justice reforms was discretionary decision-mak-
ing, because identifying the causes and prescribing the cures for delinquency re-
quired an individualized approach which precluded uniformity of treatment or
standardization of criteria.
The Progressives' reformulation of criminal justice strategies reflected chang-
ing ideological assumptions about the causes and cures of crime and deviance. Posi-
tivism-the identification of antecedent causal variables producing crime and
deviance---challenged the classic formulations of crime as the product of free will.
Allen, Rehabilitative Ideal, supra; Matza, supra note 17, at 5; Rothman, supra, at
50-51. Attributing criminal behavior to external, antecedent forces rather than to
deliberately chosen misconduct reduced an actor's moral responsibility for crime
and focused efforts on the reform of the offender rather than the punishment of
the offense. Ellen Ryerson, The Best-Laid Plans 22 (1978). The new criminology,
as distinguished from the old "free will," asserted a scientific determinism of devi-
ance and sought to identify the causal variables producing crime and delinquency.
See Matza, supra note 17, at 4-12; Anthony Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention
of Delinquency 46-74 (2d ed. 1977); Rothman, supra, at 50. In its quest for scientific
legitimacy, criminology at the turn of the century borrowed both methodology and
vocabulary from the medical profession as metaphors such as pathology, infection,
diagnosis, and treatment provided popular analogues for criminal justice profession-
als. Allen, Rehabilitative Ideal, supra; Platt, supra, at 18; Rothman, supra, at 56.
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tural conceptions of children.30 While many. Progressive 3 ' pro-
grams shared a unifying, child-centered theme,3 2 the juvenile court
synthesized the new approaches to childhood and social control
into a specialized, bureaucratic agency staffed by experts and
designed to serve the needs of the child offender. The Progres-
These deterministic interpretations of human behavior redirected research efforts
to identify the causes of crime by scientifically studying the offender, because the
ability to identify the causes of crime also implied the correlative ability to cure it.
The conjunction of positivistic criminology, analogies to the medical profession
in the treatment of criminals, and the growth of new social science professionals
gave rise to the "Rehabilitative Ideal," a prominent feature of all Progressive crimi-
nal justice reforms. See Allen, Rehabilitative Ideal, supra, at 25; Allen, Decline of
the Rehabilitative Ideal, supra note 16, at 11-15.
30. A modernizing of the family and a changing cultural conception of child-
hood accompanied economic modernization and industrialization. Demographic
changes in the numbers and spacing of children and a shift of economic functions
from the family to other work environments modified the roles of women and chil-
dren. Joseph Kett, Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America 1790 to the Present
114-16 (1977). See generally Carl Degler, At Odds: Women and the Family in
America from the Revolution to the Present 178-209 (1980);Turning Points: Histor-
ical and Sociological Essays on the Family (John Demos & Sarane Boocock eds.
1978); Christopher Lasch, Haven in a Heartless World: The Family Besieged 6-10
(1977).
Especially within the upper and middle classes, a more modern conception of
childhood emerged. Children were perceived as corruptible innocents whose up-
bringing required greater physical, social, and moral structure than had previously
been regarded as prerequisite to adulthood. The family, particularly women, as-
sumed a greater role in supervising a child's moral and social development. See
Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood 329 (1962); Degler, supra, at 86-110; Kett,
supra, at 109-43; Platt, supra note 29, at 75-83; Bernard Wishy, The Child and the
Republic: The Dawn of Modern American Child Nurture 116 (1968).
31. During the last third of the nineteenth century and the beginning decades
of the twentieth century, rapid industrialization, economic modernization, urbaniza-
tion, immigration, and social change overwhelmed traditional social stability and
posed fundamental new problems of social control. See generally Samuel Hays,
The Response to Industrialism 1885-1914 (1957); Richard Hofstadter, The Age of
Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (1955); David Noble, America by Design: Science,
Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (1977); Robert Wiebe, The
Search for Order 1877-1920 (1967). The Progressive movement emerged around the
turn of the century in response to the social problems caused by rapid industrializa-
tion, urbanization, and modernization. See generally Hofstadter, supra; Gabriel
Kolko, The Triumph of Conservativism: A Reinterpretation of American. History,
1900-1916 (1963); James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State 1900-
1918 (1968); Wiebe, supra.
32. The changing cultural conception of childhood informed the Progressives'
policies embodied in juvenile court legislation, child labor laws, child welfare laws,
and compulsory school attendance laws. See generally Wiebe, supra note 31, at 169;
Kett, supra note 30, at 226-27; Juvenile Justice: The Progressive Legacy and Cur-
rent Reforms (LaMar Empey ed. 1979) (juvenile court legislation); Susan Tiffin, In
Whose Best Interest? Child Welfare Reform in the Progressive Era (1982)(social
welfare legislation); Walter Trattner, Crusade for the Children: A History of the
National Child Labor Committee and Child Labor Reform in America (1970)
(child-labor legislation); Lawrence Cremin, The Transformation of the School: Pro-
gressivism in American Education, 1876-1957, at 127-28 (1961)(compulsory education
legislation).
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sives envisioned that juvenile court professionals would use inde-
terminate and informal procedures to make discretionary,
individualized treatment decisions, thus achieving benevolent goals
by substituting a scientific and preventative approach for the tradi-
tional punitive intent of the criminal law.3 3 In the ideal juvenile
court, an expert judge, assisted by social service personnel, clini-
cians, and probation officers who investigated the child's back-
ground, would identify the sources of the child's misconduct and
develop a treatment plan to meet the child's needs.
Because their aims were benevolent, their solicitude individu-
alized, and their intervention guided by science, juvenile court
judges were given enormous discretion to make dispositions in the
"best interests of the child." The juvenile court's methodology en-
couraged collecting as much information as possible about the
child to allow rational, scientific analysis of the facts which would
presumably reveal the proper diagnosis and prescribe the cure.
Principles of psychology and social work, rather than formal deci-
sional rules, guided decision-makers. In the factual inquiry into
the whole child-his or her life, character, environment, and social
circumstances-the specific criminal offense a child committed was
accorded minor significance because it indicated little about a
child's "real needs."
The misdeeds that brought the child before the court affected
33. The juvenile court movement attempted to remove children from the adult
criminal justice and corrections systems, and to provide them with individualized
treatment in a separate system of their own. Sanford Fox, Juvenile Justice Re-
form. An Historical Perspective, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 1187 (1970); Julian Mack, The Ju-
venile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1909); Platt, supra note 29, at 137-45; Ryerson,
supra note 29, at 32-37. Under the guise of parens patriae, an emphasis on treat-
ment, supervision, and control, rather than punishment, allowed the state to inter-
vene affirmatively in the lives of more young offenders. Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart.
9 (Pa. 1838); Neil Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens
Patriae," 22 S.C.L. Rev. 147, 180-81 (1970); Douglas Rendleman, Parens Patriae:
From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. Rev. 205, 207-10 (1971).
In separating children from adult offenders, the juvenile court also rejected the
jurisprudence and procedures of criminal prosecutions. Courtroom procedures
were modified to eliminate any implication of a criminal proceeding;, a euphemistic
vocabulary and a physically separate court building were introduced to avoid the
stigma of adult prosecutions. Rothman, supra note 29, at 217; Ryerson, supra note
29, at 35-37; Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency, President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delin-
quency and Youth Crime 92-93 (1967). Proceedings were initiated by a petition in
the welfare of the child, rather than by a criminal complaint. Juries and lawyers
were excluded because the important issues in juvenile court proceedings were the
child's background and welfare rather than the details surrounding the commission
of a specific crime. Judges dispensed with technical rules of evidence and formal
procedures in order to obtain all the information available. Hearings were confi-
dential, access to court records limited, and the child found to be delinquent rather
than guilty of committing a criminal offense to avoid stigmatizing a youth.
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neither the intensity nor the duration of intervention because each
child's "real needs" differed and no limits could be defined in ad-
vance. Dispositions were indeterminate, nonproportional, and con-
tinued for the duration of minority. The individualized justice of
the juvenile court was as variable as that administered by the Kadi
in the marketplace "who renders ... decisions without any refer-
ence to rules or norms but in what appears to be a completely free
evaluation of the particular merits of every single case." 34 As re-
flected in juvenile sentencing practices, an extremely wide frame
of relevance and an absence of controlling rules or norms charac-
terized this type of decision-making.
From the court's inception, juvenile court judges could also
sentence young offenders by denying them the protective jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court and subjecting them to adult criminal
courts.
35
[L]egislation in many states permitted juvenile court judges to
transfer any given case to an adult court, an allowance that
they occasionally took advantage of when the charge was espe-
cially serious. The Cook County juvenile court, for example,
asked grand juries to weigh the merits of a regular indictment
in about fifteen cases a year-a figure which represented no
more than one percent of its cases but did include the most no-
torious. Typically these boys were older (sixteen, not twelve)
and were arrested for "deeds of violence, daring holdups, car-
rying guns, thefts of considerable amounts, and rape." These
transfers probably muted criticism of the courts for coddling
the criminal.36
Thus, waiver was always a possible disposition and its availability
also protected juvenile courts from political criticism by allowing
the transfer to adult courts of highly visible or serious cases.
Although judicial waiver reflected individualized sentencing
practices from its inception, the decision-making process has been
substantially revised. In Kent v. United States,37 the United States
Supreme Court held that some procedural due process protections
must be accorded juveniles in judicial waiver determinations,
thereby formalizing this special sentencing decision.38 Kent also
anticipated many of the same procedural safeguards afforded by In
34. Matza, supra note 17, at 118 (quoting Max Weber on Law in Economy and
Society at xlvii (Max Rheinstein ed. 1954)). Kadi justice is administered by a Mos-
lem judge. The dispostion of each case depends on the unique skills and experience
of each judge. Id.
35. Rothman, supra note 29, at 285.
36. Id.
37. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
38. Id. at 554.
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re Gault's later formalization of delinquency adjudications.3 9 Sub-
sequently, in Breed v. Jones,40 the Court applied the double jeop-
ardy provisions of the Constitution to the adjudication of juvenile
offenses,41 thereby requiring the states to make the juvenile or
adult dispositional determination before proceeding against a
youth on the merits of the charge.
Although Kent and Breed provide the formal procedural
framework within which the judicial waiver/sentencing decision
occurs, the substantive bases of the waiver decisions pose the prin-
cipal difficulty. Most jurisdictions provide for discretionary waiver
based on a juvenile court judge's assessment of a youth's amenabil-
ity to treatment or dangerousness as indicated by (1) age, (2) the
treatment prognosis, as reflected in clinical evaluations, and (3)
the threat to others, as reflected in the seriousness of the present
offense and prior record.42  Legislatures specify waiver factors
with varying degrees of precision, typically adopting the substan-
tive criteria appended to the Supreme Court's decision in Kent.
43
39. Compare Kent with In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Kent, the Supreme
Court concluded that the loss of the special protections of the juvenile court-pri-
vate proceedings, confidential records, and protection from the stigma of a criminal
conviction-through a waiver decision was a "critically important" action that re-
quired a hearing, assistance of counsel, access to social investigations and other
records, and written findings and conclusions capable of review by a higher court.
Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-57 (1966). "Tlhere is no place in our system of law for reach-
ing a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony-without hearing,
without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons." Id. at 554.
See generally Monrad Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of
Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev. 167.
40. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
41. In Breed v. Jones, the Court held that the protections of the double jeop-
ardy clause of the fifth amendment prohibited adult criminal re-prosecution of a
youth after a prior conviction in juvenile court. At issue was the applicability of
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to delinquency proceedings.
The Court resolved the question by establishing a functional equivalence between
an adult criminal trial and a delinquency proceeding. The Court described the vir-
tually identical interests implicated in a delinquency hearing and a traditional crim-
inal prosecution-"anxiety and insecurity," a "heavy personal strain," and the
increased burdens as the juvenile system became more procedurally formalized. Id.
at 528-29. In light of the potential consequences of a delinquency proceeding, the
Court concluded that there was little basis to distinguish it from a traditional adult
criminal prosecution. Id. at 530.
42. See Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy, supra note 7, at 198;
Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 526; Feld, Principle of Of-
fense, supra note 6, at 490; see, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 260.125 (1988).
43. Although the Supreme Court decided Kent on procedural grounds, in an ap-
pendix to its opinion, the Court indicated some of the substantive criteria that a ju-
venile court might consider:
An offense falling within the statutory limitations... will be waived if
it has prosecutive merit and if it is heinous or of an aggravated charac-
ter, or-even though less serious--if it represents a pattern of re-
peated offenses which indicate that the juvenile may be beyond
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As sentencing criteria, determining whether a youth is ame-
nable to treatment or dangerous implicates some of the most fun-
damental and difficult issues of penal policy and juvenile
jurisprudence. The underlying legislative assumptions-that effec-
tive treatment programs for serious or persistent juvenile offend-
ers exist, that classification systems can differentiate the
treatment potential or dangerousness of various youths, and that
validated and reliable diagnostic tools enable a clinician or juvenile
court judge to determine the proper disposition for a particular
youth--are all highly problematic and controversial. 44 Similarly,
legislation authorizing a judge to waive juvenile court jurisdiction
because a youth poses a threat to public safety requires the judge
to predict the youth's dangerousness despite compelling evidence
that the "capacity to predict future criminal behavior [is] quite be-
rehabilitation under Juvenile Court procedures, or if the public needs
the protection afforded by such action.
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge
in deciding whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such of-
fenses will be waived are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, vi-
olent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against
property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons espe-
cially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e. whether there is ev-
idence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indict-
ment....
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in
one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are
adults....
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined
by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional atti-
tude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previ-
ous contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement
agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of pro-
bation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the like-
lihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to
have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services
and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 app. at 566-67 (1966).
Whether Kent required some formal sentencing criteria as due process norms
is unclear. The Court has never confronted the substantive issue, however, because
most jurisdictions have adopted the Kent factors either through legislation or judi-
cial gloss. Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 503-11; Feld, Reference of Ju-
venile Offenders, supra note 5, at 525-26.
44. See, e.g., Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 529-46;
Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7; Feld, Delinquent Ca-
reers and Criminal Policy, supra note 7, at 198-202; Feld, Principle of Offense,
supra note 6, at 489; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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yond our present technical ability."45
Judicial waiver statutes, couched in terms of amenability to
treatment or dangerousness, are effectively broad, standardless
grants of sentencing discretion characteristic of the individualized,
offender-oriented dispositional statutes of the juvenile court. They
are the juvenile equivalent of the discretionary capital punishment
statutes condemned by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Geor-
gia.46 The addition of long lists of supposed substantive standards,
such as the one offered in Kent, do not provide objective indicators
to guide discretion. "[Tihe substantive standards are highly subjec-
tive, and the large number of factors that may be taken into con-
sideration provides ample opportunity for selection and emphasis
in discretionary decisions that shape the outcome of individual
cases."47 Indeed, such catalogues of amorphous and contradictory
factors reinforce juvenile court judges' exercise of virtually unre-
viewable discretion by allowing selective emphasis of one set of
factors or another to justify any disposition.48
Like individualized sentencing statutes, the subjectivity in-
herent in waiver administration permits a variety of inequities and
disparities to occur without any effective check. The empirical re-
ality is that judges cannot administer these discretionary statutes
on a consistent, even-handed basis.49 Within a single jurisdiction,
waiver statutes are inconsistently interpreted and applied from
county to county and from court to court.50 Hamparian's nation-
45. Morris, supra note 18, at 62; see also Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders,
supra note 5, at 540-46. See generally Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of
Dangerousness, 6 Crime & Just. 1 (1985).
46. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Professor Frank Zimring has described the waiver of
serious juvenile offenders as "the capital punishment of juvenile justice." Franklin
Zimring, Notes Toward a Jurisprudence of Waiver, in Readings in Public Policy,
supra note 8, at 193. Zimring notes that "[clapital punishment in criminal justice
and waiver in juvenile justice share four related characteristics: (1) low incidence,
(2) prosecutorial and judicial discretion, (3) ultimacy, and (4) inconsistency with the
premises that underlie the system's other interventions." Id.
47. Zimring, supra note 46, at 195.
48. "Collectively, 'lists' of this length rarely serve to limit discretion or regular-
ize procedure. By giving emphasis to one or two of the guidelines, a judge can usu-
ally justify a decision either way." Task Force on Sentencing Policy Toward Young
Offenders, Twentieth Century Fund, Confronting Youth Crime 56 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter Confronting Youth Crime] (background statement by Franklin Zimring).
49. See infra notes 83-121 and accompanying text analyzing empirical data of
transfer decisions in Minnesota in 1986. See generally Feld, Reference of Juvenile
Offenders, supra note 5, at 546-56; Between Two Worlds, supra note 8.
50. See, e.g., Supreme Court Juvenile Justice Study Commission, Report to the
Minnesota Supreme Court 61-78 (1976) (waiver is used for three different purposes
in different parts of the state); Leonard Edwards, The Case for Abolishing Fitness
Hearings in Juvenile Court, 17 Santa Clara L. Rev. 595, 611-12 (1977) (county by
county disparity); Between Two Worlds, supra note 8, at 150-98 (county by county
disparity within states); James Heuser, Juveniles Arrested for Serious Felony
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wide analysis of waiver in 1978 provides compelling evidence that
judicial waiver practices are inherently arbitrary, capricious, and
discriminatory.5l In addition to "justice by geography," there is ev-
idence that a juvenile's race may influence the waiver decision.52
Bortner concludes that a juvenile court's organizational and polit-
Crimes in Oregon and "Remanded" to Adult Criminal Courts: A Statistical Study
30 (1985) (county by county variation in Oregon-"it appears that some counties
may be over- or under-represented in terms of the proportion of cases per unit of
risk population").
51. Between Two Worlds, supra note 8, at 102-07. Among the states that rely
on judicial waiver for the transfer decision, the rates of waiver vary from a high of
13.5 to a low of .07 per 10,000 youths at risk; youths in Oregon have nearly 200
times the probability of being waived for trial as adults as do youths in Montana.
Id. at 102-03.
Fagan analyzed waiver decisions involving a sample of violent youths in four
different jurisdictions and concluded that there were no uniform criteria guiding
the transfer decision. Jeffrey Fagan, Elizabeth Piper & Martin Forst, The Juvenile
Court and Violent Youth: Determinants of the Transfer Decisions (Nov. 1986)
[hereinafter Juvenile Court and Violent Youth].
What we found was a rash of inconsistent judicial waiver decisions,
both within and across sites. Inconsistent and standardless decisions
for youth retained in juvenile court are not surprising in a judicial con-
text which cherishes individualized justice .... But for youth who may
be tried and convicted in criminal court and subjected to years of im-
prisonment in a secure institution, such subjective decision making is
no longer justified.
Id. at 20-21. Fagan, et al., tested seven offense and offender variables to identify
determinants of the transfer decision within a sample of violent youths. They re-
port that "[n]either multivariate analysis nor simple explorations identified strong
or consistent determinants of the judicial transfer decision. Except for a relation-
ship between extensive prior offense history and the transfer decision, none of the
identified variables could significantly describe differences between youth who
were or were not transferred." Id. at 19.
52. See generally Joel Eigen, The Determinants and Impact of Jurisdictional
Transfer in Philadelphia, in Readings in Public Policy, supra note 8; Between Two
Worlds, supra note 8, at 104-05; Robert Keiter, Criminal or Delinquent?: A Study
of Juvenile Cases Transferred to the Criminal Court, 19 Crime & Delinq. 528
(1973).
Hamparian reported that nationally, 39% of all youths transferred in 1978 were
black and that in 11 states, minority youths constituted the majority of juveniles
waived. Between Two Worlds, supra note 8, at 104-05. Without being able to con-
trol for the seriousness of the present offense and prior record, however, it is not
possible to ascribe the disproportionate over-representation of minority youths in
waiver proceedings to racial discrimination per se. Eigen reports an interracial ef-
fect in transfers; black youths who murder white victims are significantly more at
risk for waiver. Eigen, supra, at 339-40. But cf McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987) (Statistical evidence that black defendants whose victims are white are dis-
proportionately at risk for execution does not result in violations of due process or
equal protection.).
Fagan's study of transfer of violent youths also found substantial disparities in
the rates of minority and white offenders. Although there was no direct evidence
of sentencing discrimination, "it appears that the effects of race are indirect, but
visible nonetheless." Jeffrey Fagan, Martin Forst & Scott Vivona, Racial Determi-
nants of the Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent Youth in Criminal
Court, 33 Crime & Delinq. 259, 276 (1987) [hereinafter Racial Determinants of Ju-
dicial Transfer].
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ical characteristics explain more about the waiver decision than
does the inherent dangerousness or intractability of a youth.53
[P]olitical and organizational factors, rather than concern for
public safety, account for the increasing rate of remand. In ev-
idencing a willingness to relinquish jurisdiction over a small
percentage of its clientele, and by portraying these juveniles as
the most intractable and the greatest threat to public safety,
the juvenile justice system not only creates an effective sym-
bolic gesture regarding protection of the public but it also ad-
vances its territorial interest in maintaining jurisdiction over
the vast majority of juveniles and deflecting more encompass-
ing criticisms of the entire system.54
Idiosyncratic differences in judicial philosophies and the lo-
cale of a waiver hearing are far more significant for the ultimate
transfer decision than is any inherent quality of the criminal act or
characteristic of the offending youth.55 The inconsistency in the
interpretation and application of waiver statutes is hardly surpris-
ing in view of the inherent subjectivity of the dispositional issue,
the lack of effective guidelines to structure the decision, and the
latent as well as manifest functions the process serves. In short,
judicial waiver statutes reveal all of the defects characteristic of in-
dividualized, discretionary sentencing schema.
B. Legislative Exclusion of Offenses
Legislative waiver, the principal alternative to judicial
waiver, excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction youths who are
charged with specified offenses or who have records of prior adju-
dications in addition to the present offense. 56 Because legislatures
created juvenile courts, legislatures may modify the court's juris-
diction as they please. Appellate courts have consistently upheld,
against both due process and equal protection challenges, legisla-
tion that excludes from juvenile court jurisdiction youths who
commit certain offenses.57
Statutes mandating the prosecution of a youth as an adult on
the basis of the offense charged or the offense history, however,
are inconsistent with the individualized rehabilitative philosophy
of juvenile courts. Although legislatures may subordinate individ-
53. M.A. Bortner, Traditional Rhetoric, Organizational Realities: Remand of
Juveniles to Adult Court, 32 Crime & Delinq. 53, 69-70 (1986).
54. Id.
55. Between Two Worlds, supra note 8, at 101-07.
56. See Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 511-19 (summary of offense
exclusion legislation).
57. Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 556-71; see, e.g.,
United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert denied, 412 U.S. 909
(1973).
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ualized treatment considerations to other social control policy
objectives, they have often failed to make clear which of several
alternative sentencing policies-retribution, selective incapacita-
tion, or deterrence-they sought to achieve in redefining
jurisdiction.
The primary justification for waiver is the need for minimum
confinement periods longer than the maximum sanctions typically
available to juvenile court, i.e., a sixteen-year-old could not be con-
fined "for long enough" if juvenile court retained jurisdiction.5 8
IThe justification for waiver is singular: transfer to criminal
court is necessary when the maximum punishment available
in juvenile court is clearly inadequate.... [Tihe standard for
making a waiver decision is a determination that the maxi-
mum social control available in juvenile court falls far short of
the minimum social control necessary if a particular offender
is guilty of the serious crime he is charged with.59
Fagan reports that the length of time from age at offense to the
jurisdictional age limit, rather than the offender's prior record, ap-
pears to dictate the judicial transfer decision; judges transfer
juveniles where the seriousness of the offense requires a longer
sentence than that available in the juvenile court.60
If the rationale for adult prosecution is the need for mini-
mum lengths of confinement in excess of the juvenile court's max-
imum remaining jurisdiction, then the theories of punishment
which structure the choice of waiver criteria are retribution and
selective incapacitation. Packer propounds an integrated theory of
punishment that emphasizes both retributive and utilitarian
goals.61 Retributive punishment is necessary because it limits the
imposition of criminal sanctions to the culpable and blameworthy,
introduces a degree of certainty to the process, and confines the is-
sue of waiver to the most serious types of criminal conduct for
which the longest terms of confinement are authorized.62
By itself, retribution theory may be overly inclusive and pro-
duce the undesirable infliction of harm without any offsetting util-
itarian gain. Selective incapacitation is an appropriate theory to
couple with retribution because there is a limited class of offenders
whose persistent history of wrongdoing indicates the inadequacy of
58. Zimring, supra note 46, at 197. See generally Institute of Judicial Admin.-
ABA Joint Comm'n on Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to Transfer
Between Courts 3, 19-21 (1977).
59. Zimring, supra note 46, at 201.
60. Juvenile Court and Violent Youth, supra note 51, at 11.
61. Packer, supra note 16, at 62-70.
62. See id. at 68.
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juvenile court sanctions.63 Persistent offending may evidence
greater culpability-the actor was on notice that his or her behav-
ior was condemned yet repeated it. In the allocation of scarce pe-
nal resources, selective incapacitation of persistent offenders64
constitutes a reasonable rationing strategy and may have the inci-
dental benefit of preventing some future crimes.6 5
Translating these jurisprudential premises into legislative
waiver criteria requires an explicit acknowledgement of the actual
sentencing goals being pursued. A legislature seeking retribution
could rationally conclude that an older youth who commits a par-
ticularly heinous offense deserves to be treated as an adult and ex-
clude that youth from the juvenile system. If the legislative goal
in redefining juvenile court jurisdiction is to selectively incapaci-
tate chronic offenders, however, excluding offenders solely on the
basis of the seriousness of their present offense may not be the
most effective strategy. The seriousness of a first offense provides
little basis for distinguishing those youths who are likely to recidi-
vate from those who are not.66 The number of contacts a young
offender has with the juvenile justice system, however, is the most
reliable indicator of the likelihood of future criminality.6 7
63. Jacqueline Cohen, Incapacitation as a Strategy for Crime Contro" Possibili-
ties and Pitfalls, 5 Crime & Just. 1 (1983).
64. Although selective incapacitation attempts to identify those offenders with
a substantially greater probability of future criminal involvement, juveniles waived
pursuant to this strategy are waived not on the basis of a prediction regarding the
future, but rather because of their past conduct. By confining the predictor criteria
to past criminal history, many of the legitimate civil liberties objections to over-pre-
diction, false positives, and preventive incarceration may be avoided. See Feld, Ref-
erence of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5; Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal
Policy, supra note 7, at 208-10; Von Hirsch, supra note 15, at 84.
65. See generally Cohen, supra note 63; Deterrence and Incapacitation: Esti-
mating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates (Alfred Blumstein, Jac-
queline Cohen & Daniel Nagin eds. 1978); Peter Greenwood, Selective
Incapacitation (1982).
66. The available evidence on the development of delinquent careers indicates
that many youths engage simultaneously in both trivial and serious violations of the
law, and that police arrest and process youths primarily as a function of the fre-
quency, rather than the seriousness, of their delinquent behavior. See, e.g., Marvin
Wolfgang, Robert Figlio & Thorsten Sellin, Delinquency in a Birth Cohort (1972)
[hereinafter Delinquency in a Birth Cohort]; see also Marvin Wolfgang, From Boy
to Man, From Delinquency to Crime (1987); Donna Hamparian, Richard Schuster,
Simon Dinitz & John Conrad, The Violent Few (1978); Paul Strasburg, Violent De-
linquents (1978).
67. Studies of the development of delinquent careers suggest that serious of-
fenders are best identified by their persistence rather than by the nature of their
initial offense. See sources cited supra note 66. The criminal career research indi-
cates that young offenders do not "specialize" in particular types of crime, that seri-
ous crime occurs within an essentially random pattern of delinquent behavior, and
that a small number of chronic delinquents are responsible for many offenses and
most of the violent offenses committed by juveniles. See sources cited supra note 66
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Although most youths desist after one or two contacts, there is a
substantial probability that chronic offenders will continue to com-
mit delinquent acts.68 Thus, a legislature attempting to identify se-
rious offenders should emphasize an offender's cumulative
persistence rather than just the current offense.6 9
Legislatively defining adulthood entails not only an empirical
judgment as to who the persistent and serious offenders are, but
an explicit legislative value choice about the quantity and quality
of deviance that will be tolerated within the juvenile system before
a more punitive response is mandated. Because, in most cases,
youths will not receive better rehabilitative services in the adult
correctional system than are available in the juvenile system, the
decision to transfer a youth to the adult process must ultimately be
defensible on the grounds of retribution or selective incapacitation.
From the community's perspective, the principal values of exclu-
sion are enhanced community protection through the greater se-
curity and longer sentences available in the adult system,
increased general deterrence through greater certainty and visibil-
ity of consequences, and reaffirmation of fundamental norms. Be-
cause most offenders, adults and juveniles alike, do not require
penal incarceration, legislative exclusion is appropriate only when
a juvenile offender's record of persistence and the seriousness of
the present offense warrant confinement for a substantially longer
term than could be imposed on him or her as a juvenile.
To satisfy these community values, a legislature might ad-
dress the questions of an offender's record of recidivism or the se-
riousness of the current offense directly by emphasizing offense
criteria, rather than addressing these public safety issues circui-
tously and less visibly through judicial inquiry into amenability to
treatment or dangerousness. The value judgment about when pub-
lic safety justifies waiver further reflects the tension between ret-
ribution and utilitarian prevention. Whereas a retributive choice
and authorities cited therein. Although it is not possible to predict violence on the
basis of prior offense records, a prior record of violence or crime is the best indica-
tor of similar behavior in the future. See, e.g., Peter Greenwood, Differences in
Criminal Behavior and Court Responses Among Juvenile and Young Adult De-
fendants, 7 Crime & Just. 151, 164-65 (1986) (hereinafter Greenwood, Criminal Be-
havior and Court Responses].
68. 1 Criminal Careers and "Career Criminals" 18, 75-76 (Alfred Blumstein,
Jacqueline Cohen, Jeffrey Roth & Christy Visher eds. 1986) [hereinafter Criminal
Careers]; Joan Petersilia, Criminal Career Research: A Review of Recent Evidence,
2 Crime & Just. 321, 343-45 (1980); Delinquency in a Birth Cohort, supra note 66, at
247-49.
69. Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 565; Feld, Delin-
quent Careers and Criminal Policy, supra note 7; Greenwood, Criminal Behavior
and Court Responses, supra note 67, at 164-65.
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might dictate automatic exclusion of any juvenile who committed a
heinous offense-intentional homicide, rape, armed robbery, as-
sault with a weapon or with substantial injury to the victim-a
choice based on prevention suggests that the serious offender
should be excluded only if shown to be a chronic offender.
In addition to defining offense categories or histories, the leg-
islature also needs to prescribe a minimum age of criminal liability
for excluded offenders-sixteen, fifteen, or fourteen. 70 At what
age is it appropriate to hold a youth as responsible for a serious
crime as an eighteen-year-old adult? "There is no compelling or
convincing evidence that persons aged sixteen to eighteen differ
significantly from persons aged eighteen and over in their capacity
to understand the outcomes and consequences of their acts....
[S]erious crime should be treated seriously regardless of the of-
fender's age." 7 1
Offense categories are necessarily crude and imprecise classi-
fications. Many youths charged and tried as adults will ultimately
plead to or be found guilty of lesser, nonexcluded offenses. Again,
if the rationale of legislative exclusion is that youths who commit
certain "worst case" offenses should be sentenced as adults, then
regardless of the initial charge, if an individual is subsequently
found not to have committed one of the offenses excluded from ju-
venile court jurisdiction, he or she should be returned to juvenile
court for disposition.72
Ultimately, the question of waiver involves the appropriate
dispositions of serious young offenders who, chronologically, hap-
pen to be juveniles. The traditional distinction between "treat-
ment" as a juvenile and "punishment" as an adult is based on an
arbitrary legislative line that has no criminological significance
other than its legal consequences. The inconsistencies in sentenc-
ing policies between the juvenile and adult systems often make fu-
70. See, e.g., Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 609-11.
71. Confronting Youth Crime, supra note 48, at 25 (Marvin Wolfgang dissenting
from the Task Force's report).
72. Where the rationale for transfer, whether judicial or legislative, is based on
the seriousness of the offense and the need for extended confinement, then perma-
nent divestiture of juvenile court jurisdiction should be based upon the offense for
which a youth is ultimately convicted, not the one initially charged.
Return to juvenile court is certainly consistent with the statutory poli-
cies providing for differential treatment on the basis of offense com-
mitted. Moreover, the policy reasons that militate against subjecting
the prosecutor's charging decision to prior judicial review do not pre-
clude examining it after the fact. Finally, in the absence of a transfer-
back provision, legislative waiver statutes lend themselves to
prosecutorial abuse via overcharging.
Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 564.
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tile any attempt to rationalize social control and the response to
serious deviance among the young.73 These inconsistencies arise
from the legislative failure to recognize that young people are con-
tinually maturing; they are not irresponsible children one day and
responsible adults the next, except as a matter of law. Moreover,
there is a strong correlation between age and criminal activity,
with the rates of many kinds of criminality peaking in mid to late
adolescence. 74 Chronic offenders are disproportionately involved
in criminal activity, committing their first offenses in their early to
mid-teens, persisting in criminal activity into their twenties, and
then gradually reducing their criminal involvement.75 "[Tihose in-
dividuals who are arrested as juveniles are three to four times
more likely to be arrested as adults than are those who are not ar-
rested as juveniles." 76 An integrated sentencing policy requires co-
ordinated responses to young offenders on both sides of the line
distinguishing juveniles from adults, based on a standardized
means of identifying and subsequently sanctioning the chronic and
ultimately serious young criminal.
Despite the criminal career research findings, criminal sen-
tencing policies tend to maximize sanctions for older offenders
whose criminal activity is declining, while withholding sanctions
from chronic younger offenders at the point when their rate of ac-
tivity is increasing or at its peak.77 When juvenile offenders ap-
pear in criminal court for the first time as adult offenders, they
are typically accorded the leniency of adult first offenders.78 Ana-
73. Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Policy, supra note 7, at 205.
74. Criminal Careers, supra note 68, at 22-23.
75. Criminal Careers, supra note 68, at 18, 22-24; Greenwood, Criminal Behav-
ior and Court Responses, supra note 67, at 163; Petersilia, supra note 68, at 357-58.
76. Greenwood, Criminal Behavior and Court Responses, supra note 67, at 163.
77. Barbara Boland & James Wilson, Age, Crime, and Punishment, 51 Pub. In-
terest 22, 25 (1978); Barbara Boland, Fighting Crime: The Problem of Adolescents,
71 J, Crim. L. & Criminology 94 (1980); Feld, Delinquent Careers and Criminal Pol-
icy, supra note 7, at 205-06; Peter Greenwood, Joan Petersilia & Franklin Zimring,
Age, Crime, and Sanctions: The Transition from Juvenile to Adult Court (1980)
[hereinafter Age, Crime, and Sanctions].
78. Greenwood, et al., examined dispositions of youths tried as adults in several
jurisdictions and found substantial variation in sentencing practices. Age, Crime,
and Sanctions, supra note 77, at viii; Peter Greenwood, Allan Abrahamse & Frank-
lin Zimring, Factors Affecting Sentence Severity for Young Adult Offenders 12-14
(1984) [hereinafter Factors Affecting Sentence Severity]. In New York City and in
Franklin County (Columbus), Ohio, they found that youthful offenders faced a sub-
stantially lower chance of being incarcerated than did older offenders, that youth-
ful violent offenders got lighter sentences than older violent offenders, and that for
approximately a two-year period after becoming adults, youths were the benefi-
ciaries of informal lenient sentencing policies in adult courts. Factors Affecting
Sentence Severity, supra, at 12-14.
This "punishment gap" appears in other studies as well. See supra note 77; in-
fra note 82. Although the seriousness of a juvenile's offense is the primary deter-
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lyzing the relationships between waiver offenses and eventual dis-
positions, Hamparian concludes that "[t]here seems to be a direct
correlation between low percentage of personal offenses waived
and high proportion of community dispositions (as opposed to in-
carceration)." 79 Moreover, even within the more serious categories
of crimes, age-related patterns of seriousness also affect eventual
sentences. Younger offenders are less likely to be armed with
guns, to inflict as much injury, or to steal as much property.8 0 In
short, the differences in sentencing philosophies between the juve-
nile and adult justice systems continue to work at cross-purposes
minant of the severity of the adult sentence imposed in Washington, D.C., "youth,
at least through the first two years of criminal court jurisdiction, is a perceptible
mitigating factor." Confronting Youth Crime, supra note 48, at 63 (background
statement by Franklin Zimring).
Hamparian's nationwide study of waived youths sentenced as adults found that
the majority of juveniles judicially transferred were subsequently fined or placed
on probation. Between Two Worlds, supra note 8. Even among those confined, 40%
had maximum sentences of one year or less. Id. at 114. In part, these relatively
lenient dispositions reflect the fact that less than one-third of those youths waived
judicially were convicted of offenses against the person and that the largest propor-
tion were property offenders, primarily burglars. Id. at 106-09.
Heuser's evaluation of the adult sentences received by waived juvenile felony
defendants in Oregon shows that the vast majority were property offenders rather
than violent offenders, and that as a consequence only 55% of the youths convicted
of felonies were incarcerated, while the rest received probation. Heuser, supra note
50, at 22-23. Even this rate is inflated by the fact that youths convicted of violent
offenses were almost invariably incarcerated. "The incarceration rate is much
higher for violent crimes (75.0%) and much lower for property crimes (51.5%)." Id.
at 23. Moreover, even of those youths incarcerated as adults, nearly two-thirds re-
ceived jail terms of one year or less and served an average of about eight months.
Id. at 26-27. Juveniles with extensive prior records who are convicted of felonies
within juvenile court would receive approximately the same dispositions. See Min-
nesota Dep't of Corrections, Juvenile Release Guidelines 4 (Sept. 1980).
Gillespie and Norman's study of youths waived in Utah between 1967 and 1980
reports that the majority of juveniles who were transferred were not charged with
violent offenses, and a majority of those convicted as adults were not imprisoned.
L. Kay Gillespie & Michael Norman, Does Certification Mean Prison: Some Prelim-
inary Findings from Utah, Juv. & Fain. Ct. J., Fall 1984, at 23, 33-34. In her evalu-
ation of waiver practices, Bortner reports that less than orie-third of the transferred
juveniles convicted in adult proceedings were sentenced to prison. She concludes
that
a significant number of juveniles remanded to adult court are returned
to the community immediately or shortly after conviction. The [possi-
ble reasons] include their first-time offender status in the adult sys-
tem, the relatively minor nature of their offenses, and the brevity of
their offense histories compared to adult offenders .... [R]emanded
juveniles are not being incarcerated uniformly nor for long periods of
time.
Bortner, supra note 53, at 57 (emphasis in original).
79. Between Two Worlds, supra note 8, at 112.
80. Age, Crime, and Sanctions, supra note 77, at 5-9; M. Joan McDermott &
Michael Hindelang, Juvenile Criminal Behavior in the United States: Its Trends
and Patterns (1981).
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even when youths make the transition from one system to the
other.
The punishment gap-the system's failure to intervene most
strongly in the lives of chronic and active criminal offenders-oc-
curs because of qualitative differences in the nature of juveniles'
offenses, the differences between the criteria for juvenile court re-
moval and criminal court sentences, and the failure to integrate ju-
venile and adult criminal records for sentencing purposes.81
Legislative definition of the criteria for exclusion of offenders
from juvenile court can better integrate juvenile removal and
adult sentencing practices and reduce the gap in intervention.8 2
81. Adult criminal courts tend to rely on the seriousness of the present offense
and the prior adult criminal history in making sentencing decisions. Their failure
to include the juvenile component of the offender's criminal history stems from the
confidential nature of juvenile court records, the functional and physical separation
of the respective court services staffs, and the sheer bureaucratic ineptitude that
makes the maintenance of an integrated system for tracking offenders and compil-
ing complete criminal histories extremely difficult. Age, Crime, and Sanctions,
supra note 77; Greenwood, Criminal Behavior and Court Responses, supra note 67,
at 54-58; Joan Petersilia, Juvenile Record Use in Adult Court Proceedings: A Survey
of Prosecutors, 72 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1746, 1763-68 (1981). In a recent study
of the effects of juvenile offense histories on adult sentencing practices, Greenwood
reports that "local sentencing policies have much more of an impact on how young
adults are treated, than any modest variations in the availability of juvenile
records." Factors Affecting Sentence Severity, supra note 78, at 36.
In Minnesota, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines include a "juvenile compo-
nent" in the adult criminal history score. See Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Comm'n, Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines & Commentary II.B.4 (rev. ed. 1988), re-
printed in Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244 app. (West Supp. 1989). Juvenile felony convic-
tions of 16 or 17 year-old youths are included in the adult criminal history score up
to a maximum of one point. Id. As a result of this limitation and the sentencing
guidelines' focus on the seriousness of the present offense, however, an extensive
prior record as a juvenile has no independent effect on the first adult sentence. See
id. at IV (sentencing guidelines grid).
82. Legislation which reduces judicial sentencing discretion by focusing on the
most serious offenses or coupling serious present offenses with prior records also
increases the likelihood of significant adult sentences for serious young offenders.
Hamparian's survey of waived youths reported that the largest group was property
offenders, and that the majority of all waived offenders received non-incarcerative
dispositions. Between Two Worlds, supra note 8, at 106-12. This "punishment gap"
has been reported in other studies as well. Age, Crime, and Sanctions, supra note
77, at 12-39; Bortner, supra note 53, at 56-58; Confronting Youth Crime, supra note
48, at 57-64.
It is instructive to compare the sentences of juveniles tried as adults in jurisdic-
tions where they are targeted as serious offenders with the sentences received in
more discretionary jurisdictions. Thomas and Bilchik's study of waived youths' dis-
positions in Florida, a concurrent jurisdiction/direct file state, reported that the ma-
jority of youths tried as adults were older males with prior delinquency
adjudications and multiple present felony charges, typically property offenses.
Thomas & Bilchik, supra note 12, at 470-74. Unlike Hamparian's findings, however,
approximately two-thirds of these Florida juveniles were sentenced to substantial
terms of imprisonment. Compare id. at 473-74 with Between Two Worlds, supra
note 8, at 112-17. Rudman, et al., studied the processing and dispositions of "violent
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An incongruity results when youths are waived from juvenile
court because they presumably require longer sentences than the
juvenile system can provide, but are then placed on probation as
adults. An adult sentencing court would be in a better position to
respond effectively to chronic juvenile violators if waiver decisions
were keyed to offense seriousness and criminal history rather than
to amorphous clinical considerations. Focusing on cumulative
criminal activity, whether as a juvenile or an adult, may maximize
social control of the chronic offender.
III. The Empirical Consequence of Judicial Waiver/Sentencing
Decisions: Uneven Exercise and "Justice by Geography"
Although cases of serious but isolated offenses by youths
challenge the relative emphases to be placed on the characteristics
of the offender or the seriousness of the offense, even less extreme
cases raise difficult issues of sentencing policy. The highly variable
exercise of judicial sentencing discretion constitutes a critical defi-
ciency of the waiver process. In actual practice, a statewide law of
general applicability has very different meanings depending, ini-
tially, upon the prosecutor's discretionary decision whether to file
a certification motion and, subsequently, upon each judge's applica-
tion of the vague legislative language to the myriad facts of the
specific case. This section of the article examines the highly varia-
ble, idiosyncratic results of these exercises of discretion.
Certification for adult prosecution is a rare juvenile court dis-
juvenile offenders"-defined as youths with a present violent offense and a prior
felony adjudication-tried and sentenced as juveniles or as adults in several juris-
dictions. Cary Rudman, Eliot Hartstone, Jeffrey Fagan & Melinda Moore, Violent
Youth in Adult Court: Process and Punishment, 32 Crime & Delinq. 75 (1986)
[hereinafter Violent Youth in Adult Court]. Of the youths targeted as violent and
convicted in criminal courts, over 90/d were incarcerated, and their sentences were
five times longer than those youths retained in juvenile court. Id. at 91-92. They
conclude that "because the criminal justice system is not limited by the jurisdic-
tional age considerations of the juvenile justice system, violent youths convicted
and sentenced in criminal court receive considerably longer sentences, in adult se-
cure facilities, than their counterparts retained by the juvenile court." Id. at 89.
Heuser's study of transferred juvenile felony defendants in Oregon reported
that 75% of the youths convicted of violent offenses were incarcerated, and that
youths committed to prison received average sentences in excess of six years.
Heuser, supra note 50, at 24, 28-29. Greenwood, et al., compared the sentences of
young adult armed robbers and burglars with the sentences of juveniles and older
adults to ascertain the prevalence of a "leniency gap." Although not directly com-
parable to the studies of dispositions of waived juveniles, they report that young
adult armed robbers were sentenced as severely as younger and older offenders on
the basis of the seriousness of their present offense, but that the effects of prior
juvenile records on young adult dispositions were inconsistent across jurisdictions.
See Factors Affecting Sentence Severity, supra note 78, at 52-54; Greenwood Crimi-
nal Behavior and Court Responses, supra note 67, at 172.
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position which occurs in only a miniscule fraction of all petitioned
delinquency cases. Table 1 summarizes the total numbers and per-
Table 1
Juvenile Delinquency and Adult Certification Petitions Filed
Year = > 1985 1986 1987
TOTAL NUMBER OF
DELINQUENCY PETITIONS N = 22772 23761 25141
% = 99.4 99.3 99.3
TOTAL NUMBER OF PETITIONS
FILED FOR CERTIFICATION AS
ADULT N = 127 142 167
% = .6 .6 .7
Source: Minnesota State Planning Agency
centages of delinquency and waiver petitions filed in Minnesota in
1985, 1986, and 1987. The cases of virtually all juveniles charged
with delinquency are heard and disposed of in juvenile court; a pe-
tition accompanied by a motion for reference for adult prosecution
is a very unusual occurrence. Although there is a steady upward
trend in the total number of petitions certified for adult prosecu-
tion over the years-127, 142, 167-their proportion of the total
number of delinquency petitions filed has remained relatively con-
stant at less than 1%.
The data presented in Tables 2-8 are derived from a larger
study of juvenile justice administration in Minnesota in 1986.83
This study uses data collected by the Minnesota Supreme Court's
Judicial Information System (SJIS) for delinquency and status of-
fense cases processed in 1986.84 The data files are housed in the
83. For a more extensive discussion of the data collection and coding protocols
see Barry Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of
When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminol-
ogy 1185, 1209-14 (1989) [hereinafter Feld, Right to Counsel].
84. The Minnesota Supreme Court's Judicial Information System (SJIS) com-
piles statewide statistical data on juvenile delinquency and status petitions filed an-
nually, as well as dependency, neglect, and abuse cases. The data are based on the
petitions filed; there is no data base that includes the cases referred to intake,
county probation, or juvenile courts that were handled informally. The data col-
lected on a case-specific basis include offense behavior, representation by counsel,
court processing information, entries each time a court activity occurs, any continu-
ation or change in the status of a case and types of dispositions. In most counties,
this information is obtained from the juvenile courts' own automated computer sys-
tem and is entered by court administrators in each county who are trained by the
state court administrator. Because the juvenile courts themselves rely upon this
computerized information for record-keeping, scheduling hearings, maintaining
court calendars, and monitoring cases, the information is highly reliable.
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National Juvenile Court Data Archive (NJCDA) at the National
Center for Juvenile Justice.85 The sample in this study consists of
individual juveniles against whom petitions were filed for delin-
quency and status offenses. It excludes all juvenile court referrals
for abuse, dependency, or neglect, as well as routine traffic viola-
tions. Only formally petitioned delinquency and status cases are
analyzed; the SJIS does not include data on cases referred to juve-
nile courts but handled informally.
More commonly, the NJCDA's unit of count is a "case dis-
posed of" by a juvenile court.88 Unlike Table 1, which reflects the
total numbers of petitions filed, the data reported in Tables 2-8 are
based on the 17,195 individual juveniles whose cases were formally
petitioned in Minnesota's juvenile courts in 1986.87 The annual
data collected by the Minnesota SJIS do not include any family,
school, or socioeconomic status variables, or a youth's prior record
of offenses, adjudications, or dispositions. Each youth processed in
a county's juvenile court, however, receives a unique identifying
number which is used for all subsequent purposes. The NJCDA
created a youth-based file by merging the 1984, 1985, and 1986 an-
nual data tapes and matching the county/youth identification
number across years to reconstruct a juvenile's prior record of pe-
titions, adjudications, and dispositions. Thus, the data reported
herein reflect a youth's most current referral to juvenile court as
well as all prior petitions, adjudications, and dispositions for at
least the preceding two years or more. 8
85. The National Juvenile Court Data Archive (NJCDA) is housed at the Na-
tional Center for Juvenile Justice (NCJJ) which is the research arm of the Na-
tional Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges. The Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, has supported the juve-
nile court data archive for the past decade. Currently, more than 30 states contrib-
ute their annual juvenile court data tapes to the NJCDA.
86. The NJCDA unit of count is "cases disposed." Each "case" represents a
youth whose case is disposed of by the juvenile court for a new delinquency/status
referral. A case is "disposed" when some definite action is taken, whether dismis-
sal, warning, informal counseling or probation, referral to a treatment program, ad-
judication as a delinquent with some disposition, or transfer to an adult criminal
court. Ellen Nimick, Howard Snyder, Dennis Sullivan & Nancy Tierney, Juvenile
Court Statistics 1983, at 6 (1987). As a result of multiple referrals, one child may be
involved in several "cases" during a calendar year. Moreover, each referral may
contain more than one offense or charge. The multiple referrals of an individual
child may tend to overstate the numbers of youths handled annually. Multiple
charges in one petition may appear to understate the volume of delinquency in a
jurisdiction. Because the unit of count is case disposed, one cannot generalize from
the NJCDA data either the number of individual youths who are processed by the
courts or the number of separate offenses charged to juveniles.
87. Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 83, at 1212.
88. The youth identification numbers are unique within a county, but not
within the entire state. A youth who has delinquency referrals in several different
counties will receive separate identification numbers in each county. Thus, the va-
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In this study, the offenses reported by the SJIS were re-
grouped into six analytical categories.8 9 The "felony/minor" of-
fense distinctions provide an indicator -of the seriousness of the of-
fense;90 offenses are also classified as against person, against
property, other delinquency, and status. Combining person and
property offenses with the felony and minor distinctions produces
a six-item offense scale.91 When a petition alleges more than one
offense, the youth is classified on the basis of the most serious
charge.9 2 This study uses two indicators of the severity of previous
riable "prior referrals" may be slightly inflated by a juvenile with multiple refer-
rals in several counties, and slightly reduced by juveniles whose prior records
consist of only one referral in each of several counties.. Such multi-county cases ap-
pear to be rare. A cross-tabulation of youths' county of residence with the county
of adjudication reveals between 97-99% overlap. Because Minnesota lacks a state-
wide juvenile information system, a juvenile court at sentencing normally has in-
formation regarding only prior referrals in its own county. Thus, the variable
"prior referrals" includes the information routinely available to and relied upon by
the courts themselves.
89. The National Juvenile Court Data Archive has developed a seventy-eight
item coding protocol that recodes the raw offense data provided by the states into a
uniform format. This permits delinquency offense data from several different orig-
inal formats to be recoded for analysis using a single conversion program.
90. The distinctions are also legally relevant for the right to counsel analyses
for which the data file was originally created. Compare, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (indigent defendant must be afforded counsel in felony proceed-
ing) with Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (indigent defendant must be afforded
counsel in state court misdemeanor proceeding only if imprisonment is imposed).
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
The Minnesota Criminal Code contains three categories of offenses: felony
(punishable by more than one year of imprisonment); misdemeanor (punishable by
a maximum of 90 days); and gross misdemeanor (an intermediate offense which is
neither a felony nor a misdemeanor). See Minn. Stat. § 609.02 (2)-(4) (1988). The
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines assign misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors 1/4
and 1/2 points respectively and felonies one point in the computation of an of-
fender's criminal history score. Minnesota Sentencing Guildelines Comm'n, Minne-
sota Sentencing Guidelines & Commentary II.B.1, II.B.3 (rev. ed. 1988), reprinted
in Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244 app. (West Supp. 1989). In the present coding schema,
gross midemeanors are classified as "minor" offenses to preserve the felony
distinction.
91. The "felony offenses against person" generally correspond to the FBI's Uni-
form Crime Report classification of Part I violent felonies against the person-
homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. "Felony offenses against property"
generally include Part I property offenses-burglary, felony theft, and auto theft.
"Minor offenses against person" consist primarily of simple assaults, and "minor of-
fenses against property" consist primarily of larceny, shoplifting, or vandalism.
"Other delinquency" includes a mixed bag of residual offenses-drug offenses pri-
marily involving possession of marijuana, public order offenses, as well as offenses
against the administration of justice, primarily contempt of court or violations of
probation or parole. "Status" offenses are the juvenile offenses that are not crimi-
nal for adults-runaway, truancy, curfew, ungovernability, and the like. See gener-
ally FBI, Uniform Crime Reports: 1986, at 331-32 (1987).
92. When a petition contains multiple allegations, there is no way to separate
whether they are multiple charges arising out of the same offense transaction or
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dispositions: out-of-home placement and secure confinement.93
Out-of-home placement includes any disposition in which the child
is taken from his or her home and placed, for example, in a group
home, in foster care, in an in-patient psychiatric or chemical de-
pendency treatment facility, or in a secure institution.94 Secure
confinement is a numerically substantial subset of all out-of-home
placement but includes only commitments to the county-level in-
stitutions or state training schools.95
Although Table 1 indicates that county prosecutors filed a to-
tal of 142 certification petitions in 1986, Table 2 shows that only
eighty-three individual juveniles actually were certified for adult
prosecution. The difference between the two reflects the fact that
several separate petitions may be filed against a juvenile in one
certification proceeding.96 In addition, not every juvenile for
whom prosecutors seek waiver is ultimately referred for adult
prosecution; trial judges do exercise their discretion.97 While the
coding protocols of the SJIS data do not permit comparisons be-
tween certified juveniles and those juveniles for whom waiver was
sought but denied, they do allow for comparisons between
juveniles certified for adult prosecution and those whose cases
were disposed of in juvenile courts.
whether they represent several offenses committed on different occasions which
were simply petitioned in the same document.
93. The NJCDA has developed a 22 item conversion program that transforms
the state-specific dispositions into a uniform national format. The NJCDA staff
speaks directly with the states' data collectors and reporters to determine how spe-
cific dispositions or programs should be classified-out-of-home and secure--within
the national format.
94. While many inpatient psychiatric or chemical dependency placements are in
secure facilities, these commitments are classified as "out-of-home" to distinguish
them from more traditional institutional confinement in training schools.
95. In the juvenile justice context, secure confinement is somewhat of a misno-
mer, because most juvenile training schools and institutions do not rely upon locks,
bars, fences, or armed guards to the same degree as do adult maximum security in-
stitutions. Compare, e.g., Gresham Sykes, Society of Captives (1958) (maximum se-
curity prisons) with Barry Feld, Neutralizing Inmate Violence: Juvenile Offenders
in Institutions (1977) (juvenile correction institutions).
96. See, e.g., In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955 (Olnsted County, Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr.
21, 1988) (four delinquency petitions); In re T.S.E., 379 N.W.2d 99, 101 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985)(three delinquency petitions).
97. See, e.g., Hennepin County Juvenile Court, Juvenile Court Report: Update
1986, at 3. (Of the 67 motions for certification filed by the county attorney in Hen-
nepin County in 1986, 38 were granted, 12 were denied, and 17 were pending.)
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Table 2
Present Offense and Prior Record of Juveniles, 1986
TOTAL RETAINED CERTIFIED
JUVENILES JUVENILES JUVENILES
OVERALL
N( )
FELONY
N( )
Felony Offense
Against Person
N( )
Felony Offense
Against Property
N( )
MISDEMEANOR
N( )
Minor Offense
Against Person
N( )
Minor Offense
Against Property
N( )
Other Delinquency
N( )
STATUS OFFENSE
N( )
OFFENSE HISTORY
0 Prior Offenses
N( )
1 - 2 Prior Offenses
N( )
3 - 4 Prior Offenses
N( )
5+ Prior Offenses
N( )
* The total numbers
offense data is missinj
offense, as are 4 or .5
100.0
(17195)*
18.4
(3153)
4.0
(680)
14.4
(2473)
54.4
(9298)
5.2
(889)
32.3
(5554)
16.6
(2855)
27.2
(4649)
71.9
(12359)
23.0
(3962)
3.9
(669)
99.5
(17112)
18.1
(3095)
3.8
(656)
14.3
(2439)
54.2
(9279)
5.2
(887)
32.4
(5547)
16.6
(2845)
27.2
(4647)
72.1
(12339)
22.9
(3922)
3.8
(654)
1.2 1.2
(205) (205)
of juveniles includes a total of 95 for whom the present
g. Of the retained juveniles 91 or .5% are missing the present
b of the certified juveniles.
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Table 2 shows that waiver is a highly exceptional juvenile
court disposition, occuring in 0.5% of all cases and involving only
eighty-three individual juveniles. For the entire state, 18.4% of all
juveniles were charged with offenses that would be felonies if
committed by adults, 54.4% were charged with minor offenses such
as misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors, and 27.2% were
charged with non-criminal status offenses. For the entire state,
only 4.0% of juveniles were charged with felony offenses against
the person, such as assault or robbery, and 14.4% were charged
with felony offenses against property, such as burglary. By con-
trast, a comparison of the certified and retained juveniles reveals
that more than two-thirds (69.9%) of certified juveniles were
charged with felony offenses, predominantly felony offenses
against property. In all, slightly more than one-quarter of all certi-
fied juveniles were charged with serious offenses against the per-
son while the largest single category of certified juveniles were
charged with felony property offenses. This is consistent with
other research that also reports that serious property offenders,
rather than violent juveniles, predominate in the waiver
populations.98
Thus, the cumulative exercises of prosecutorial and judicial
discretion produce a certified population which consists of substan-
tially more serious offenders than the general delinquency popula-
tion. At the same time, however, more than one-quarter of all
certified juveniles are charged with relatively minor offenses.
Moreover, vastly more juveniles who were charged with serious of-
fenses were retained by the juvenile system than were waived for
adult prosecution. For example, of those youths charged with fel-
ony offenses against the person, 656 were retained as juveniles
while only 24 were certified as adults.
Table 2 also reports the prior records of retained and certified
juveniles. For the state as a whole, 71.9% of all petitioned
juveniles appeared in court for their first time, while 23.0% had
one or two prior appearances, 3.9% had three or four prior appear-
ances, and only 1.2% had five or more prior referrals. A compari-
son of the retained and certified juveniles reveals that only about
one-third (33.7%) of certified juveniles appeared for the first time,
while the vast majority had been referred to court previously. By
contrast, nearly three-quarters (72.1%) of the retained juveniles
appeared for the first time in juirenile court. Again, it is important
to note that the vast majority of juveniles with substantial prior
records were tried as juveniles rather than as adults. For example,
98. See sources cited supra note 78.
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Table 3
Present Offense Controlling for Prior Records (1986)
PRIORS = > 0 1-2 3-4 5+
PRESENT OFFENSE:
FELONY OFFENSE
AGAINST PERSON
Retained
% = 3.9 3.6 4.6 1.5
N ( ) (482) (141) (30) (3)
Certified
%= 32.1 27.5 26.7 -
N ( )(9) (11) (4) -
FELONY OFFENSE
AGAINST PROPERTY
Retained
% = 13.3 16.0 17.6 27.3
N ( ) (1639) (629) (115) (56)
Certified
%= 35.7 42.5 46.7 -
N ( ) (10) (17) (7) -
MINOR OFFENSE
AGAINST PERSON
Retained
% = 4.9 5.9 6.0 7.3
N ( ) (600) (233) (39) (15)
Certified
%= 7.1 - - -
N( (2) - - -
MINOR OFFENSE
AGAINST PROPERTY
Retained
% = 33.1 31.0 30.9 22.9
N ( ) (4084) (1214) (202) (47)
Certified
%= 7.1 7.5 13.3 -
N( ) (2) (3) (2) -
OTHER DELINQUENCY
Retained
% = 16.3 17.5 17.0 19.0
N ( ) (2007) (688) (111) (39)
Certified
%= 10.7 17.5 - -
N( ) (3) (7) - -
STATUS
Retained
%= 28.0 25.5 23.4 21.0
N ( ) (3452) (999) (153) (43)
Certified
%= 3.6 - 6.7 -
N ( ) (1) - (1) -
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of those juveniles with three or four prior referrals, 654 were re-
tained as juveniles while only 15 were certified as adults.
Table 3 compares the retained and certified juveniles on the
basis of their present offense and prior records simultaneously.
Unfortunately, formal offense categories may be too general to
capture all of the important qualitative distinctions regarding the
seriousness of the present offense (i.e., extent of victimization,
presence of a weapon, value taken, etc.). As a result of the rela-
tively small number of certified youths, certified juveniles charged
with homicide may be compared within an offense category to re-
tained youths charged only with aggravated assault or armed rob-
bery. The greater homogeneity of offenses among certified and
retained juveniles charged with felony offenses against property,
such as burglary or auto theft, allows more certain analysis.
While recognizing that there may be some qualitative differ-
ences within offense categories, comparing retained and certified
juveniles on the basis of their present offense and prior record
reveals that far more juveniles charged with similar offenses and
with comparable prior records are retained than are certified.
Thus, for those juveniles charged with felony offenses against
property-the largest proportion of certified juveniles (41.0%, Ta-
ble 2)-ten youths making their first juvenile court appearance
were certified while 1,639 were not. Similarly, for those with one
or two prior referrals, seventeen were certified while 629 were re-
tained. At every level of offense, far more juveniles, including
many possessing more extensive prior records, were retained than
were certified. Thus, while Table 2 indicates some degree of selec-
tivity in identifying the certified population (greater selection of
serious property offenders), Table 3 reveals that certified juveniles
may be rather similar to retained juveniles. Either great arbitrari-
ness, or factors other than present offense and prior record must
account for this sentencing decision.
Table 4 summarizes the age of retained and certified
juveniles. As would be expected, certification is reserved almost
exclusively for "older" juveniles. While juveniles aged fifteen or
under account for 48.8% of the total juvenile court clientele, only
one fifteen-year-old juvenile (1.2%) was certified. By contrast,
more than three-quarters (77.2%) of certified juveniles were seven-
teen or eighteen at the time of the waiver proceedings. In short,
the potential period of confinement remaining within juvenile
court jurisdiction appears to influence substantially the decision to
waive a juvenile. Again, however, it is important to note that
while fifty-two seventeen-year-old youths were certified, 4,382
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Table 4
Waiver and Age of Juvenile
TOTAL
JUVENILES
6.1
(1042)
7.8
(1346)
13.8
(2373)
21.1
(3636)
22.6
(3888)
25.8
(4434)
2.8
(476)
RETAINED
JUVENILES
CERTIFIED
JUVENILES
6.1
(1042)
7.9
(1346)
13.9
(2373)
21.2
(3635)
22.6
(3870)
25.6
(4382)
2.7
(464)
other seventeen-year-olds were retained as juveniles, re-emphasiz-
ing the infrequent exercise of the waiver decision.
Although age, present offense, and prior record are among
the factors influencing juvenile court sentencing decisions, other
variables that affect a youth's disposition include a juvenile's pre-
trial detention status and any sentences imposed during prior ap-
pearances.9 9 Table 5 summarizes the detention status and prior
dispositions of retained and certified juveniles.
For the entire state, 7.6% of all juveniles received one or
more detention hearings.1 0 0 Fewer retained juveniles (7.4%), as
99. See, e.g., Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 83, at 1305-11 & Table 47; see
also Terence Thornberry & R.L. Christenson, Juvenile Justice Decision Making as
a Longitudinal Process, 63 Soc. Forces 433, 442 (1984); John Henretta, Charles Fra-
zier & Donna Bishop, The Fffects of Prior Case Outcomes on Juvenile Justice Deci-
sion-Making, 65 Soc. Forces 554, 561 (1986) (confirming Thornberry &
Christenson's finding that the outcome of current cases is highly dependent on
prior dispositions).
100. Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 83, at 1252-56 & Table 15.
AGE
12>
N(
N(
N(
N(
N(
N(
N(
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Table 5
Pretrial Trial Detention Status and Previous Dispositions
TOTAL RETAINED CERTIFIED
JUVENILES JUVENILES JUVENILES
DETAINED OVERALL
% = 7.6 7.4 45.8
N ( ) (1309) (1271) (38)
FELONY
%= 14.9 14.2 55.2
N ( ) (470) (438) (32)
Felony Offense
Against Person
% = 24.3 22.9 62.5
N ( ) (165) (150) (15)
Felony Offense
Against Property
% = 12.3 11.8 50.0
N ( ) (305) (288) (17)
MISDEMEANOR
%= 6.5 6.5 26.3
N ( ) (606) (601) (5)
Minor Offense
Against Person
% = 11.4 11.4 -
N ( ) (101) (101)
Minor Offense
Against Property
% = 6.0 6.0 14.3
N ( ) (332) (331) (1)
Other Delinquency
% = 6.1 5.9 40.0
N( ) (173) (169) (4)
STATUS OFFENSE
% = 4.8 4.8 -
N ( ) (221) (221)
PRIOR DISPOSITION
Home Removal
% = 8.8 8.6 48.2
N ( ) (1505) (1465) (40)
Secure Confinement
% = 5.7 5.6 43.4
N ( ) (985) (949) (36)
contrasted with certified juveniles (45.8%), were detained before
trial. The seriousness of the present offense and the length of the
prior record are among the factors associated with the initial deci-
sion to detain.3O1 Logically, because certified juveniles, as a group,
constitute a somewhat more serious class of offenders than re-
101. See id. at 1299-1305 & Table 43.
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tained juveniles, a larger proportion of them are detained. A juve-
nile's pre-trial detention status also has an independent effect on
the severity of the subsequent disposition.102 It is not surprising
that a larger proportion of juveniles who ultimately were certified
were initially detained. Although previous research indicates that
there are no obvious formal rationales for the initial detention de-
cision,10 3 apparently similar, albeit unmeasurable, factors influence
both the initial detention decision and the later sentencing or
waiver decisions. To the extent that the present offenses and prior
records of certified juveniles are similar to those of many retained
juveniles, how does a court decide to detain a youth? What criteria
guide these decisions?
Because a juvenile's "amenability to treatment" is assessed, in
part, by his or her reponsiveness to previous intervention, one
would expect retained juveniles to have experienced fewer severe
sentences than their certified counterparts. In part, a previous dis-
position reflects the combined effects of age and a prior record:
certified juveniles were typically older' 0 4 and with somewhat more
extensive delinquency involvements.105 Recall that only 28.1% of
Minnesota's delinquents had one or more prior delinquency refer-
rals. For the entire state, only 8.8% of all juveniles were removed
from their homes on their previous appearance, and only 5.7%
were confined. Table 5 compares the previous dispositions of re-
tained juveniles to their certified counterparts. Nearly half of the
certified juveniles had been removed from their homes (48.2%).or
confined (43.4%) as a result of their previous juvenile court ap-
pearances. In contrast, of those retained only 8.6% had been re-
moved from their homes and 5.6% had been confined. Thus, a far
larger proportion of certified youths than retained juveniles had
102. Id. at 1305-11 & Table 47.
103. See, e.g., Robert Coates, Alden Miller & Lloyd Ohlin, Diversity in a Youth
Correctional System 65-67, 101-04 (1978)(current offense, offense history, and prior
experience in youth corrections do not appear to be strongly related to the deten-
tion decision); Charles Frazier & Donna Bishop, The Pretrial Detention of
Juveniles and Its Impact on Case Dispositions, 76 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1132,
1143 (1985)("[N]either legal variables nor sociodemographic characteristics can pre-
dict the probability of being detained.").
Research in Minnesota concluded:
Detention constitutes a highly arbitrary and capricious process of
short-term confinement with no tenable or objective rationale. Once it
occurs, however, it then increases the likelihood of additional post-ad-
judication sanctions as well. In operation, detention almost randomly
imposes punishment on some juveniles for no obvious reason and then
punishes them again for having been punished before.
Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 83, at 1338.
104. See supra Table 4, p. 34.
105. See supra Table 2, p. 30.
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previous exposure to juvenile court "rehabilitative" efforts, albeit
without apparent success. Significantly, the majority of certified
youths had not received intensive intervention prior to their
waiver.
The data presented in Tables 2-5 indicate that as a class, certi-
fied juveniles differed from their retained counterparts. They
were more likely to be older youths, to be charged with more seri-
ous offenses, to possess more extensive prior records, to have pre-
viously received a severe juvenile disposition, and to be detained
pending their certification proceedings. At the same time, how-
ever, the proportional comparisons mask the reality that in abso-
lute numerical terms the great majority of juveniles, with
seemingly identical offense and prior record characteristics as
their certified peers, are retained. Within each offense category,
little seems to differentiate the certified juveniles from the larger
delinquent population from which they are selected.
The preceding analyses focused on bivariate relationships be-
tween selected variables while controlling for the effects of one or
more other variables. The next analysis uses ordinary least
squares multiple regression procedures to analyze the relation-
ships among a number of independent variables and to assess the
relative impact of each independent variable on the dependent va-
riable--certification-while controlling for the effects of other
variables. Using regression techniques allows one to estimate and
evaluate the strength and significance of the independent contribu-
tions of a number of factors to the explanation or prediction of the
dependent variable.106 Multiple regression estimates the relation-
ships between the dependent variable and the independent vari-
ables by extracting from each variable the effects of the others.
The standardized regression coefficient for each independent vari-
able ("beta") expresses the relationship between each independent
variable and the dependent variable, once the effects of the other
variables have been taken into account. The relative importance
of each independent variable in predicting the dependent variable
is determined by the size of the beta, or standardized regression,
coefficient. Where two or more independent variables are mea-
sured in different units, standardized coefficients provide the only
way to compare the relative effect on the dependent variable of
each independent variable. Table 6 reports the standardized beta
106. See generally Fred Kerlinger & Elazar Pedhazur, Multiple Regression in
Behavioral Research (1973); David Kleinbaum & Lawrence Kupper, Applied Re-
gression Analysis and Other Multivariable Methods (1978); Michael Lewis-Beck,
Applied Regression: An Introduction (1980).
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Table 6
Regression Model of Factors Influencing Certification Decision
STANDARDIZED
BETA
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES COEFFICIENT MULTIPLE R R2
PREVIOUS SECURE
CONFINEMENT
DISPOSITION .097* .113 .013
DETENTION - .082* .143 .020
AGE - .073* .160 .026
PRESENT OFFENSE
SEVERITY .058* .171 .030
NUMBER OF OFFENSES
ALLEGED -. 033* .174 .031
* p < .001
coefficient, the multiple regression correlation coefficient ("R"),
and R2 . The R 2 summarizes the amount of variation in the depen-
dent variable that is explained by the independent variables in-
cluded in the regression equation. The R2 has the additional virtue
of being interpretable as a straightforward percentage. For exam-
ple, an R2 =.10 means that 10% of the variation in the dependent
variable is explained by the joint operation of the independent
variables.
A forward, stepwise regression equation107 was computed us-
ing SPSS for the dichotomous dependent variable "certified."' 0 8
107. Norman Nie, C. Hadlai Hull, Jean Jenkins, Karin Steinbrenner & Dale
Bent, SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (2d ed. 1975). Using stan-
dard regression techniques, each variable is added to the regression equation in a
separate step after the influence of all other variables has been calculated. The in-
crement in R' due to the addition of that variable is taken as the component of vari-
ation attributable to that variable. Forward stepwise inclusion enters independent
variables only if they meet certain statistical criteria (e.g., p <.05); the respective
contribution of each variable to the explained variance determines the order of in-
clusion. Id. at 345.
108. Because the dependent variable is a dichotomous, categorical variable rather
than interval variable, log linear or logit approaches to multivariate analyses may
be preferable to ordinary least squares regression. See, e.g., Lawrence Cohen &
James Kluegel, Determinants of Juvenile Court Dispositions: Ascriptive and
Achieved Factors in Two Metropolitan Courts, 43 Am. Soc. Rev. 162, 164 (1978)
(criticizing earlier research on juvenile justice decision-making for using inadequate
data analytic techniques). Thornberry reanalyzed the data in his earlier study and
concluded that the findings "are remarkably similar to the ones reached in this au-
thor's earlier study, even though the earlier work was based on less sophisticated
analytic techniques." Terence Thornberry, Sentencing Disparities in the Juvenile
Justice System, 70 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 164, 170-71 (1979). Because the sam-
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The independent variables included the present offense, prior rec-
ord, and court-process variables. 109 As previously noted, the SJIS
data include only court-processing variables and the study cannot
control for the influence of other factors that juvenile courts may
deem relevant to sentencing such as family status, socioeconomic
status, clinical evaluations, school or work involvement, and the
like.
Table 6 presents the regression equation for the decision to
certify a juvenile for adult prosecution. The first variable entering
the equation is a previous secure confinement disposition. A juve-
nile's pretrial detention status, age, the seriousness of the present
offense, and the number of offenses alleged in the certification pe-
tition also enter the equation. The bivariate analyses revealed that
a substantial proportion of certified juveniles had received previ-
ous juvenile court dispositions (Table 5) and had been detained
pending their certification hearing. Once the regression model
controls for the effect of a previous disposition, there is no addi-
tional influence of a prior record of delinquency as such on the de-
cision to certify.1' 0 Thus, it appears to be previous intervention,
not simply a prior record of referrals, that influences the waiver
decision.
The regression equation also confirms the bivariate analyses
that revealed that certified juveniles tended to be older (Table 4)
and charged with more serious offenses (Table 2). The number of
offenses alleged in the petition is an additional indicator that the
certified juveniles were charged with more serious offenses.X"'
ple size in this study is very large (N=17,195), the data robust, and the complexity
of the data requires multivariate analyses, ordinary least squares regression was
used. See Kleinbaum & Kupper, supra note 106, at 45-46, 137-38.
109. The independent variables and their coding, which effects the signs of the
beta coefficients, include: a previous secure confinement disposition (1=yes, 2=no);
a previous out-of-home placement (1=yes, 2=no); age (1= 12 or younger, through
7=18 years of age); detention (1=no, 2=yes); priors (1=none, through 4=5 or
more); present offense (1=felony offense against person, through 6=status);
number of offenses at disposition (1=none, through 6=five or more).
110. Other studies have also reported that a prior record, as such, is not as signif-
icant a variable in the transfer decision as might be expected. For example, Jeffrey
Fagan, Martin Forst, and T. Scott Vivona, Racial Determinants of the Judicial
Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 Crime & De-
linq. 259 (1987), report:
The surprising finding that prior record did not enter either the local
or aggregate models contradicts the widespread assumptions that
judges weigh offense history (either length or severity) as a primary
criterion for amenability to treatment. But the finding on age of onset
as a predictor of transfer suggests that judges may view this factor as a
proxy for length of career or prior rehabilitative efforts.
Id. at 276.
111. See Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 83, at 1280-82 & Table 31. "A sub-
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While statistically significant, the beta weights are approximately
equal and very modest, indicating that no single factor strongly in-
fluences the certification decision.
The most surprising result of the regression equation is how
little of the variance in sentencing it explains, only 3.1%. By con-
trast, for more routine sentencing in juvenile courts,
[a]ll of the independent variables account for 24.5% of the vari-
ance in home removal and 22.4% of the variance in institution-
alization. Of the independent variables, a previous disposition
of removal from the home is the most powerful determinant of
the present decision to remove a juvenile from the home
(beta=.357). Similarly, a previous disposition of secure con-
finement is the most powerful determinant of the present de-
cision to incarcerate a youth (beta=.354).112
Although a previous sentence of institutional confinement is the
most powerful variable influencing certification, its explanatory
power is only about one-quarter of that for the more routine deci-
sion to confine a juvenile (beta=.097 versus .354). In short, while
the regression equation identifies the seemingly appropriate vari-
ables, they do not explain much of the variance in the decision.
There is very little systematic variation among the independ-
ent variables that explains those few juveniles who are certified.
With so few certifications, no single factor or group of factors ex-
plains why or how certified juveniles are selected from the larger
universe of juveniles. Again, this interpretation is consistent with
the earlier observation that the present offenses and prior records
of certified juveniles reveal no obvious differences compared to the
records of those retained (Table 3).
Although previous disposition, age, and the seriousness of the
present offense bear some relationship to the waiver decision,
nearly all of the variance in certifying juveniles cannot be ex-
plained. With respect to the large amount of unexplained varia-
tion in juvenile court sentencing practices, commentators have
observed that "the juvenile justice process is so ungoverned by
procedural rules and so haphazard in the attribution of relevance
to any particular variables or set of variables that judicial disposi-
tions are very commonly the product of an arbitrary and capricious
stantially larger proportion of cases involving felony offenses and offenses against
the person involve multiple offenses at disposition: 30.4% of felony offenses against
the person; 30.2% of felony offenses against property; and 18.0% of minor offenses
against the person." Id. at 1281. Because most certified juveniles were charged with
felony offenses, the presence of multiple charges is as expected.
112. Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 83, at 1305-06.
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decision-making process."113 The absence of any explanatory rela-
tionship between legal variables and certification may be inter-
preted as true "individualized justice," where every youth receives
a unique disposition tailored to his or her individual needs. An
equally plausible interpretation, however, is that no rationale ex-
ists in waiver decision-making; that the decision consists of little
more than intuition, guesswork, and hope, constrained marginally
by the youth's present offense and prior sentence. If such is the
case, individualization is simply a euphemism for arbitrary and ca-
pricious decision-making. While such a finding with respect to
routine decision-making is rather troubling,114 it is even more dis-
turbing because waiver is the most significant sentencing decision
that juvenile court judges make.
Discretionary waiver raises problems in addition to the appar-
ent lack of distinction between those few juveniles who are certi-
fied and the vast majority who are retained as juveniles. Similarly
situated juveniles in different parts of the state do not share an
equal risk of transfer. Tables 7 and 8 summarize urban, suburban
and small urban, and rural variations in certification decision-
making.115
113. Ineke Marshall & Charles Thomas, Discretionary Decision-Making and the
Juvenile Court, Juv. & Faro. Ct. J., Aug. 1983, at 47, 57.
114. Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 14, at 879-91.
115. The classification of counties as urban, suburban or small urban, and rural
depends on the concept of Standardized Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). An
SMSA is an integrated economic and social unit with a large population nucleus.
An SMSA always includes a central city with a population of 50,000 or greater, and
the remainder of the county in which the central city is located. In addition, when
the relationships between the central city and contiguous counties meet specified
criteria of metropolitan character and integration, an SMSA also includes the con-
tiguous counties and their smaller cities (generally with populations less than
50,000). Thus, an SMSA includes the central cities, the suburban cities, and the
remainder of the area within the SMSA counties but outside the suburban cities.
Howard Snyder & Ellen Nimick, City Delinquents and Their Country Cousins: A
Description of Juvenile Delinquency in Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Areas,
2 Today's Delinq. 45, 67 (1983).
For purposes of this study, counties were classified as urban if they were lo-
cated within an SMSA, had one or more cities of 100,000 inhabitants, and had a
county juvenile population aged 10-17 of at least 50,000 youths. Hennepin County
(Minneapolis) and Ramsey County (St. Paul) are classified as urban counties.
Counties were classified as suburban or small urban if they were located
within a metropolitan SMSA (suburban) or, if within their own SMSA (small ur-
ban), had one or more cities of 25,000 to 100,000 inhabitants, and had a county juve-
nile population aged 10-17 of between 7,500 and 50,000 youths. The suburban
counties meeting the SMSA and juvenile population criteria include: Anoka, Da-
kota, Scott, Washington, and Wright Counties. The small urban counties and their
principal cities include: Olmsted (Rochester), St. Louis (Duluth), and Stearns (St.
Cloud).
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Table 7
Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in Waiver by Present
Offense and Prior Record, 1986
URBAN SUBURBAN RURAL
TOTAL DELINQUENTS
% = 36.5 21.4 42.1
N( ) (6273) (3681) (7241)
WAIVED JUVENILES
% = 42.2 24.1 33.7
N ( ) (35) (20) (28)
FELONY
% = 88.6 60.0 53.6
N ( ) (31) (12) (15)
Felony Offense
Against Person
% = 37.1 15.0 28.6
N ( ) (13) (3) (8)
Felony Offense
Against Property
% = 51.4 45.0 25.0
N ( ) (18) (9) (7)
MISDEMEANOR
% = 5.7 25.0 42.9
N( ) (2) (5) (12)
Minor Offense
Against Person
% = - - 7.1
N( ) - - (2)
Minor Offense
Against Property
% = 2.9 10.0 14.3
N( ) (1) (2) (4)
Other Delinquency
% = 2.9 15.0 21.4
N( ) (1) (3) (6)
STATUS
% = - 10.0 -
N( ) - (2)
PRIOR RECORDS
0 Offenses
% = 37.1 15.0 42.9
N ( ) (13) (3) (12)
1 - 2 Offenses
% = 48.6 55.0 42.9
N ( )(17) (11) (12)
3 - 4 Offenses
% = 14.3 30.0 14.3
N( ) (5) (6) (4)
5+ Offenses
N( - -
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The first two rows of Table 7 show the geographic location of
Minnesota's delinquents and the subset of certified youths. The
largest plurality of certified juveniles are in urban counties
(42.2%). While rural juveniles account for 42.1% of the total deli-
quent population, they contribute only 33.7% of the certified juve-
nile population. In part, this is because rural youths generally
commit less serious offenses and have less extensive prior r&cords
than do their urban cousins. 116
An examination of the offenses for which juveniles are certi-
fied reveals an interesting geographic pattern. Urban youths are
certified almost exclusively for felonious misconduct (88.6%), with
the largest proportion involving felony offenses against property,
such as burglary (51.4%). The smallest proportion of certified
juveniles charged with felony offenses (53.6%) occurred in rural
counties. Furthermore, in rural counties, youths charged with fel-
ony offenses against the person (28.6%), rather than property,
predominate. While only 5.7% of waived urban youths are certi-
fied for non-felony charges, 35.0% of waived suburban youths are
certified for misdemeanors or status offenses, as are 42.9% of rural
youths. Thus, a distinctive geographic pattern emerges in which
rural youths charged with less serious offenses are at greater risk
for transfer than are their similarly-situated urban peers." 7 Table
All of the remaining counties in Minnesota were classified as rural because
they are located outside of an SMSA, have no principal city of at least 25,000 in-
habitants, and have a total juvenile population aged 10-17 of less than 7,500.
116. Cf. Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 83, at 1215-16 & Table 1; see also Sny-
der & Nimick, supra note 115, at 45; Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Pre-
vention, U.S. Dep't of Justice, OJJDP Update on Statistics: The Juvenile Court's
Response to Violent Crime 1 (Jan. 1989) ("Violent offense referrals were more
common in large urban counties: the violent offense referral rate in large counties
was three times the rate in small counties and 31 percent greater than that in me-
dium-sized counties.").
117. A study of geographic variations in certification practices in Minnesota con-
ducted a decade earlier yielded similar findings. Supreme Court Juvenile Justice
Study Comm'n, Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court 61-78 (Nov. 1976) (on file
with Law & Inequality); see Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at
552 (summarizing the findings of the Supreme Court's Study Commission).
[T]he Commission found pronounced differences in certification prac-
tices in urban and rural counties throughout Minnesota. According to
the study, the reference or certification process is used for three dif-
ferent purposes or objectives:
In Hennepin County certifications are requested for youths
who, in the judgment of the office of the county attorney, repre-
sent substantial threats to the public safety or cannot be effec-
tively handled with the resources currently available through
the juvenile court process. This purpose or objective is consis-
tent with legislative intent in enacting the enabling statute. A
second purpose for which certification is utilized in a number of
courts is to attempt to insure that the offender will be subject to
correctional or rehabilitative efforts beyond his 18th birthday.
Law and Inequality
7 also reports on the prior records of certified juveniles in the vari-
ous geographic locales. While 62.9% of urban juveniles and 85.0%
of suburban youths had one or more prior delinquency referrals,
only 57.1% of rural youths had a prior referral. Thus, rural youths
were certified on the basis of less serious present offenses and with
less extensive prior records.
The geographical disparities in certification are even more ap-
parent when a youth's prior juvenile court dispositions are ex-
amined. Recall from Table 6 that a previous secure confinement
disposition was the most powerful variable explaining the certifica-
tion decision. Table 5 reported that 48.2% of all certified juveniles
previously had been removed from their homes and 43.4% of certi-
fied juveniles had been institutionalized. Table 8 presents the pre-
vious sentences imposed upon certified youths in the different
geographic locales. Both suburban and urban certified juveniles
had received extensive prior juvenile court intervention in the
form of removal from their homes or institutional confinement.
By contrast, certified rural youths had experienced far less previ-
ous intervention. Only 28.6% had been. exposed to any out-of-
home treatment program, including only 25.0% who had been in-
stitutionalized previously. To the extent that a prior disposition
provides a surrogate for a record of prior referrals, it is apparent
that certified rural youths are substantially less criminally in-
volved than are their urban counterparts.
Thus youths who are approaching their 18th birthday at the
time of their offense may be certified because some juvenile
court judges feel that a youth committed to the Commission of
Corrections as a juvenile "automatically" will be released from
state jurisdiction when he turns 18. A third purpose for which
certification is utilized is to allow the imposition of a sanction
such as a fine or short jail sentence upon juveniles who commit-
ted relatively minor offenses and who, it is felt, are not in need
of probation or other treatments available through the juvenile
court.
The discretion afforded by this typical waiver statute thus lends itself
to a variety of applications, which, in turn, can lead to inequities. For
example, analysis of waiver decisions in a sample of counties through-
out Minnesota showed that urban offenders considered for certifica-
tion had generally committed more serious offenses and had more
extensive prior records than their rural counterparts. In addition to
more recorded offenses, certified urban youths had records extending
over a longer period of time and more appearances on delinquency pe-
titions than did rural youths. Yet, despite the substantially greater se-
riousness of the present offense and the longer and more extensive
prior records of urban youths, rural youngsters were much more likely
to be certified for adult prosecution.
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Table 8
Previous Dispositions of Urban, Suburban, and Rural Certified
Juveniles
URBAN SUBURBAN RURAL
HOME REMOVAL
% = 48.6 75.0 28.6
N ( ) (17) (15) (8)
SECURE CONFINEMENT
% = 45.7 65.0 25.0
N ( ) (16) (13) (7)
These urban/rural disparities are perhaps understandable in
terms of the relative tolerance with which various communities
view deviant behavior. Because crime, especially serious crime, is
heavily concentrated in urban areas, urban courts are provided
with a frame of reference and perspective for responding to seri-
ous offenders not available to courts in rural counties, which ap-
pear to deal with qualitatively less serious delinquency problems.
These urban/rural disparities emerge under a statute in-
tended to be applied uniformly throughout the state. They suggest
that the waiver statute provides for little more than a subjective
exercise of discretion, the antithesis of a rule of law. A statute ex-
plicitly providing for different treatment of youths solely on the
basis of urban/rural distinctions, however, would likely violate
equal protection.ll 8 The discretion afforded by a broad, general
statute permits the same violation to occur de facto. Rural
juveniles are subjected to adult criminal prosecutions more readily
than are urban juveniles, despite their less serious present offenses
or prior sentences. 119
118. In Long v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th
Cir. 1971), the federal district court invalidated a Maryland statute that set a state-
wide juvenile court age limit of 18 but that restricted the juvenile age limit to 16 in
Baltimore City. As the court noted, this statutory scheme created two classes of 16-
and 17-year-olds: "those who reside outside of Baltimore City and/or who although
residing in Baltimore City are not arrested within city limits; and those who
whether or not residing within the limits of Baltimore City are arrested therein."
Id. at 26. While recognizing that geographic distinctions do not necessarily offend
equal protection, the court was unable to find a psychological, physical, sociological,
or other rational basis for distinguishing between 16- and 17-year-olds arrested in
Baltimore City and those arrested thoughout the rest of the state. The court invali-
dated the Baltimore City exception as "arbitrary, unreasonably discriminatory, and
not related to any legitimate State objective." Id. at 28. But see Francis v. State,
459 F. Supp. 163 (D. Md. 1978) (upholding territorial distinctions that serve a rea-
sonable state interest), aff'd, 605 F.2d 747 (4th Cir. 1979).
119. Ironically, Minnesota's Adult Sentencing Guidelines were adopted, at least
in part, to eliminate the effects of geographic variations on adult sentencing deci-
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The empirical reality, revealed by statistical analysis, is that
judges cannot evenhandedly administer these discretionary stat-
utes. Within a single jurisdiction, judges interpret and apply
waiver statutes inconsistently from county to county and from
court to court.120 Other analyses of waiver corroborate these more
recent Minnesota findings and provide substantial evidence that
judicial waiver practices are inherently arbitrary, capricious, and
discriminatory.121
IV. Waiver in Minnesota: A Decade of Experience From Dahl to
D.F.B. (David F. Brom)
Judicial waiver practices pose two primary and interrelated
problems-the highly discretionary, idiosyncratic nature of this in-
dividualized sentencing decision, and the lack of integration be-
tween the criteria for removal of offenders from juvenile court
and the sentencing practices in adult criminal courts. The source
of both problems is individualized judicial sentencing discretion. A
juvenile court judge who attempts to make a clinical determina-
tion of a youth's dangerousness or amenability to treatment must
do so even though little evidence exists of treatments to which
some serious offenders consistently respond, or of valid indicators
that permit accurate individualized identification of those who
might respond to intervention. Through indeterminate waiver de-
cisions, juvenile courts exercise extraordinarily broad discretion
that exacerbates the potential for abuse and discrimination. The
presence of organizational or political considerations, resulting at
times in waivers for less serious offenses, further aggravates the
"lack of fit" between juvenile and adult criminal sentencing prac-
tices. Although the routine administration of waiver statutes poses
a variety of problems, discretionary sentencing practices undergo
their most severe tests when confronting serious but isolated of-
sions. See Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Comrnn'n, Report to the Legislature 5
(1980) ("We discovered some regional differences in sentencing. A slightly lower
proportion of person offenders was committed from metropolitan areas than from
non-metropolitan areas.").
120. Intrastate geographic variations in waiver statutes are not unique to Minne-
sota. See, e.g., Leonard Edwards, The Case for Abolishing Fitness Hearings in Juve-
nile Court, 17 Santa Clara L. Rev. 595, 610-13 (1977) (county by county disparity in
California); Heuser, supra note 50, at 30 (1985) (county by county variations in Ore-
gon-"it appears that some counties may be over- or under-represented in terms of
the proportion of cases per unit of risk population"); Between Two Worlds, supra
note 8, at 147-98 (county by county disparity within states in Northeast Region,
North Central Region, Southeast Region, South Central Region, and West Region),
121. Between Two Worlds, supra note 8, at 102-05.
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fenders-apparently ordinary youths with no prior delinquency or
treatment who suddenly commit heinous crimes.
A. The Legislative Response to In re Dahl
In In re Dahl,122 the Minnesota Supreme Court confronted
some of the procedural and substantive problems inherent in the
juvenile waiver process. Dahl, seventeen years old at the time of
the alleged offense and eighteen years old at the time delinquency
and certification proceedings were initiated, murdered another
youth with several shotgun blasts after taking him to a remote
area of northern Minnesota. Despite Dahl's virtues123 and his lack
of previous contacts with the juvenile justice system,124 he was cer-
tified to stand trial as an adult on the grounds that he was both
unamenable to treatment and a threat to the public safety. The
reasons given for certifying Dahl were his age, the seriousness of
his alleged offense, and the concern that he could not be ade-
quately treated within the three years remaining under juvenile
court jurisdiction.125 The record upon which the state's certifica-
tion motion was granted contained neither psychological or psychi-
atric information nor negative information regarding the juvenile's
background apart from the alleged homicide.126 The case, as
presented to the Minnesota Supreme Court, thus raised the rela-
tively narrow issue whether a juvenile's age and the seriousness of
the alleged offense standing alone satisfied the statutory require-
ments of nonamenability or dangerousness.
The Dahl court explicitly held that "the existing statutory
framework does not authorize referral based on the specific crime
charged.... IT]his court did not intend the application of the Ho-
gan factors to result in the referral of a juvenile solely because of
122. 278 N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1979).
123. Dahl was a high school senior who maintained a B average, participated in
interscholastic sports, planned to attend a nearby college, and was a dependable
worker at his various part-time jobs. The court commented, "[I]t is clearly appar-
ent that [Dahl] is not the typical delinquent seen by the Juvenile Court. This of-
fense [first degree murder]... appears to be an isolated delinquent act .... " Id. at
317-18.
124. The only blemishes on Dahl's record were a two day suspension from school
for swearing and kicking his locker when an expensive watch was stolen, and a 45
day driver's license suspension for reckless driving. Id. at 317.
125. Id. at 318. The juvenile court's conclusion that Dahl could only receive
three years of treatment as a juvenile, i.e., until age 21, was based on Minn. Stat.
§ 260.181(4)(1978). Subsequent amendments to that statute reduced the maximum
age of juvenile court jurisdiction over youths from 21 to 19 years of age. See Minn.
Stat. § 260.181(4) (1988); see also inkfra notes 268-271 and accompanying text.
126. Dahl, 278 N.W.2d at 318.
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the alleged offense."' 27 The court went on to say that the offense
charged was obviously "among the relevant factors to be consid-
ered"128 and "[t]he record must contain direct evidence that the ju-
venile endangers the public safety for the statutory reference
standard to be satisfied."' 2 9 The case was thus remanded to the
trial court, which, in order to certify the youth, had to include in
the record direct evidence, apart from the offense charged, that
the juvenile was not amenable to treatment or presented a threat
to the public safety.
The case, as decided, simply addressed the narrow issue of
what factual record is necessary to support a judicial determina-
tion of nonamenability or dangerousness; the court concluded that
proof of age and seriousness of the crime alone were insufficient
without additional direct evidence. In dicta, however, the court ex-
pressed serious concerns about the adequacy of the transfer legis-
lation and clearly indicated to the legislature that the waiver
criteria were in need of modification and greater specificity. 130
127. Id. at 321. In the earlier case of State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 212 N.W.2d
664 (1973), the Minnesota Supreme Court had indicated that the presence of several
criteria, including consideration of the offense allegedly committed, allowed the
lower court to certify a youth on public safety grounds. The Hogan court said that
the following factors should be considered to determine whether the public safety
would be threatened by retaining juvenile court jurisdiction:
(1) The seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection;
(2) the circumstances surrounding the offense; (3) whether the offense
was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful man-
ner; (4) whether the offense was directed against persons or property;
(5) the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act; and (6) the ab-
sence of adequate protective and security facilities available to the ju-
venile treatment system.
Id. at 438, 212 N.W.2d at 669-70 (1973). The Hogan and Kent criteria were incorpo-
rated into Rule 32.05(2) of the Minnesota Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Courts.
See Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 8, at 266-72.
In In re J.B.M., 263 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 1978), the last certification case consid-
ered by the Minnesota Supreme Court prior to Dahl, the waiving judge construed
the seriousness of the offense to mandate reference "if the offense is of a suffi-
ciently dangerous nature." Id. at 75. The supreme court rejected that construction
with the observation that "[a]lthough the nature of the offense is certainly a factor
to be considered in this determination and may serve as a basis for statutory refer-
ence ... this court has not held that reference is mandatory when a serious crime is
involved." Id. at 76.
128. Dahl 278 N.W.2d at 321 (emphasis in original) (citing State v. Hogan, 297
Minn. 430, 212 N.W.2d 664 (1978)).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 318. In 1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated rules of pro-
cedure for juvenile courts that included a variety of factors that courts should con-
sider in making waiver decisions. These factors, drawn from Hogan, 297 Minn. at
438, 212 N.W.2d at 669-70, and Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 app.
(1966), include:
(a) The seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection,
(b) the circumstances surrounding the offense,
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The court, sensitive that judicial determinations of amenability or
dangerousness produced decisions that were potentially erroneous
and prejudicial to juveniles and to public safety, concluded that
"[a] re-evaluation of the existing certification process may be in
order."131
The sentencing conflicts posed by isolated but very serious of-
fenders such as Dahl and Brom dramatically highlight the concep-
tual inadequacy of judicial determinations of amenability or
dangerousness. Although the commission of one serious offense is
not reliable evidence for predicting either future offenses or ame-
nability to treatment, the seriousness of the offense may over-
whelm any judge's effort to give individualized consideration to
the offender. These youths pose a fundamental conflict between
the primary rehabilitative mission of juvenile courts and the
waiver inquiry and the retributivist impulses occasioned by highly
visible serious crimes. Couching these broad policy issues in indi-
(c) whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, pre-
meditated or willful manner,
(d) whether the offense was directed against persons or property, the
greater weight being given to an offense against persons, especially if
personal injury resulted,
(e) the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act,
(f) the absence of adequate protective and security facilities available
to the juvenile treatment system,
(g) the sophistication and maturity of the child as determined by con-
sideration of the child's home, environmental situation, emotional atti-
tude and pattern of living,
(h) the record and previous history of the child,
(i) whether the child acted with particular cruelty or disregard for the
life or safety of another,
(j) whether the offense involved a high degree of sophistication or
planning by the child, and
(k) whether there is sufficient time available before the child reaches
age nineteen (19) to provide appropriate treatment and control.
Minn. R. P. Juv. Cts. 32.05(2); see also Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra
note 8, at 266-72, concluding that
[t]he catalogue of miscellaneous factors promulgated by the Minnesota
Supreme Court provides neither a "central guiding principle" nor
much practical guidance to juvenile court judges struggling with this
difficult sentencing decision. Instead, Rule 32's emphasis on vague,
discretionary, and ultimately unquantifiable factors simply compounds
all the preexisting problems of the process and submits the most im-
portant dispositional decision in the juvenile court to the subjective re-
action of each individual juvenile court judge.
Id. at 272.
131. Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. 1979). The Dahl court observed that "the
standards for referral adopted by present legislation are not very effective in mak-
ing this important determination." Id. at 318. The court went on to note that
"[d]ue to these difficulties in making the waiver decision, many juvenile court
judges have tended to be overcautious, resulting in the referral of delinquent chil-
dren for criminal prosecution on the erroneous, albeit good faith, belief that the
juveniles pose a danger to the public." Id. at 319.
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vidualized subjective or clinical terms-amenability or dangerous-
ness--disserves their rational resolution.
In 1980, as a result of the Dahl decision, the Minnesota legis-
lature revised the state's juvenile code and significantly amended a
number of interrelated provisions involving certification. 3 2 The
legislature repudiated the theory that the purposes of Minnesota's
juvenile courts were exclusively benevolent and rehabilitative.
For youths charged with crimes, the purposes of the juvenile code
now include maintaining the integrity of the substantive criminal
law and developing individual responsibility. 3 3 The amendment
marked a fundamental philosophical departure from the previous
emphasis of rehabilitative purposes and a movement toward pur-
poses explicitly emphasizing punishment and social control.
The amended legislation also mandated a probable cause
hearing on the alleged offense to provide a basis for the certifica-
tion motion.134 Although the legislature retained, without change,
the basic waiver criteria of nonamenability to treatment or danger-
ousness,135 it placed the burden of proof in waiver proceedings on
the prosecution to establish by "clear and convincing evidence"
132. Those legislative changes are examined extensively in Feld, Dismantling
the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 192-239.
133. The previous purpose of the law was to secure "for each minor ... the care
and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the ... welfare of the mi-
nor and the best interests of the state .... Juvenile Court Act, ch. 685, § 1, 1959
Minn. Laws 1275 (repealed 1980).
Under the new legislation, the exclusively benevolent and rehabilitative pur-
pose of the juvenile court remains only for children "alleged or adjudicated ne-
glected or dependent." Minn. Stat. § 260.011(2)(a) (1988) (effective Aug. 1, 1980).
For those charged with delinquency, however,
[t]he purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or adjudicated to
be delinquent is to promote the public safety and reduce juvenile de-
linquency by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibit-
ing certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility for
lawful behavior. This purpose should be pursued through means that
are fair and just, that recognize the unique characteristics and needs of
children, and that give children access to opportunities for personal
and social growth.
Id. § 260.011(2)(c).
134. Minn. Stat. § 260.125(2)(d) (1988); see Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative
Ideal," supra note 7, at 203-05.
135. Section 260.125 provides:
[T]he juvenile court may order a reference only if:...
(d) The court finds that
(1) there is probable cause ... to believe the child committed the of-
fense alleged by delinquency petition and
(2) the prosecuting authority has demonstrated by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the child is not suitable to treatment or that the
public safety is not served under the provisions of laws relating to ju-
venile courts.
Minn. Stat. § 260.125(2)(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
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that juvenile court jurisdiction should be waived. 3 6
The legislature, responding to the supreme court's directive
in Dahl and purporting to give greater guidance and direction to
juvenile court judges administering the waiver provisions, added a
third subdivision to the certification statute. 3 7 The added subdivi-
136. 1dA; Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 205-07.
137. The legislature adopted an offense matrix that establishes a prima facie case
for certification under the amenability and dangerousness provisions when various
combinations of a youth's present offense and/or prior record are present. Under
the amended statute, the prosecution can establish a prima facie case of both
nonamenability and dangerousness simply by proving that the juvenile is at least 16
years of age, that the present crime charged is a serious offense, and that the com-
bination of the present crime charged and the prior record brings the case within
one of the subdivision's clauses. Minn. Stat. § 260.125(3)(1988). See generally Feld,
Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 194-95, 195 n.96. Minn.
Stat. § 260.125(3)(1980) provides:
A prima facie case that the public safety is not served or that the child
is not suitable for treatment shall have been established if the child
was at least 16 years of age at the time of the alleged offense and:
(1) Is alleged by delinquency petition to have committed an aggra-
vated felony against the person and (a) in committing the offense, the
child acted with particular cruelty or disregard for the life or safety of
another; or (b) the offense involved a high degree of sophistication or
planning by the juvenile; or
(2) Is alleged by delinquency petition to have committed murder
in the first degree; or
(3) Is alleged by delinquency petition (a) to have committed the
delinquent act of escape from confinement to a state juvenile correc-
tional facility and (b) to have committed an offense as part of, or sub-
sequent to, escape from custody that would be a felony listed in section
609.11, subdivision 9, if committed by an adult; or
(4) Has been found by the court, pursuant to an admission in court
or after trial to have committed an offense within the preceding 24
months which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and is al-
leged by delinquency petition to have committed murder in the second
or third degree, manslaughter in the first degree, criminal sexual con-
duct in the first degree or assault in the first degree; or
(5) Has been found by the court, pursuant to an admission in court
or after trial, to have committed two offenses, not in the same behav-
ioral incident, within the preceding 24 months which would be felonies
if committed by an adult, and is alleged by delinquency petition to
have committed manslaughter in the second degree, kidnapping, crimi-
nal sexual conduct in the second degree, arson in the first degree, ag-
gravated robbery, or assault in the second degree; or
(6) Has been found by the court, pursuant to an admission in court
or after trial, to have committed two offenses, not in the same behav-
ioral incident, within the preceding 24 months, one or both of which
would be the felony of burglary of a dwelling if committed by an adult,
and the child is alleged by the delinquency petition to have committed
another burglary of a dwelling....
(7) Has previously been found by the court, pursuant to an admis-
sion in court or after trial, to have committed three offenses, none in
the same behavioral incident, within the preceding 24 months which
would be felonies if committed by an adult and is alleged by delin-
quency petition to have committed any felony other than those de-
scribed in clause (2), (4), or (5); or
(8) Is alleged by delinquency petition to have committed an aggra-
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sion enables the prosecution to establish a "prima facie" case for
certification under the nonamenability and dangerousness provi-
sions when various combinations of a youth's present offense and
prior record are proved.138 For example, the prosecution can
prove a prima facie case for certification by charging a sixteen-
year-old, who possesses a specified prior record, with certain types
of serious offenses. While still retaining the "nonamenability" or
"dangerousness" criteria, the legislature provided the prosecutor
with an indirect method to prove those ultimate facts in addition
to proof by direct evidence. The Minnesota legislature's adoption
of offense criteria to structure judicial sentencing discretion is typ-
ical of recent legislative changes in waiver statutes throughout the
nation.139
Legislative amendments of the waiver statutes to establish a
"prima facie" case for transfer based on the present offense or
prior record affect the allocation of the burdens of production and
persuasion.140 As an earlier article concluded,
a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption that shifts
the burden of producing substantial, controverting evidence to
the party opposing the prima facie case. Once a party has es-
tablished its prima facie case, the burden of producing evi-
dence is shifted to the opposing party to rebut the presumptive
facts. Thus, the factual presumption created by a prima facie
case stands unless and until rebutted by placing contrary evi-
dence on the record. If substantial, countervailing evidence is
presented, then the matter is to be determined by the trier of
fact on the basis of the entire record and not by reference to
the prima facie case.... Functionally, then, the procedural op-
eration of a prima facie case is equivalent to a presumption in
civil actions .... 141
This analysis of the effects of a "prima facie" case as creating a re-
buttable presumption for certification has been endorsed by the
Minnesota courts in several subsequent waiver decisions.142
vated felony against the person ... in furtherance of criminal activity
by an organized gang.
Minn. Stat. § 260.125(3) (1988).
138. Minn. Stat. § 260.125(3) (1988); see Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative
Ideal," supra note 7, at 207-14.
139. Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 504-11.
140. Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 207-14.
141. Id. at 209-10.
142. See, e.g., In re J.F.K., 316 N.W.2d 563' (Minn. 1982) (where state established
a prima facie case which defense rebutted with substantial evidence, court must de-
cide waiver issue on basis of the entire record, not simply by reference to the prima
facie case); In re Givens, 307 N.W.2d 489 (Minn. 1981) (unrebutted prima facie case
authorizes reference on both grounds of nonamenability and dangerousness); In re
K.J.K., 357 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (where prima facie case not estab-
lished, court must consider totality of circumstances).
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That article also suggested that
where the defendant has introduced substantial evidence of his
amenability to treatment and nondangerousness and has re-
butted the prima facie case, the case should be decided under
the discretionary waiver provisions of subdivision two rather
than under subdivision three. If the waiver decision is made
under subdivision two, proof of age and present offense alone
may not carry the state's burden of persuasion .... 143
Again, that analysis has been confirmed by a number of appellate
opinions that conclude that once the juvenile has rebutted the
prima facie case with "significant evidence," then the prosecution
has the burden of proof, by "clear and convincing" evidence,
that the child is not suitable for treatment or that the public
safety is not served under the provisions of the laws relating to
juvenile courts. In evaluating evidence under the clear and
convincing standard, the court must consider the totality of
the circumstances.... In this case... the State established a
prima facie case but the defense introduced substantial evi-
dence rebutting the prima facie case. It was thus up to the ju-
venile court to decide whether the State had met its burden of
proof by clear and convincing evidence on the basis of the en-
tire record and not by reference to the prima facie case.144
The article concluded that adoption of a legislative "prima fa-
cie" certification case based on age and the seriousness of the of-
fense would not effectively overrule the holding of Dahl.
[J]uvenile court judges will continue to decide on a discretion-
ary basis if a youth is amenable to treatment or not dangerous
despite the absence of clinical tests or objective, validated in-
dicators that accurately predict such traits.
In the final analysis, the problem lies not with the opera-
tive significance of the prima facie case language on the bur-
den of proof, but with asking judges questions that they are
unequipped to answer and then attempting to control judicial
discretion when the judges' answers go awry. This is the prob-
lem that resurfaced in Dahl, which the legislature not only
failed to address, but has now compounded.1 45
The legislature's decision to create a rebuttable presumption
for certification based on age and offense was probably the least
satisfactory procedural strategy to solve the problems raised by the
exercise of judicial discretion regarding an isolated but serious
143. Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 212.
144. In re S.R.L., 400 N.W.2d. 382, 384 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted); accord J.F.K, 316 N.W.2d at 564 (citing Feld, Dismantling the
"Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7).
145. Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 214. Whether
the legislature effectively overruled Dahl remains a source of judicial controversy.
Compare S.R.L., 400 N.W.2d at 384 (amendments and supreme court's reasoning in
J.F.K implicitly overrule Dahl) with In re J.L.B., 435 N.W.2d 595, 601-04 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989) (Crippen, J., dissenting) (continuing vitality of Dahl).
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young offender. The legislature could have redefined juvenile
court jurisdiction simply to exclude from juvenile courts youths
with certain combinations of present offense and prior record.146
Or the legislature could have placed the burdens of production and
persuasion on the juvenile charged with serious offenses rather
than having it remain at all times with the prosecution. 47 The
legislature considered both of those alternatives and rejected them
in favor of the "rebuttable presumption," or prima facie case, ap-
proach.148 Because it failed to address effectively the sentencing
contradictions inherent in the statute, it was only a matter of time
until the problems identified in Dahl reappeared.
B. The Three Variations of In re D.F.B.
Prior to February 18, 1988, there were no obvious indications
that sixteen-year-old David F. Brom was a seriously disturbed
youth or a potential mass murderer.X49 He was a high school soph-
omore, a B + student, and regarded by his teachers as pleasant and
cooperative. 150 Although he appeared to his teachers and class-
mates to be a happy person, according to the clinicians who testi-
146. Legislative waiver results in "automatic" certification of certain youths to
adult criminal court based on the offenses alleged. See Feld, Reference of Juvenile
Offenders, supra note 5, at 573-78, 617-18. This option is nondiscretionary-there is
simply no occasion for a judicial waiver hearing. The virtues of legislative waiver
include objectivity, consistency, economy, equality, and ease of administration. Id.;
see Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 494-99.
147. See Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 215.
Placing the burden of persuasion on a youth to prove amenability and
nondangerousness would emphasize the policies of social defense and
public safety in light of the uncertainty of the issues being determined.
In many cases, a court cannot reliably determine whether a youth is
amenable or dangerous. In these ambiguous cases the decision
whether or not to waive is determined by which party bears the bur-
den of persuasion. The legislative policies that justify creating a rebut-
table presumption also justify placing the burden of persuasion on the
juvenile rather than on the state.
Id.
148. See, e.g., Minn. S.F. 2149, 71st Leg. (1980) (burden of proof on juvenile to
prove reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation); Minn. S.F. 644, 70th Leg. (1977) (ex-
cluding from juvenile court jurisdictions youths 15 or older charged with felony of-
fenses). The history of the legislation's change from automatic exclusion, to burden
on the juvenile, to rebuttable presumption may be traced in Minnesota County At-
torneys' Ass'n, Minnesota County Attorneys' Legislative Report (Feb. 18, 1980); id.
(March 4, 1980); id. (March 17, 1980). See generally Feld, Dismantling "Rehabilita-
tive Ideal," supra note 7, at 192-97, 205-22.
149. A detailed journalistic account of the Brom case may be found in Tom Krat-
tenmaker, The Rochester Ax Murders, Star Tribune, July 17, 1988, Sunday Maga-
zine, at 6.
150. A counselor at Brom's high school testified, "David's attendance was excel-
lent, his grades were good, his relationship with his teachers seemed very good. So
there was nothing that would show that [there might be problems in the Brom
household]." Reference Hearing Transcript at 270, In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955 (Olm-
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fied at his waiver hearing, he was the victim of a progressive
depressionl51 that emerged over a period of several years and
which left him suicidal 5 2 and ultimately caused him to slay his fa-
sted County, Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 21, 1988) (testimony of Michael Larson, Lourdes
High School Counselor).
Brom's Spanish teacher testified, "David was an above average student. He got
B's in my class.... He was pleasant, quiet, but we got along well." Id. at 231 (testi-
mony of Celeste Heidelberger).
Brom's religion and home room teacher testified, "My relationship with
David-first of all, I liked him very well and I think probably he felt the same way.
His reactions in class were he was usually joking, usually laughing. He would say
something clever and I would respond to it.... Yes, he was [a] cooperative [stu-
dent]." Id. at 280 (testimony of Helen Restovich).
Dr. Carl Malmquist, the court-appointed psychiatrist who evaluated David
Brom for the reference hearing, described him as "a somewhat gangly boy, of 5'10"
130 pounds, quite deferential, polite, compliant, and smiling. He was not muscular
but appeared rather shy and withdrawn in some ways, yet he talked volubly and
readily." Dr. Carl Malmquist, Psychiatric Evaluation Report at 1, In re D.F.B., No.
88-J-0955 (Olmsted County, Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 21, 1988) [hereinafter Malmquist
Report] (report dated March 18, 1988).
151. [HIe became progressively depressed and feeling life was not worth
living going on this way. But his solution was to try to be happy and
thinking that he could make everybody else happy. And this is how
everybody got fooled. All the friends and people who knew him, and
the peer group in the school, because they either saw him as a fool or a
clown or a boy always jumping around or saying witty or entertaining
things whereas, in fact, he was really a deeply depressed boy who from
this past year, from last June on, was entertaining either suicide and
at that point thoughts of homicide start to enter as well, from Septem-
ber on ....
Transcript at 186 (testimony of Dr. Carl Malmquist).
152. Dr. Malmquist testified:
Q: Were there any suicide attempts that you were aware of?.
A: First one that he mentioned to me was at the completion of ninth
grade in June of 1987 and the second one was at the end of the sum-
mer in September, 1987.
Id. at 194-95.
In his report, Dr. Malmquist provided additional details of Brom's attempted
suicide:
David then elaborated that he had made two suicide attempts earlier
in the year which he had not told his parents about.... The first at-
tempt was shortly after the conclusion of the academic year in June,
1987. Their home was near a forest area and he tried to hang himself
in a tree with a rope noose. He tied the noose on a tree branch that
was about 15-20 feet off the ground and was hanging there with the
rope around his neck when he got the feeling that he did not want to
die. He is not clear on details of how he got out of the noose but be-
lieves that he was not extended so far that he could not reach up and
grab the sides of the tree arm by his arms and pull himself up again
which was the way he was able to get out of the noose. Later that
summer, shortly before the commencement of the school year, he
stated he took an overdose of four to five pills. These were pills that a
girl he knew took for a "sleeping disorder." He got sick and threw up
at that time and his parents thought he had the flu. David stated he
was also serious about committing suicide at that time and disap-
pointed in the outcome.
Malmquist Report at 6.
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ther, mother, and younger sister and brother with an axe. 5 3
153. Brom's depression, according to the clinicians, centered on his conflicted re-
lationship with his family, particularly his father. Malmquist Report at 11-12.
These conflicts intensified after Brom's parents ejected his older brother, Joe, from
the home because he adopted a "punk" style of dress. Apparently, Bernard and
Paulette Broin imposed even stricter discipline on their other children to ensure
that they would not follow Joe's pattern. Id at 4-5. Although David Brom's family
was comfortably middle-class economically, the family regimine was somewhat
atypical. Transcript at 153-54 (testimony of Annick Perrault) (describing her inter-
actions with the Brom family when she was a dinner guest). David's parents sub-
jected him to a strict curfew, required him to perform many household chores, and
slapped or grounded him if he failed to do them promptly or satisfactorily. The cli-
nicians testified that Brom wanted to be a dutiful son but found it impossible to
please his father; as a result he developed an exaggerated fear of being punished.
[E]vents which happened to him, while unpleasant, had become
greatly magnified in his own thinking. They had become overwhelm-
ing and seen as impossible to deal with. Hence, he described episodes
where his father would slap him, usually only once at a time (although
on rare occasions two-three times in succession), and with an open
hand. David never described his father hitting him with a fist nor ever
receiving any beatings. Yet to David the nature of the anticipation of
being slapped in such a manner by his father was experienced as
something he came to dread. It was experienced as one of the things
he could not deal with, and from which he needed desperately to es-
cape.... On these occasions, he would feel "terrified."... The strik-
ing thing is David's overreaction and sensitivity, his inability to deal
with his father, and the persistent fear which did not leave.
Malmquist Report at 2-3.
David was unable to discuss his feelings with his father. Id. at 3 ("his father
and he rarely talked at all .... "). David did not seek help with his fears from any
teachers, counselors, or other adults because his parents were widely-respected in
the community.
In appearance the Broms were pillar-of-society material. Dad was an
engineer at the IBM plant. Mom had run a preschool program at
church, but had quit a couple of years before to spend more time with
her own kids. She sewed at home .... Bernard, Paulette, Dave and
the two younger kids attended mass every Sunday at Pax Christi
Catholic Church. The parents were parish leaders and ardent partici-
pants in a variety of church activities. They hosted meetings at their
house, and Bernard put his home computer to work for the parish....
The Broms were eulogized as a beautiful family. "Leaders of the
church and very well-respected," the pastor called them. "There was
not a clue that something was wrong," a neighbor woman said.
Krattenmaker, supra note 149, at 7.
David told the clinicians that adults would neither believe nor appreciate the
seriousness of his problems. Transcript at 196-97 (testimony of Dr. Carl Malm-
quist). Although Brom "defended psychologically," according to the experts, by
pretending to be and attempting to make other people happy, maintaining this role
became increasingly difficult as his depression deepened. Id. at 194 (testimony of
Dr. Carl Malmquist). Thoughts of suicide, he reported, mingled with thoughts of
killing his family. Malmquist Report at 11.
Brom shared his suicidal and homicidal thoughts with some young friends, al-
beit disguised in the form of a collective fantasy.
[H]e said that this summer he wanted to go to Florida. He wanted to
take the van and he said he wanted to kill his parents.... He said that
he wanted to take a couple of other girls with him, but he didn't tell
me who .... (H]e told me that he was going to kill them, too, but I
didn't know if .... I really didn't believe him when he told me. I
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The case of David F. Brom, In re D.F.B., squarely posed the
mean I didn't think-It's not like you hear something like that every
day. I didn't know what to think.
Transcript at 119-20 (testimony of Lynda Lund, a 15-year-old classmate of Brom).
In one version, he would kill his family, steal the family van and money, and
drive to Florida, where the three juveniles would "live it up" until their funds were
exhausted, at which point Brom would kill himself. One friend testified:
A friend and me and Dave, we had a sort of vacation planned which
seemed more like a story that we would add things into it to make it
more exciting, add into the plot. Like saying [an ongoing] story. But
not written. Just a conversation piece that we would have .... It in-
volved me, Angie and Dave going to Florida this summer and how we
would live off the money we would have and just get an apartment
and have fun.... We had to get a car to get down there and he said
that the way we could do that was for him to get rid of his parents so
that we could have the car. [He would] kill his family and call in to
IBM and tell them that there had been a death in the family and so
Mr. Brom would be taking off a few weeks and so therefore, no one
would be looking for him .... I just thought it was a way to make the
plot more exciting in our conversations. Like saying when I grow up I
want to do this. Just making a story line and making everything more
dramatic. But it wasn't like a big plan. It wasn't planned to happen
February 18 .... The whole thing was pretty much to live it up
before--and Dave said he wanted to die--and me and Angie didn't
want to die. Just when we talked to each other we always said when
he does that, we'll just leave because we didn't want that. But it was
still just a part of the story for me and Angie.
Id. at 135-37 (testimony of Annick Perrault, a 16-year-old classmate of Brom).
Another described a similar fantasy:
We were gonna take off to Florida or something and just live
there.... [H]e was going to kill his family and then get money out of
the bank and then we were gonna take the van and he was gonna
come pick me up and we were just gonna leave.
Id. at 165 (testimony of Angela Endrizzi, a 15-year-old classmate of Brom).
Another variation of the fantasy also involved the death of Brom's family fol-
lowed by an excursion to California.
[Slomehow a trip to California came into effect and we just, you know,
we were trying to think of how we were going to get money and stuff
and he mentioned his mom had a cash card, you know, if he knocked
his parents off he could get that and, you know, it would fund our
trip.... Well, he like said that he'd get his mom and his brother and
sister in the morning and then wait until his dad came home from
work. And he'd like be behind his bedroom door when his dad came
in the room, he'd get him then.
Id. at 174-75 (testimony of Chadric Hines, a 15-year-old classmate of Brom).
Various students, including Brom, also participated in writing a so-called "hit
list," which included unpopular teachers as well as parents. A classmate of Brom's
testified, "There was a hit list. Names of people he was gonna kill.... Some kids,
some teachers. I can't remember exactly, but I think Mr. Nigon [math teacher] was
on it. I think. That was a joke. Everybody had stuff on the hit list." Id. at 207-08
(testimony of Jennifer Cranston, a 15-year-old classmate of Brom). Despite the vio-
lent images of these casual conversations, however, none of Brom's peers regarded
them as cause for concern.
On the evening of February 17, 1988, according to the clinicans who inter-
viewed him, Brom's father threatened to take away David's extensive record collec-
tion unless David's attitude changed. Malmquist Report at 5. Bernard Brom then
pushed David who fell backwards onto a table. Fearful that he would be struck
again, David Brom fled the room. I& Later that evening, Brom called one of the
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difficult sentencing conflicts between an emphasis on the rehabili-
tative potential of the offender and the seriousness of the offense.
Other than the four brutal homicides alleged in the petition, the
friends with whom he shared the Florida-trip fantasy and asked her if she would
skip school with him the next day if he killed his family that night. Transcript at
164 (testimony of Angela Endrizzi).
Brom returned to his bedroom and listened to records. After brooding about
his situation for hours, according to the experts, at about 3:00 a.m. he went to the
garage and got a long-handled axe. Malmquist Report at 13. Armed with the axe
and a steak knife, he went into the bedroom where his parents were sleeping.
Although he could not remember hitting anyone, he recalled that there was
screaming and that he also cried and screamed.
He recalled going to his parents' bedroom and opening the door. Their
lights were out, and he recalled standing in the doorway with the axe.
"When I think about it, I get kind of sick. What I remember is gross.
I walk into my parents' room and they are asleep. I have the axe.
There is a lot of screaming in there; I am screaming and they are. I
was scared; I don't remember hitting anyone. I could hear the scream-
ing though, and it went on and on. Then I remember being in my
room and packing things like blankets. All the lights were on and I
had to go into each room. My brother was in his bedroom and my
mother and sister in the hall, and there was blood everywhere."
I asked specifically if he could remember hitting anyone with the
axe, and he could not nor could he remember entering any of the
rooms specifically, but he remembered vividly hearing the constant
screaming. The screaming was not only that of the victims, but he re-
members himself screaming and believes he was crying at the time, as
well. He does not know why he was screaming, but he remembered it
was not particularly any words, although he remembered screaming at
the top of his voice.
Id.
He also confided to a friend whom he called immediately after the slaying.
[H]e went into his parents' room. And his mom started screaming and
he went over to his dad and hit him in the head and knocked him
over. And his dad tried to get up and so he hit him again .... [with a]n
axe. And he said that he had hit his dad several times because his dad
kept trying to get up. And he walked out of the room and he didn't
tell me what order after that, but he said that he got his mom and
when he went into Rick's room, Rick screamed and so Dave screamed
back. And he didn't say anything about hitting Rick. And he went out
into the hall again and Diane was standing over her mom, just staring,
and Diane screamed and so Dave, again, screamed back. And he didn't
say anything about hitting Diane.
Transcript at 142-43 (testimony of Annick Perrault).
Bernard Brom received 22 axe wounds; Paulette Brom, 19; Diane Brom, 8; and
Ricky Brom, 9. Id. at 60, 64, 69, 72 (testimony of Dr. Kathryn Berg, Deputy Olm-
sted County Coroner). While in his room packing a duffel bag, he told the clinican
evaluating him, he heard the sound of dripping blood. Malmquist Report at 14.
The first investigating officer on the scene testified, "We had never seen so much
carnage in such a small area. I think we were both in a state of shock." Transcript
at 18 (testimony of Deputy Michael Braley).
After the slayings, Brom called a friend at 3:30 a.m. but hung up when her fa-
ther answered. Malmquist Report at 14. Sometime thereafter, Brom drove the
family van to a bank, withdrew money with his mother's cash card, and then
purchased some cigarettes and snacks at a local supermarket. Id. He then drove to
an area overlooking a friend's house so that he could see her when she left for
school. When she did not appear, he drove to school, only then realizing that the
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sixteen-year-old Brom had no prior history of illegal behavior,
drug abuse, or aggressive behavior.15 4 He was diagnosed as suffer-
ing from a major depressive disorder, but one that would likely re-
spond to treatment. 55
clock in the van was incorrect. He returned to watch for his friend, and when she
again failed to appear, he returned to school. Id. at 17.
When he found his friend at school, he asked her to skip school with him, a not
unusual request.
I said, "So are we skipping school?" and he goes, "Yeah, you need a
break." And so I was all happy and thinking that, "Okay, sure.
Whatever." . . . I asked him if he had the car today, and he said,
"Yeah." And I said, "Why? Did you have to work?" because usually
when he worked he got to drive the car to school and he said, "No. I
can get anything I want now. My parents are dead." . .. I didn't
know if this was a way to make the cutting school more exciting, if we
were going to add something into [the story] and make it exciting.
And I said, "So, you did it?" and he said, "yep," and that's when we
reached the car, the van.
Transcript at 139-40 (testimony of Annick Perrault).
After driving to a nearby park, and then withdrawing more money at a bank,
they went to his friend's house where she attempted to shave the sides of Brom's
head. Malmquist Report at 17. After going to a K-Mart to obtain a razor, they re-
turned to her home where she completed the "punk" haircut-"[h]e wanted the
sides taken off and a design in the back with lines." Transcript at 144-45 (testimony
of Annick Perrault). When her mother returned home unexpectedly, Brom hid in
her closet. Id. at 146-47.
After his friend returned to school, Brom went to another high school where
he met some friends for lunch. Id. at 120-22 (testimony of Lynda Lund). Brom
then enlisted still another friend to dye his hair. After one unsuccessful attempt,
Brom returned to his own home alone to try once again to dye his hair. Malmquist
Report at 17. He then returned a bookbag to a friend, acknowledged that he was in
"deep trouble," and told his friend that he intended to sleep under a bridge and
then walk to the Twin Cities in the morning. Transcript at 149 (testimony of An-
nick Perrault). Brom spent the night after the murders in a culvert near his home
and was taken into custody the following morning at the Rochester post office. Id.
at 114-15 (testimony of Officer Timothy Heroff).
154. The trial court's undisputed finding of fact was that "the Child has no his-
tory of illegal behavior, drug abuse, or aggressive behavior except for the incident
alleged in this petition." In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955, Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order at 1 (Olmsted County, Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 21, 1988).
155. Judge Ring reported that
Dr. Carl Malmquist, a psychiatrist with years of experience in criminal
cases, examined the child. His report ran to 23 pages in an attempt to
explain this child. In the end, his diagnosis was "major depressive epi-
sode." Dr. Malmquist testifed that the child could be treated. He was
reluctant to say how long it would take. He could not guarantee that
the child could be treated in two-and-a-half years, but he did not say
that the child could not be successfully treated in that time. The pros-
ecution needed to prove that he could not be treated by clear and con-
vincing evidence and needed testimony like that to carry that burden
of proof. Dr. Gilbertson, on the other hand, said that two-and-a-half
years would normally be a relatively long time for such treatment be-
cause it usually takes only a few weeks or months.
Id., Memorandum at 3-4. On the basis of the testimony and report, Judge Ring
found that "[t]he child has been diagnosed as having a major depressive disorder
and it has not been shown that he cannot be successfully treated by his 19th birth-
day." Id., Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order at 2.
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1. The Trial Court: Applying the Law to the Facts
Judge Gerard Ring, who presided over the Brom reference
hearing, believed initially that the outcome of the proceeding was
a foregone conclusion. "I had assumed at the outset that we were
going through the motions with this reference hearing, and that
there really was little likelihood that the accused in a case like this
would remain in juvenile court."156 Judge Ring clearly recognized
the fundamental differences in sentencing policies between juve-
nile and criminal proceedings; he also knew that in a waiver hear-
ing, "[w]hether a child can be treated or is a threat to public safety
must be determined by looking at the' child, so the offense is rele-
vant only as it tells us something about the child."157
After a four day waiver hearing less than two months after
the offense, Judge Ring denied the prosecutor's motion to transfer
Brom for prosecution as an adult. Although the legislature had
amended the waiver statute in response to Dahl,15 Judge Ring
correctly concluded that the net effect of the amendments was to
make transfer more, rather than less, difficult.'59 In Judge Ring's
opinion, the central focus of a reference proceeding remained the
juvenile's treatability or threat to the public; he concluded that the
prosecution had failed to carry its burden of proving either Brom's
nonamenability or dangerousness.
This is one place where the burden of proof becomes signifi-
cant. I do not believe the child could prove suitability for
treatment if the burden were placed on him. However, the
prosecution has been unable to prove the contrary. Each of
the experts when asked said that it is possible to complete the
treatment in the time available; certainly no one said he could
not. Since the evidence cannot be said to be clear and convinc-
ing ,proof that he cannot be treated, the petitioner has failed to
carry the burden of proof on this issue.160
Ultimately, the decision in D.FB. hinged quite properly on who
bore the burden of proof on subjective and clinical issues-amena-
bility and dangerousness. The political and community outrage
156. Id., Memorandum at 1.
157. Id. at 2.
158. See supra notes 132-148 and accompanying text.
159. In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955, Memorandum at 9-11 (Olmsted County, Minn.
Dist. Ct. Apr. 21, 1988) ("The net result of the 1980 amendments has been to make
it more difficult to refer children to adult court rather than easier as may have
been intended.... [I]n my judgment the 1980 amendments did not change the bur-
den of proof, they only raised the degree of proof required. Instead of making it
easier and more likely that children would be referred to adult court, the statute
has had the opposite effect."). See generally Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative
Ideal," supra note 7.
160. In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955, Memorandum at 17 (Olmsted County, Minn.
Dist. Ct. Apr. 21, 1988).
[Vol. 8:1
BAD LAW MAKES HARD CASES
that followed Judge Ring's decision 16 ' is in microcosm analogous
to the public reactions to the acquittal of other "guilty" defend-
ant's whose cases included psychiatric defenses and who received
intense media attention.162
Judge Ring's decision to retain Brom as a juvenile was based
upon an analysis of statutory criteria and the various factors in
Rule 32,163 considered individually and collectively under the "to-
tality of the circumstances." Although he viewed the ultimate re-
sult in the case as undesirable, Judge Ring felt compelled by the
statutory language not to transfer Brom for prosecution as an
adult.
It does not make sense that any person, if convicted of the
crimes alleged in this case, should serve a sentence of less than
three years. However, the Legislature has not vested absolute
discretion in me as a trial judge to decide this issue based on
what my own feeling of justice should be. Rather, I am com-
pelled to decide the case based upon the law as it exists at this
time. I cannot modify that law, and if there is change to be
made in a fundamental principal [sic] of law such as what con-
stitutes a prima facie case, that change should be made by the
Supreme Court and not by me. That phrase has a well-under-
stood meaning which has existed for many years. Changing
the meaning of that phrase should not be undertaken lightly
as it may well have consequences in many other areas of the
law.64
Under the statute as written and previously interpreted, the
logic of Judge Ring's decision was impeccable. The prosecution's
proof of a prima facie case created a rebuttable presumption for
161. Judge Ring's decision, issued on April 22, 1988, "caused an uproar in Roch-
ester .... Krattenmaker, supra note 149, at 12.
162. The acquittal of John Hinckley by reason of insanity for his attempted as-
sassination of President Ronald Reagan ultimately hinged on the prosecution's in-
ability to affirmatively prove Hinckley's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt and
provoked intense public outrage. See generally Peter Low, John Jeffries & Richard
Bonnie, The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr.: A Case Study in the Insanity Defense
(1986). Professors Low, Jeffries, and Bonnie note:
One much-debated feature of the insanity defense after the Hinckley
verdict has been on whom the burden of proof should be placed. Allo-
cation of the burden of proof may play an important role in close
cases. It determines which side-prosecution or defense-will lose if
the jury finds itself unable to determine (with whatever degree of cer-
tainty the law may specify) whether the defendant was or was not le-
gally insane.
Id. at 132.
In the aftermath of the Hinckley case, most states and the federal government
now require the defendant to bear the burden of proof and the risk of non-persua-
sion. Id.; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1982); Minn. Stat. § 611.025 (1988).
163. See Minn. R.P. Juv. Cts. 32.05; supra note 130.
164. In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955, Memorandum at 19 (Olmsted County, Minn.
Dist. Ct. Apr. 21, 1988).
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transfer.165 Once that presumption is rebutted or where it does
not arise, the issues of amenability and dangerousness must be de-
cided on the "totality of circumstances" based upon the whole rec-
ord and not just by reference to the offense criteria or the
rebuttable presumption.166 Throughout the proceedings, the bur-
den of proof by "clear and convincing evidence" remains with the
prosecution to demonstrate either that the juvenile is not amena-
165. In Minnesota, it is well-established that creation of a statutory pre-
sumption or prima facie case serves only to shift the burden of going
forward with the evidence.... The party in whose favor the presump-
tion runs can establish that presumption and rest. The other party
then must go forward with evidence to rebut that presumption. Ifevi-
dence is introduced which rebuts the presumption, then that presump-
tion disappears and the burden of proof remains with whichever party
would normally have to carry it.
Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
In In re Givens, 307 N.W.2d 489 (Minn. 1981), the supreme court ruled on the
procedural effect of an unrebutted prima facie case.
[Tihe state can establish a prima facie case of unamenability and dan-
gerousness simply by proving that at the time of the alleged murder,
the juvenile was at least 16 along with one or more additional facts....
In this case, the state established a prima facie case by showing that
appellant was charged with first-degree murder and he was at least 16
at the time of the alleged murder.... Appellant did not introduce any
significant evidence bearing on the issue of amenability or dangerous-
ness. Thus, this is a case in which reference was based on the state's
establishing an unrebutted prima facie case. The statute clearly autho-
rizes reference in such a situation, and we affirm the reference order.
Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
166. In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955, Memorandum at 9 (Olmsted County, Minn. Dist.
Ct. Apr. 21, 1988).
In the present case, the prosecution could have introduced evidence
that the child was at least 16 years of age and charged with first degree
murder and rested. If the child had not offered any evidence in rebut-
tal, that could have been a sufficient basis to refer the child to adult
court for trial. However, the child did introduce evidence to the con-
trary and did rebut the prima facie case. Having done so, the burden
of proof remained with the prosecution to prove the elements neces-
sary for referral to the adult court and pursuant to the 1980 amend-
ments that burden now is by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. (emphasis added).
In In re J.F.K., 316 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 1982), the supreme court ruled that
where rebuttal evidence is introduced in response to a prima facie case, the issues
of amenability and dangerousness must be decided based on the whole record.
In this case the state established a prima facie case but the defense in-
troduced substantial evidence rebutting the prima facie case. It was
thus up to the juvenile court to decide whether the state had met its
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence on the basis of the
entire record and not by reference to the prima facie case.
Id. at 564 (emphasis added); accord In re D.R.D., 415 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) ("Where . . . there is no prima facie case, the court must consider the
totality of circumstances, including eleven factors set out in the juvenile court
rules .. "); In re S.R.L., 400 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In re K.J.K.,
357 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (where alleged offense does not create a
prima facie case for waiver, court must consider totality of the circumstances).
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ble to treatment or constitutes a threat to public safety. 6 7 Trial
judges are vested with broad discretion when making waiver/sen-
tencing decisions. 6 8 A decision to refer or to retain a juvenile may
not be overturned on appeal unless it is "clearly erroneous" so as
to constitute an abuse of discretion.' 69 On the basis of the whole
record and with "the focus on the child," Judge Ring concluded
that the prosecution failed to prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence either that Brom was not amenable to treatment or that he
threatened public safety.'7 0
The reference hearing record, including the testimony of two
clinicians, supported Judge Ring's conclusions that the prosecution
had failed to carry its burden by "clear and convincing evidence"
167. See S.R.L, 400 N.W.2d at 384 (once defense rebuts prima facie case, prosecu-
tion then has burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence under the totality of
the circumstances); KJ.K., 357 N.W.2d at 119; In re Haaland, 346 N.W.2d 190, 193
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (state must prove clearly and convincingly that juvenile is
either not amenable to treatment or a threat to public safety before court can waive
for adult prosecution).
168. See In re Hartung, 304 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 1981) ("juvenile court has
broad discretion in determining whether either of the statutory prerequisites to ref-
erence exists"); In re K.P.H., 289 N.W.2d 722, 724 (Minn. 1980); In re J.B.M., 263
N.W.2d 74, 76 (Minn. 1978); In re R.J.C., 419 N.W.2d 636, 637 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
("considerable latitude"); In re D.R.D., 415 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
("wide latitude"); In re J.A.R., 408 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("broad
discretion"); In re T.R.C., 398 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("considerable
latitude"); In re K.J.K., 357 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); In re Haaland,
346 N.W.2d 190, 193 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) ("vested with broad discretion").
169. See In re Hartung, 304 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 1981) ("findings will not be
disturbed on appeal unless 'clealy erroneous' "); In re Clipper, 293 N.W.2d 43
(Minn. 1980) ("district court did not clearly err in its findings or abuse its discre-
tion"); In re Roybal, 289 N.W.2d 165, 166 (Minn. 1980); In re I.Q.S., 309 Minn. 78, 86-
87, 244 N.W.2d 30, 38 (1976); In re S.E.M., 421 N.W.2d 369, 370 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988); In re R.J.C., 419 N.W.2d 636, 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); In re D.R.D., 415
N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (" 'clearly erroneous' so as to constitute an
abuse of discretion"); In re J.A.R., 408 N.W.2d 692, 694 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (re-
verse only if decision "based on clearly erroneous findings"); In re T.R.C., 398
N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) ("clearly erroneous so as to constitute an
abuse of discretion"); In re R.W.B., 376 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
("clearly erroneous"); In re D.M., 373 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(" 'clearly erroneous' so as to constitute an abuse of discretion"); In re K.J.K., 357
N.W.2d 117, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); In re J.R.D., 342 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) ("On review, the trial court's findings will not be disturbed absent a
showing that they are 'clearly erroneous' so as to constitute an abuse of
discretion.").
170. In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955, Memorandum at 17 (Olmsted County, Minn.
Dist. Ct. Apr. 21, 1988) ("Since the evidence cannot be said to be clear and convinc-
ing proof that he cannot be treated, the petitioner [prosecutor] has failed to carry
the burden of proof on this issue."). Based on his findings of fact, supra notes 154-
155 and accompanying text, Judge Ring's conclusion of law was that "the petitioner
has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the child is not suitable
to treatment or that the public safety is not served under the provisions of law re-
lating to the juvenile courts." Id., Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
at 2.
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to prove that Brom was not amenable to treatment or was danger-
ous.'71 Dr. Carl Malmquist, a psychiatrist appointed by the court
to evaluate Brom, testified that David's depression would require
long-term treatment. 72 Dr. Malmquist was asked specifically
whether he could assure the court that Brom could be successfully
treated within the juvenile justice system before Brom's nine-
teenth birthday.173 While Dr. Malmquist could not guarantee a
171. Previous decisions emphasized the need for psychological data to support a
finding that a juvenile is or is not suitable for treatment. In re Dahl, 278 N.W.2d
316, 319 (Minn. 1979); In re D.M., 373 N.W.2d 845, 850 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (there
must be psychological data supporting the juvenile court's conclusion); In re
R.D.W., 407 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (conclusion that a juvenile is un-
suitable for treatment "must be based on psychological data or a history of miscon-
duct as well as the juvenile's age, level of maturity, and the seriousness of the
offense").
Judge Ring's finding that the prosecution had failed to prove that Brom could
not be treated was based on the reports and testimony of three clinicians-Dr. Carl
Malmquist, Dr. R. Owen Nelson, and Dr. James Gilbertson.
Dr. Malmquist's testimony, bolstered by a 23-page report, see supra note 150,
concluded that Brom suffered from a "major depressive episode," but that "the
child could be treated" and that he could not say that "the child could not be suc-
cessfully treated" within the two-and-a-half years remaining under juvenile court
jurisdiction. In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955, Memorandum at 3-4, 12, 17 (Olmsted
County, Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 21, 1988). Dr. Malmquist emphasized that Brom
needed long-term treatment, but "declined to say what period of time that would
be, saying that you can never tell ahead of time how long treatment like this will
take." Id. at 16-17.
Dr. Gilbertson testified that "two-and-a-half years would normally be a rela-
tively long time for such treatment because it usually takes only a few weeks or
months," id. at 4, and that "two-and-a-half years would be considered quite a long
time for [treating] a problem such as we have here." Id. at 17.
Dr. Owen's psychometric assessments, relied upon by both clinicians in their
evaluations of Brom, did not express an opinion as to the amount of time that treat-
ment would take. Id. at 17.
172. I think somebody with the degree of depression David has had and
which we know culminated in the acts that are a fact and his suicidal
tendencies, you need some long-term treatment focused on his de-
pressed state, which there are tendencies that he's had towards self-
destruction as well as outbursts of violence this way and I think that's
the kind of thing that would need addressing.... I couldn't [tell how
long treatment would take], except I would say that I would presume
it would take some time. The reason I can't ahead of time is that you
can never tell ahead of time how long treatment like this is going to
take and you have to monitor it just like with any other kind of medi-
cal condition. David was severely depressed, there's no doubt in my
mind about that and in fact my concern about him at this point is
David has always been a compliant boy, he doesn't know what to do
with his agression. It might seem paradoxical in view of the acts that
have occurred, but that's exactly what I mean. And a whole recon-
struction is needed in terms of how he deals with this problem within
himself and the world, and something went awry there very deeply.
That's where the problem is now. And so the concerns I'd have would
be as much suicide as anything else now.
Transcript at 198-99 (testimony of Dr. Carl Malmquist).
173. Id. at 202-03.
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successful therapeutic intervention within that time, neither could
he assert that such an intervention would not be successful.174
In contrast to Dr. Malmquist's somewhat guarded prognosis,
Dr. James Gilbertson, who testified as an expert witness on
Brom's behalf at the reference hearing, suggested several treat-
ment programs that he believed would be appropriate for and suc-
cessful with Brom. 175 Dr. Gilbertson did not interview Brom
personally, but based his opinion solely on the reports submitted
by Malmquist and a psychometrician. 176
Q. Imagine that you are to treat an individual who is a teen-
age boy about 16 years of age who has committed such an act
of explosive violence, who has no prior criminal history and no
prior legal problems, no history of violence, who is seen as en-
gaging and likeable and who does well in school, who has se-
vere conflicts at home and who has been diagnosed as having a
major depressive episode. First of all, is it possible to treat
such an individual?
A. Yes.177
Q. So is the personality trait situation which we are discussing
in our example treatable and able to be changed?
174. I'd have some real reservations if I was being asked to carry out the
treatment, and I'm putting your question in those terms, that I could
assure myself as well as David if he was my patient as well as the
court that at 19 I could step back and say I'm totally assured in this
matter to the degree of medical certainty, for example, that I don't
have to worry about suicide or homicide for anybody. I say that on the
basis that this is a whole unfolding personality which has emerged by
16 that needs reworking. David doesn't know what to do with his ag-
gression. He smiles and is a nice kid, everybody likes him. That comes
through in all the voluminous reports that everybody who has talked
about David says. And he is likable. The problem is that he doesn't
know what to do when other people or events in his life aren't likable
and they're difficult, and that's the difficulty he ran into. He didn't
know what to do about it. So is it possible by 19? Yeah, it's possible,
but if I was going to weigh my bets on it I'd say I wouldn't be comfort-
able if somebody could say at 19 no matter what you do we're done.
That kind of either/all proposition for me would put me in a bind as a
psychiatrist.
Id. at 203-04.
In his written report, Dr. Malmquist also expressed
some serious reservations given my perspective on the boy's problems
as a psychiatrist, whether he is going to be able to receive appropriate
treatment and control to resolve the multiple problems he has been
struggling with over many years by the time he reaches 19 years. Part
of the answer to this question is related to what we mean by
treatment....
Malmquist Report at 23.
175. Transcript at 300-02 (testimony of Dr. James Gilbertson).
176. Id. at 290-91. One can only speculate as to why the defense clinical expert
did not actually interview Brom. Perhaps it involved a defense strategy to avoid
probing questions as to the factual premises upon which the expert opinion was
based or an effort to avoid factual inconsistencies between the experts which could
be exploited by the prosecution on cross examination.
177. Id. at 295.
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A. Given the diagnosis that Dr. Malmquist puts forward of a
major depressive reaction or disorder, these typically are quite
treatable, quite amenable to change.178
Dr. Gilbertson was also asked whether Brom could be treated
within less than three years, the time remaining within juvenile
court jurisdiction, and testified that successful treatment was
likely within that time.179
178. Id. at 297. Dr. Gilbertson went on to describe the type of treatment that
Brom's disorder required:
Q. What kind of treatment would be used to change this personality?
A. Mind you, there are two facets to the personality we're talking
about. One is the major depressive features which causes the negative
thinking, the poor self esteem, the tendency to think that there are no
other options other than to end his life or perhaps the life of others.
And then there's this other feature, the over controlled part which
gives the fuel, if you will, that is the triggering aspect of the depres-
sion. So if we're talking how does one treat that combination, first of
all, depression is quite a treatable disorder, either through medication
which often times is prescribed or through verbal psychotherapies or
counseling, either individual or on a group basis ....
As far as the over controlled individual .... [o]ne of the things
that we have to look at first is does the individual have some requisite
skills to begin the process of therapy? Are they bright? Are they in-
telligent? Do they have verbal facility? Can they talk and label
things? Can they form relationships with individuals? Is there a pre-
vious history of success in major institutions, school or church or fam-
ily or other kinds of things? Given that, a good premorbid or
pretrauma or preoffense history, there's a stronger likelihood that
they'll respond to treatment.
The matter, as I see it with Mr. Brom, is that he was extremely
over controlled, he collected injustices right and left. He saved up all
the pressures and humiliations, real or imagined, experienced at his fa-
ther or his family's hands. He had no way to bleed them off. He
wouldn't share these with other individuals. He perhaps had a superfi-
cial relationship with some girlfriends, but it was only superficial and
did not serve the process of venting or providing a catharsis or relief
from his difficulties. He was not assertive in the family situation. He
could not approach his father. He designed ways to avoid his father, to
leave his father's presence, would not talk to his father in any fashion
about the difficulties. So all of these things grew, simmered, increased
in pressure and combined with his own personality, probably started
the downslide into the depressive state Dr. Malmquist sets forward.
What would be needed with Mr. Brom is to teach him to come for-
ward, to be more assertive, to learn to label his feelings, not to retreat
from people if they hurt him, but to come up to them and share with
them what they've done to him to help establish a dialogue on what
hurts him or what doesn't hurt him, not to save them up quietly, not
to retreat into rock music, not to avoid or evade, but to come forward.
That could be done either individually [or] in a group process, and as I
say, in combination with medication if it was deemed necessary by a
physician to help calm his mood or reduce some of his fearfulness. I
understand in reading Dr. Malmquist's report that he is an individual
who is overly sensitive to things, becomes overly frightened of things
that most people would not and sometimes calmative medication is
helpful in the overall treatment plan.
Id. at 297-300.
179. That's always a factor of the disorder and secondarily the program
that the individual is in. I might say, however, that with.., major de-
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Q. So do you think an individual could successfully be treated
in two-and-a-half years?
A. Yes, given cooperativeness, given aggressiveness and inten-
sity of programming. Very definitely.'80
Dr. Gilbertson conceded, on cross-examination, that the success of
a treatment program depended on the cooperation of the pa-
tient.' 8 ' On redirect, however, he opined there were no indications
that Brom was averse to therapeutic intervention. 8 2 Finally,
Brom's attorney asked Dr. Gilbertson whether Brom could be
treated successfully within the time remaining under juvenile
court jurisdiction, a period of two-and-a-half years. He responded:
Given the diagnosis of major depressive disorder and even
with the over controlled nature, two-and-a-half years of availa-
bility of aggressive treatment is a luxury. To have sanctioned
treatment for two-and-a-half yearsfor most treatment folk is a
luxury. Typically most depressive disorders are treated in a
far shorter time. Most of them within ten days to two weeks in
a hospital with follow-up. Some, four orfive months if they're
fairly untractable depressions that aren't yielding well to the
combination of medication and talking therapies, if you will
Two-and-a-half years is quite a long time given the working di-
pressive disorder as the working diagnosis, that typically that is a dis-
order that can be treated fairly rapidly as treatment programs are
discussed. Depression typically is a discreet event. It has a beginning
and an ending. For some it's longer, for some it's shorter. For some it
ends in suicide. For some it may end in another cataclysmic event. In
some cases it spontaneously remits or goes away. For some they get
treatment, either medication or counseling and it goes away. If there's
one good thing about depression, it's that it does have an ending, an
end point. Certainly in this case the goal would be to intervene agres-
sively and to end the depression and to end the feelings of being
trapped or that nothing counts and there is no way out. And I think
that could be accomplished in an aggressive program that would follow
an individual over the length of time at least available in this case.
Id. at 304-06.
180. Id. at 305-06 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 307-09.
182. Q. Dr. Gilbertson, you were asked about whether or not the ability of
the individual to accept his problem and to cooperate with treatment is
an important factor. In reviewing Dr. Malmquist's report do you see
anything in there that would indicate that David Brom is not-would
not be cooperative or would not accept what his situation is?
A. I did not see in Dr. Malmquist's report that he was adverse to treat-
ment or that he even knew what treatment meant or what he'd have
to go about doing. I think Dr. Malmquist saw a young man who was
naive, I guess would be the word, and just was certainly taken aback
by what he had done, but probably had little notion, if I could read be-
tween the lines, of what to do about this, how this could be prevented.
And given the fact that he has never been in counseling or treatment,
I would expect him to be that non-knowledgeable about it. But I
didn't read anything in Dr. Malmquist's report that's saying he was ad-
verse against treatment, had taken a position not to change or in any
way was oppositional toward treatment.
Id. at 313-14.
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agnosis we have here. 183
Judge Ring also concluded, despite the extraordinary violence
of Brom's crimes, that Brom did not pose a threat to public
safety.184 Again, the testimony of Dr. Gilbertson supported this
finding.
Obviously, Mr. Brom was not an antisocial predatory type who
fought and aggressed and lost his cool or exploded day after
183. Id. at 314-15 (emphasis added).
The disagreement between Drs. Malmquist and Gilbertson over Brom's progno-
sis continues after the trial. In later correspondence, Dr. Malmquist notes:
I should point out something that was never clarified in the courtroom
and should have been. I was never called back to expand on my im-
pressions of the opinion that David could be treated in such a short
time by Dr. G.... In my opinion, Dr. G was viewing the depressive
episode of David as an isolated phenomenon--something that would
not recur-and therefore we could really forget about it. This view-
point is more valid if we are talking about mild types of upsets-the
typical brief depressions many adolescents (as well as humans have).
In fact, serious depressions like David had are not self-limiting, and in
fact if he is manic-depressive in the future, they are very likely to re-
cur and be cyclic.
Such cases always give me trouble as a psychiatrist because it is
never clear to me what orientation a court or the attorneys are using
when they talk about "amenability to treatment." Some use this in
terms of the treatment a juvenile correctional facility dispenses; others
think in terms of simply putting the juvenile on some medication and
letting biochemistry do its work; then there are the other myriad ap-
proaches from discipline, work camps, etc.... [W]hen someone on the
witness stand simply is asked: Are there treatment facilities that can
treat this juvenile in 2 1/2 years? Answer: Yes. But, things never get
beyond that formality. I was determined not to slip into that naive yes
or no approach. I was also mindful in my answers that in the areas of
civil commitment, no specific time limits are put on the duration of
the commitment although periodic hearings regarding progress may
rightfully be held. The reason is that no one can tell ahead of time
what the course of a treatment outcome will be.
Letter from Dr. Carl Malmquist (July 10, 1989) (emphasis added) (copy on file with
Law & Inequality).
184. In determining that Brom did not pose a threat to other members of the
community, Judge Ring relied on the testimony of clinicians.
[Dr. Malmquist] found this child to be a quiet, compliant boy suffering
from depression and did not see him as a significant threat to the com-
munity. Dr. Gilbertson said it [threat to the community] would be a
factor only if untreated.
In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955, Memorandum at 12 (Olmsted County, Minn. Dist. Ct.
Apr. 21, 1988).
Judge Ring further concluded that even though Minnesota does not have a se-
cure juvenile treatment facility, that would not be a factor in evaluating Brom's
threat to public safety.
It does not appear to me that secure facilities is a major issue in this
case. There is nothing about the child which has been presented to me
which suggests a need for high security. He has been described by eve-
ryone as being polite, compliant, obedient, etc.... None of those who
knew him and testified in court expressed major fear so long as he can
be observed, counseled, etc. Again, this issue turns on whether he can
be treated.
Id. at 14-15.
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day, month after month. There did not appear to be intermit-
tent explosive features to him, which often times you can see
with this disorder. It appeared to be an explosive situation
within the context of this family, an intimate grouping of in-
dividuals of which he was a member, with the pressures build-
ing up over time with the young man seeing at least no other
option available. Re-offending for Mr. Brom, again, the pre-
diction would be it would have to take those same concatena-
tion of events. He'd have to be in an intimate grouping. He'd
have to be in there long enough to feel bonded He'd have to
feel that there was no way to deal with the authority present.
He would have to feel put down, rebuked, criticized, uncared
for. Whether this was real or imagined, those series of events
would have to all be occurring. And again, he'd have to be un-
treated. Namely, he'd still have this steel cap, if you will.
What is so unusual in this case is the context of the acting out,
the intimate grouping, if you will. It's the thing that makes it
the wholesale tragedy that it is. He is not at risk to the general
public. Untreated and were he not to change, the risk would
probably be in the intimate grouping he would find himself
later on in his life. 18 5
Viewing the record of the waiver hearing objectively, there
was ample evidence to support Judge Ring's decision. Conse-
quently, his findings of fact could not be clearly erroneous or an
abuse of discretion. 86 Indeed, neither the court of appeals' nor the
supreme court's opinions that reversed his decision said that Judge
Ring's findings of fact were "clearly erroneous" or an "abuse of
discretion," 8 7 the sole criteria for overturning trial court factual
determinations.1ss The higher courts, therefore, had to construct
an acceptable alternative rationale for a legally correct but politi-
cally unacceptable decision.
2. Minnesota Court of Appeals: Reconciling a Legislative
Contradiction
Judge Huspeni, writing for the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
initially assessed the effects of the 1980 legislative amendments
185. Transcript at 315-16 (testimony of Dr. James Gilbertson) (emphasis added).
186. The general rule in reference cases is that findings will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a showing that they are clearly erroneous so as to constitute an abuse
of discretion. See cases cited supra note 169.
187. In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475, 480-82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) ("We nonetheless
accept as not clearly erroneous the trial court's determination that the prima facie
case was rebutted .... We cannot criticize the trial court's application of section
260.125, subd. 3 and Dahl to the facts as it found them."); In re D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d
79, 82 (Minn. 1988).
188. See supra note 186 and cases cited supra note 169. The usual standard used
to review findings of fact is whether the trial court erred in ordering or denying
reference under the "clearly erroneous" abuse-of-discretion test. See infra notes
230-243 and accompanying text.
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permitting the prosecution to establish a "prima facie case" for
waiver based on a juvenile's age and offense.189 The prosecution
had argued that once it established a prima facie case for waiver,
the burden of persuasion shifted to Brom to demonstrate affirma-
tively that he should be retained as a juvenile.' 90 The court re-
jected this novel, burden-shifting interpretation of the effect of a
"prima facie case" as "unsound" and concluded that "the burden of
persuasion remains at all times upon the state."'19
The court then considered whether Brom had rebutted effec-
tively the prosecution's prima facie case by introducing "significant
evidence" or "substantial evidence."192 The court reasoned that
the requirement of "significant" rebuttal evidence was intended
"to impose upon a juvenile offender, against whom a prima facie
case for reference had been established, a burden to go forward
with a quantum of evidence greater than that which would be re-
quired to rebut a prima facie case in other civil matters." 93 Thus,
while the prosecutor retained the ultimate burden of persuasion,
proof of a prima facie case shifted the burden of production to de-
fendant and required the introduction of more rebuttal evidence
189. In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475, 477 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
190. Id. at 478-79. In its brief, appellant contended that the amendments al-
lowing the prosecution to establish a "prima facie case" for waiver and subsequent
cases interpreting those changes shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
Consistent with legislative intent in response to Dahl, the lan-
guage in Givens, J.F.K, and Minn. R. Pro. Juv. Cts., Rule 32.05, the
prima facie case shifts the burden of proof to the juvenile to establish
by significant evidence that he is amenable to treatment and that pub-
lic safety is served by retaining him in the juvenile court system.
The Appellate Court adopted this meaning in [In re D.M.]: "The
State may prove its case for reference either by clear and convincing
evidence of non-amenability to treatment or dangerousness pursuant
to Minnesota Statutes § 260.125, Subd. 2 (1986) or by proof of an of-
fense establishing a prima facie case under Minnesota Statutes
§ 260.125, Subd. 3 (1984). The effect of the prima facie finding is that
the burden shifts to the juvenile to establish that he is amenable to
treatment and that the public safety is served by retaining him in the
juvenile court system."
Appellant's Brief & Appendix at 30-31, In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (emphasis added).
191. D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d at 479. The court concluded that because neither the
language of the statute nor the rules of procedure evidenced an intention to shift
the burden of persuasion to a juvenile, "[a]bsent specific indication from the legisla-
ture, we must conclude that it is only the burden of producing evidence which
shifts." Id.
192. Id. at 479. Minn. R.P. Juv. Cts. 32.05(2) requires a juvenile to rebut the
prima facie case by "significant evidence." In In re J.F.K., 316 N.W.2d 563 (Minn.
1982), and in In re S.R.L., 400 N.W.2d 382 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), the courts held
that rebuttal of a prima facie case required the defendant to produce "substantial
evidence." JFK, 316 N.W.2d at 564; S.R.L., 400 N.W.2d at 384.
193. D.FB., 430 N.W.2d at 479 (emphasis added).
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than would be required simply to create a disputed issue of fact.194
After reviewing some of the rebuttal evidence introduced by
Brom, the court concluded that Judge Ring's finding that Brom
had rebutted the "prima facie" case was not clearly erroneous.195
The court of appeals agreed with Judge Ring's analysis that
upon rebuttal of the prima facie case, the waiver decision reverted
to the trial judge's sound discretion under the "totality of the cir-
cumstances,"'196 with the burden of persuasion remaining with the
prosecution.197 Appellate courts repeatedly have emphasized the
broad discretion that trial judges enjoy in making this type of sen-
tencing decision.198 Judge Ring's opinion included an extended
discussion of the non-exclusive list of factors that the rules of pro-
cedure and previous decisions required him to consider under the
"totality of the circumstances."'199 Although Judge Ring regarded
the factual question as a close one, he ultimately concluded that
the prosecution had failed to meet its heavy burden of persua-
sion.2 00 And, again, the court of appeals agreed with Judge Ring's
analysis, noting that "[i]f our search for legislative intent is limited
to the amendatory language of section 260.125, subd. 3, we inevita-
bly will be compelled to reach the conclusion reached by the trial
court." 201 In short, the appeals court concluded that the trial
194. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court repudiated the court of appeals' conten-
tion that a greater quantum of rebuttal evidence was required in waiver cases than
in any other civil matter. See infra note 224 and accompanying text. The court of
appeals subsequently acknowledged that the evidence required to rebut a prima fa-
cie case for waiver is the same as in any other civil matter. See In re J.L.B., 435
N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (" 'Significant evidence' is the same as sub-
stantial evidence, and the quantum of evidence required to rebut a prima facie case
in a reference hearing is the same as in other civil matters.").
195. In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475, 480-81 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
196. Id. at 481; see supra notes 165-170 and accompanying text.
197. See, e.g., In re S.R.L., 400 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (Once the
prima facie case was rebutted, "[ilt was thus up to the juvenile court to decide
whether the State had met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence on
the basis of the entire record and not by reference to the prima facie case.").
198. See, e.g., In re K.P.H., 289 N.W.2d 722, 724 (Minn. 1980) ("The juvenile court
is vested with broad discretion in determining whether either of the statutory crite-
ria exists upon which to base its reference decision .... ); In re J.B.M., 263 N.W.2d
74, 76 (Minn. 1978); In re K.J.K., 357 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) ("The
court has broad discretion in determining whether a juvenile is suitable for treat-
ment in the juvenile system, and its decision will not be overturned unless it is
clearly erroneous.").
199. See In re D.F.B., No. 88-J-0955, Memorandum at 11-18 (Olmsted County,
Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 21, 1988).
200. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
201. In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475, 482 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). The court of ap-
peals quoted with approval Judge Ring's analysis that the net effect of the 1980
amendments was to make juvenile court waiver more difficult, rather than easier.
The court went on to note:
In addition, if we are permitted to look only to the amendatory lan-
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court's application of section 260.125, subd. 3 and Dahl to the facts
as it found them was correct. Thus, Judge Ring correctly inter-
preted and applied the waiver statute and the evidence supported
his decision.
Even though the court of appeals agreed with every step of
Judge Ring's analysis, it concluded, as a matter of law, that Judge
Ring was wrong and that Brom must be tried as an adult.202 Judge
Ring's error, according to the court of appeals, was in following the
statutory language as written and the cases interpreting it.
Rather, Judge Huspeni asserted that "broader consideration of the
1980 amendments to Chapter 260 is not only warranted but is re-
quired," and that such a "broader consideration" would lead irrev-
ocably to the conclusion that Brom must stand trial as an adult.20 3
Judge Huspeni noted that in addition to amending the waiver
provisions, the legislature had also modifed the purpose clause of
the Minnesota juvenile code.204 The amended purpose clause pro-
vided the court with a means to "gloss" the specific language of the
waiver statute.205 While the exclusively benevolent and rehabilita-
tive purpose of the juvenile court remains for children "alleged or
adjudicated in need of protection or services,"206 for juveniles
charged with crimes, "[tihe purpose of the laws relating to chil-
dren alleged ... to be delinquent is to promote the public safety...
by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting
certain behavior and by developing individual responsibility for
lawful behavior."2 0 7
guage of section 260.125, subd. 3, and to the language of Rule 32.05, we
will be compelled to echo the trial court's determination regarding the
continued viability of Dahl; that upon rebuttal of the state's prima fa-
cie case Dahl is still good law, and that in the absence of supporting
psychological data or history of misconduct, the child's age, the serious
nature of the offense charged, social adjustment and maturity level are
insufficient to support a finding that D.F.B. could not be successfully
treated within the juvenile court system.
Id. at 482.
202. Id. "Such consideration irrevocably leads us, as we are certain it would
have led the trial court, to a determination that D.F.B. must be referred to stand
trial as an adult." Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.; see Minn. Stat. § 260.011(2) (1988); see also supra notes 132-133 and ac-
companying text. See generally Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal,"
supra note 7, at 197-203; Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 14, at 841-47.
205. Using the purpose clause to "gloss" the waiver statute is a common practice.
"Courts have also avoided invalidating [waiver] statutes on vagueness grounds by
finding that the general purpose statement of the enabling legislation creating the
juvenile court provided sufficient statutory guidance. The general purpose clauses,
however, typically provide scant guidance for decisionmakers .. " Feld, Reference
of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 550; see also id. nn.105-106.
206. Minn. Stat. § 260.011(2)(a) (1988).
207. Id. § 260.011(2)(c) (emphasis added).
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According to the court of appeals, "[i]f the words 'maintaining
the integrity of the substantive law prohibiting certain behavior'
are to have any meaning," then trial judges must look beyond the
characteristics of the child in analyzing the "totality of the circum-
stances," even though that alone is the legislative mandate.208
Thus, Judge Ring's error of law, according to the court of appeals,
was his failure to use the broad, general, and contradictory lan-
guage of the purpose clause as an aid in construing the specific and
unambiguous language of the waiver statute.
The court of appeals was clearly aware of the public outcry
that followed Judge Ring's decision to retain Brom as a juvenile.
Within the constraints of its appellate function, it sought to re-
verse his unpalatable ruling by shifting the emphasis in waiver
proceedings from the treatability of the offender to the seriousness
of the offense.
We are convinced that the legislature intended the language of
section 260.011 to ensure that the criminal justice system
would not be permitted to provide an excessively minimal re-
sponse to an offense which had a major impact upon society.
The brutal murders of these four family members has had a
major impact on society. Retention of the alleged murderer
within the criminal justice system for less than three years
would constitute an excessively minimal response.
We conclude that the legislature intended to protect the
strong and legitimate interest of the public in a fair response
by the criminal justice system to a heinous crime. There can
be no doubt that the offenses here are heinous and that the
only fair response of the criminal justice system, as a matter of
law, must be referral. The state's interest in the integrity of
the substantive law, under the facts of this case, overcomes any
consideration, however weighty, given by the trial court to the
absence of anti-social or violent behavior in D.F.B.'s past.20 9
In short, the seriousness of Brom's crimes outweighs any consider-
ation of his amenability to treatment or lack of threat to the pub-
lic; the offense takes precedence over the offender.
208. In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475, 482 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). The court was
"persuaded by the language of section 260.011 that the trial court, upon rebuttal of
the prima facie case, must not be hobbled by the statutorily weakened analysis of
Dahl and of Rule 32.05, subd. 2, especially subd. 2(h) (the record and previous his-
tory of the child), as the trial court here so clearly believed itself to be." Id.
209. Id. at 482-83 (emphasis added). More likely, Judge Huspeni's references to
the "criminal justice system" in the first quoted paragraph should have been to the
"juvenile justice system," i.e., "[r]etention . . . within the [juvenile] justice system
for less than three years..." and "the [juvenile]justice system would not be permit-
ted to provide an excessively minimal response to an offense which had major im-
pact upon society." See id. The reference instead to the "criminal justice system"
provides a Freudian revelation of the court of appeals' preoccupation with the
offense.
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In order to assure that Judge Ring's continuing exercise of ju-
dicial sentencing discretion would not frustrate its newly-found
legislative intent to subordinate the offender to the offense, the
court of appeals ruled that Brom must be tried as an adult, as a
matter of law, without remanding the case to the trial judge for re-
consideration.2 10 With its exclusive emphasis on the seriousness of
the offense, the court justified its action by asserting that Judge
Ring would have reached the same conclusion as they did in any
event.21 1
The court of appeals clearly shared the public's perception
that Brom's crimes were extraordinarily serious and that retaining
him as a juvenile with a maximum sentence of less than three
years would constitute an excessively minimal response to those
offenses. Yet, even the 1980 legislative amendments of the waiver
statute retained the central focus on the characteristics of the of-
fender. The seriousness of the offense, however violent, is rele-
vant to the waiver inquiry only as far as it reflects a youth's
amenability to treatment or threat to public safety.
Notwithstanding the court of appeals' preoccupation with the
seriousness of the offense, the court failed to elaborate on the rela-
tionship between the general language of the purpose clause and
the specific provisions of the waiver statute except in bald, unil-
luminating, and conclusory terms.2 1 2 Moreover, the court quoted
selectively and disingenuously from the legislative amendments of
the purpose clause, because the very next sentence contradicted
the rationale of its decision. Following the language that the court
quoted, the amended purpose clause continues, "This purpose
should be pursued through means that are fair and just, that recog-
nize the unique characteristics and needs of children, and that
give children access to opportunities for personal and social
growth."213 If the amended purpose clause provides a basis for
glossing the waiver statute, then providing a treatable youngster
with "access to opportunities for personal and social growth" is
consistent with Judge Ring's finding that the prosecution failed to
210. Id. at 483.
211. Id. The court of appeals noted:
We have considered returning this matter to the trial court for further
consideration on the basis of our analysis of section 260.011. We con-
clude, however, that such is unnecessary. We have no doubt that upon
reconsideration and application of section 260.011 to the facts of this
case, the trial court unquestionably would reach the decision we have
reached.
Id.
212. See id. at 482-83.
213. Minn. Stat. § 260.011(2)(c) (1988) (emphasis added).
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show that Brom was not amenable to treatment. Perhaps this
omission explains why the court of appeals precluded Judge Ring's
review of the case following its statutory reinterpretation.
The court of appeals decision is straightforward-as a matter
of law, the extraordinary seriousness of Brom's offenses requires
his prosecution as an adult. If the court correctly interpreted the
law, then the legislature reached that end in an extraordinarily
convoluted and indirect manner. The credibility of the court's
analysis is further eroded when one recalls that the legislature was
presented with an explicit opportunity to exclude certain serious
offenses from the juvenile court's jurisdiction entirely and de-
clined to do so. 214 Contrarily, the statute continued to vest in juve-
nile court judges the discretion to make individualized
determinations of amenability and dangerousness.
Not only is the court of appeals' logic hardly compelling, its
use of the juvenile code's purpose clause to justify its result raises
more problems than it resolves.215 The fundamental justification
for denying jury trials in delinquency proceedings216 and, more ba-
sically, for maintaining a juvenile justice system separate from the
214. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text.
215. In addition to the court of appeals' reading a punitive purpose into the Min-
nesota juvenile code, the Minnesota Department of Corrections uses administra-
tively adopted determinate sentencing guidelines based on the seriousness of the
present offense and the length of the prior record to establish a juvenile's length of
confinement. See Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, Juvenile Release Guidelines 3-5
(Sept. 1980). See generally Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 14, at 871-74.
Apparently, some of Minnesota's juvenile court judges also use determinate sen-
tencing guidelines to decide whether and for how long a youth should be confined.
See, e.g., In re D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d 772 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). In D.S.F., Judge Crip-
pen noted that
[the] determinate sentence of incarceration imposed by the trial court
was prompted by unpublished sentencing guidelines, based singularly
on the offense committed, and not by spontaneous exercise of discre-
tion by the presiding judge.... [Where the sentence is based upon the
type of offense committed,] we are dealing ... with a criminal justice
sentence, not a juvenile court disposition aimed at doing what is best
for the individual. The juvenile has been ordered incarcerated for a
definite term as part of a predetermined sentencing practice.
Id. at 779-80.
216. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). "Although Minnesota's
new punitive purpose clause marks a fundamental philosophical departure from its
previously rehabilitative orientation, the legislature did not provide for jury trials
in juvenile proceedings." Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 14, at 844. See
generally Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 197-203.
Moreover, in In re K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1987), the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that a juvenile could not voluntarily waive jurisdiction in order to ob-
tain a jury trial in an adult criminal proceeding. "The legislature could, and appar-
ently did, conclude that allowing a juvenile to waive juvenile court jurisdiction for
some perceived short-term benefit ignores the best interests of the State in address-
ing juvenile problems as well as the overall interests of the juvenile." Id. at 840.
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adult criminal system, is that punishment for offenses and treat-
ment of offenders are fundamentally different and inconsistent so-
cietal responses to crime.217 Many of the other procedural
differences between juvenile and adult criminal proceedings, in-
cluding the routine absence of lawyers, are based on a similar pun-
ishment versus treatment distinction.2 18
The court of appeals attempted to perform a traditional ap-
pellate function in reviewing legislation. Because the legislature
tried to accomplish mutually exclusive purposes, the statute was
conceptually flawed and practically inapplicable. Despite the
court's analytical failures, it attempted to make sense of the legis-
lative contradictions. To the' extent that its opinion emphasized
the principle of the offense, the court was introducing a judicial re-
form-moving juvenile court waiver decisions toward a more ra-
tional, less discretionary standard focused on the offense. Thus,
217. See, e.g., Martin Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A Conceptual
Framework for Assessing Constitutional Rights of Youthful Offenders, 35 Vand. L.
Rev. 791 (1982). Gardner argues that "[u]nlike the criminal law, juvenile justice re-
sponds to the status of children in need, treating them for what they are rather
than punishing them for what they have done." Id. at 791. See generally Feld,
Punishment, Treatment, supra note 14, at 822-25.
218. See Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 8, at 273-74, which
concludes:
Despite the criminalization of the juvenile court, it remains nearly as
true today as two decades ago that "the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that [the child] gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated
for children." This article has identified a number of instances in
which the procedural safeguards afforded to juvenile offenders are not
comparable either formally or functionally to those provided to adult
criminal defendants....
The court's policy choices also reflect a basic philosophical ambiv-
alence about the continued role of the juvenile court. As juvenile
courts become increasingly criminalized and converge with their adult
counterparts, there may be little reason to maintain a separate juve-
nile criminal court whose sole distinguishing characteristics is its per-
sisting procedural deficiencies.
Id. (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)).
Further, the routine absence of lawyers in delinquency proceedings, despite
Gault's promise of representation, calls into question the basic legitimacy of the ju-
venile court's adjudicative process. The United States Supreme Court in In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), held that juvenile offenders were constitutionally entitled
to the assistance of counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings because "[a] pro-
ceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and
subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution." Id. at 36.
Gault's promise of counsel remains unrealized in many jurisdictions, including
Minnesota. See Barry Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparison of the
Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 Crime & Delinq. 393 (1988) [hereinafter
Feld, In re Gault Revisited] (In half of the six states surveyed only 37.5%, 47.7%
[Minnesota], and 52.7% of the juveniles were represented); Feld, Right to Counsel,
supra note 83, at 1220 (Table 3) (In 1986, only 45.3% of Minnesota's delinquents
were represented by counsel.).
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the court of appeals' result-oriented activist strategy to salvage the
Brom case had far broader ramifications for juvenile justice ad-
ministration in Minnesota than it recognized or acknowledged.
3. Minnesota Supreme Court: De Novo Review
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted Brom's petition for
review "for the limited purpose of substituting our opinion.., for
that of the court of appeals."219 Although the court agreed with
the ultimate result reached by the court of appeals, it offered an
alternative, factual rather than legal, rationale for the decision of
the lower court.220
Like the courts before it, the Minnesota Supreme Court's
analysis began with Dahl and the post-Dahl legislative amend-
ments. Chief Justice Amdahl opined that Dahl decided that the
purpose of a waiver hearing is to consider "all of the relevant fac-
tors-not just age or seriousness of the offense-to determine if
the statutory test of reference has been met."22 1 The court also re-
viewed the 1980 amendments of the purpose clause and the waiver
statute, noting that Brom, a sixteen-year-old charged with first de-
gree murder, fit the prima facie case criteria.22 2
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with Judge Ring that
once the juvenile had rebutted the prima facie case,
then the role for the juvenile court is to decide on the basis of
the entire record, without reference to the prima facie case,
whether the state has met its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the juvenile is unamenable to treat-
ment in the juvenile court system consistent with the public
safety.2 2 3
Moreover, the court repudiated the court of appeals' assertion that
the requirement of "significant" rebuttal evidence imposed a
219. In re D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d 79, 80 (Minn. 1988).
220. Id. at 80-82.
221. Id. at 80; see also Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note
7, which noted that
the offense charged was obviously "among the relevant factors to be
considered" and "the record must contain direct evidence that the ju-
venile endangers the public safety for the statutory reference standard
to be satisfied." The case was thus remanded to the certifying court,
which, in order to recertify, had to include in the record evidence that
the juvenile was not suitable to treatment or presented a threat to the
public safety.
The case, as decided, simply resolved the narrow issue of what fac-
tual record is necessary to support a judicial determination of
nonamenability to treatment or dangerousness and concluded that
proof of age and seriousness of the crime alone are insufficient.
Id. at 190-91 (quoting In re Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn. 1979)).
222. D.FB., 433 N.W.2d at 81.
223. Id. (emphasis added).
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greater evidentiary burden than would be required to rebut a pre-
sumption in other civil matters.2 24 The court agreed with Judge
Ring that the evidence introduced by Brom, bearing both on ame-
nability to treatment and the threat to public safety, was sufficient
to rebut the prima facie case.225
The sole issue in the case, then, was whether the state had
met its burden of proving by "clear and convincing" evidence, on
the basis of the entire record, that Brom either was not amenable
to treatment or was a threat to public safety.2 26 Rather than
adopting the court of appeals' strategy of using the purpose clause
224. Compare In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475, 479 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) with In re
D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1988). The supreme court stated:
We used the word "substantial" evidence in J.F.K, and the word "sig-
nificant" in Givens. We regard the words to be interchangeable. Fur-
thermore, it was our intent that the quantum of evidence connoted by
these terms is that which is required to rebut a prima facie case in
other civil matters.
D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d at 81 (emphasis added) (citing Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabili-
tative Ideal," supra note 7, at 209-10); see supra notes 192-194.
225. According to the supreme court,
[t]he issue then becomes whether it can be said that the state met its
burden of proof without regard to the presumption. In our view, once
the district court concludes that the juvenile has rebutted the pre-
sumption, then the district court has to analyze the entire record, us-
ing the same basic multi-factor analysis discussed in Dahl, to see if it
may be said that the state has proved by clear and convincing evidence
that the juvenile is unamenable to treatment in the juvenile court sys-
tem consistent with public safety.
Id.
226. Significantly, the legislature required the prosecutor to prove a case for
waiver by the "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof rather than by the
less stringent "preponderance of the evidence" standard.
The preference of one standard over the other is a function of the un-
derlying policies of allocating burdens of proof and the dangers of er-
roneous factual determinations. As noted by McCormick, while "the
traditional measure of persuasion in civil cases is by a preponderance
of evidence, there is a limited range of claims and contentions in which
the party is required to establish by a more exacting measure of per-
suasion." Typically, this more exacting civil burden of proof is re-
quired when the "particular type of claim should be disfavored on
policy grounds." The legislature apparently concluded that waiver of
juvenile court jurisdiction would be subjected to the more exacting
burden of proof because the policies underlying the juvenile court sys-
tem as a separate entity dictate that "juveniles should, in the ordinary
case, be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. Transfer, therefore,
should be the exception and not the rule."
Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 206 (emphasis ad-
ded). Affirming this analysis of the allocation of burdens of proof, appellate courts
have reiterated that transfer of even serious offenders is the exception, not the
rule. See, e.g., Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671, 681 (Ky.), cert denied, 469
U.S. 860 (1984); In re L.C., 184-N.J. Super. 569, 573, 446 A.2d 1233, 1235 (1982); see
also In re J.L.B., 435 N.W.2d 595, 601-02 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (Crippen, J.,
dissenting).
[Vol. 8:1
BAD LAW MAKES HARD CASES
to gloss the waiver statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court simply
substituted its view of the facts for those of the trial judge.
Employing the multi-factor analysis in this case-which is
what the trial court in Dahl was directed to do on remand-
would justify a reference decision in this case even if the legis-
lature's 1980 amendment of the purpose section was without
significance. While we agree with the court of appeals' conclu-
sion that the amendment of the purpose section makes it eas-
ier to conclude that reference is justified in this case, we do
not agree with the implication that reference is justified any
time a juvenile commits a heinous offense. Rather, reference
in this case is justified because-bearing in mind the legisla-
ture's revised statement of purpose and looking at all the fac-
tors listed in R. 32.05, including the offense with which D.F.B.
is charged, the manner in which he committed the offense, the
interests of society in the outcome of this case, the testimony
of Dr. Malmquist suggesting that treatment of D.F.B. might be
unsuccessful, and the weakness of Dr. Gilbertson's testimony-
the state met its burden of proving by clear and convincing ev-
idence that D.F.B. is unamenable to treatment in the juvenile
court system consistent with the public safety.
227
By supplanting the fact-finder's view of the evidence with its own,
the supreme court decided as a question of fact, not as a matter of
law, the ultimate issue of whether Brom should be tried as an
adult.
Having substituted its version of the facts for those of the
trial judge, the supreme court found it unnecessary to remand the
case for further consideration.228 Rather, it said that because "the
trial court wanted to refer the juvenile if the court could do so,"
under its revised assessment of the facts, the supreme court was
"in effect deciding the case as the district court had wanted to de-
cide it."229
Although the supreme court conceded that the trial court in-
terpreted and applied the waiver statute correctly, it disagreed
with the results of Judge Ring's exercise of judicial sentencing dis-
cretion. At no point in its opinion did the supreme court state that
Judge Ring's factual findings were "clearly erroneous" or an
"abuse of discretion." Rather, it simply disregarded its appellate
function in reviewing lower courts' findings of facts and used a dif-
ferent strategy than that employed by the court of appeals to reach
the politically "correct" result.
It is elementary hornbook law that appellate courts must de-
227. D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d at 81-82 (emphasis added).
228. Id. at 82.
229. Id.
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fer to findings of fact made by trial courts. 230 "Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses."231 Appellate courts reiterate that a factual finding by a
trial court may be overturned on appeal only if it is "clearly
erroneous."
2 32
A trial court's findings of fact can be set aside as "clearly er-
roneous" only if the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
firmly convinced that a mistake was made. 23 3 In order to conclude
that a trial court's findings are clearly erroneous, the appellate
court must find them to be manifestly contrary to the weight of
the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a
whole.2 34 Although the scope of appellate review of judicial find-
ings of fact may be broader than that applied to findings made by a
230. See, e.g., John Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal
Appellate Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 Wash.
U.L.Q. 409 (1981) (decrying appellate courts' failure to accord trial courts' findings
of fact the respect and deference envisioned by the clearly erroneous rule); Charles
Wright, The Doub(ful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 751 (1957);
Comment, An Analysis of the Application of the Clearly Erroneous Standard of
Rule 52(a) to Findings of Fact in Federal Nonjury Cases, 53 Miss. L.J. 473 (1983);
Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate Fact Review:
Has Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule Been Clearly Erroneous?, 52 St.
John's L. Rev. 68 (1977).
Courts have emphasized the deference that appellate courts must show to fact-
finding by the trial courts. See, e.g., Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771, 1777 (1988)
("clearly erroneous standard of review is a deferential one"); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534 n.8 (1979) ("great value" of appellate deference); Com-
missioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960) ("primary weight" must be given
to conclusions of trier of fact).
231. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
232. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
Trial court judges have also decried the tendency of appellate courts to review
evidentiary records expansively.' Judge John F. Nangle, Chief Judge of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, wrote,
The appellate courts have failed increasingly to accord to the trial
court's findings of fact the respect and deference envisioned by the
Clearly Erroneous Rule. Although purporting to pay homage to the
Clearly Erroneous Rule, appellate courts have become less reticent to
substitute their view of the evidence for that of the trial court to "do
justice."
Nangle, supra note 230, at 410.
233. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948), where
the Court held that "[a] finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evi-
dence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 395; accord Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74 n.19 (1978).
234. See, e.g., Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, 330 N.W.2d 428, 441 (Minn. 1983);
Olson v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 269 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Minn. 1978); Northern
States Power Co. v. Lyon Food Prods., Inc., 304 Minn. 196, 201, 229 N.W.2d 521, 524
(1975); Johnson v. Miera, 424 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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jury,2 35 the courts have also emphasized the exceptionally broad
sentencing discretion enjoyed by trial judges.23 6
In proceedings to a court without a jury, the trial court has
the primary responsibility of determining factual issues, and appel-
late courts necessarily defer to the trial court's sound judgment
and discretion. Where the findings are based on oral testimony,
appellate courts cannot judge the credibility or demeanor of the
witness. 237 The function of an appellate court is not to examine
the evidence as if trying the matter de novo, but rather to deter-
mine whether the record of the evidence, taken as a whole, sus-
tained the trial court's findings.238 The appellate court's role is to
235. See, e.g., In re Estate of Balafas 293 Minn. 94, 96, 198 N.W.2d. 260, 261 (1972).
236. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 302 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 1981) (trial court has
discretion to depart from sentencing guidelines); State v. Horoshak, 415 N.W.2d 404,
409 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (trial court has broad discretion). Indeed, because the
sentencing focus in juvenile proceedings is theoretically on the offender, not the of-
fense, the judge's scope of discretion is even broader. See Feld, Punishmen Treat-
ment, supra note 14, at 880 ("juvenile courts enjoy greater discretion than do their
adjudicatory counterparts at the adult criminal level because of the presumed need
... to look beyond the present offense").
237. See, e.g., Tamarac Inn, Inc. v. City of Long Lake, 310 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Minn.
1981); Berry v. Goetz, 348 N.W.2d 376, 378 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). Although some
appellate courts have used a broader scope of review where the trial court's find-
ings are based on physical or documentary evidence rather than credibility determi-
nations, the Supreme Court has not approved a different scope of review under
Rule 52(a). See Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985) (stressing
the special deference accorded determinations regarding the credibility of wit-
nesses); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). The Court has, how-
ever, emphasized even greater deference to fact-finding based on demeanor
evidence, "for only the trial judge can be aware of the variations in demeanor and
tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding of and belief in
what is said." Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 575.
Minnesota courts have emphasized that resolving conflicting testimony is the
exclusive function of the fact-finder because it has the opportunity to observe the
witnesses' demeanors and weigh their credibility. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 379
N.W.2d 70, 77 (Minn. 1985); State v. Lloyd, 345 N.W.2d 240, 245 (Minn. 1984).
238. Elaborating on the meaning of the "clearly erroneous" standard, the United
States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Bessemer City, stated:
This standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the
finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would
have decided the case differently. The reviewing court oversteps the
bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the
role of the lower court. "In applying the clearly erroneous standard to
the findings of a district court sitting without a jury, appellate courts
must constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide fac-
tual issues de novo."
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 573 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969)).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also emphasized judicial restraint in appel-
late review. "We cannot retry the facts, but must take the view of the evidence
most favorable to the state and must assume that the jury believed the state's wit-
nesses and disbelieved any contradictory evidence." State v. Merrill, 274 N.W.2d 99,
111 (Minn. 1978).
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evaluate the evidence supporting the trial court's decision to deter-
mine if it is legally sufficient, not to decide whether the reviewing
court would have reached a different result.239 In making this
evaluation, the evidence is evaluated in the light most favorable to
the trial court's findings. 240
The issue for an appellate court is not whether the evidence
could reasonably support findings contrary to those made by the
trial court, but rather whether the trial court's findings are sup-
ported by the record. Even though the appellate court might have
found the facts differently if it had decided the case in the first in-
stance, the issue on review is whether the trial judge's findings are
manifestly contrary to or not reasonably supported by the evidence
as a whole. Where there is a conflict of evidence, appellate courts
will not disturb those findings unless manifestly contrary to the
evidence as a whole.24 1 Where reasonable minds could differ, the
239. E.g., Hilton v. Nelson, 283 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn. 1979) (where trial court's
factual findings are reasonably supported by the evidence, they are not clearly erro-
neous); accord Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985), where the
Court stated that
[i]f the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of
the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse
it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it
would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two
permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between
them cannot be clearly erroneous.
Id. The dilemma, for appellate review, occurs because
whenever there are two versions of the facts, or two interpretations of
undisputed facts, the trial court and then the appellate court must
choose which version or interpretation to believe. In making the
choice, a court is necessarily convinced of the correctness of the chosen
view and is necessarily, therefore, convinced that the opposing view is
erroneous. Being convinced that a view is erroneous, however, is not
the same as being convinced that a view is clearly erroneous. A court
may be convinced of the correctness of its view and at the same time
concede the merit of the opposing view.
Nangle, supra note 230, at 416.
240. Eg., Theisen's, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, 309 Minn. 60, 66, 243 N.W.2d 145, 149
(1976); Caroga Realty Co. v. Tapper, 274 Minn. 164, 169, 143 N.W.2d 215, 220 (1966).
In State v. Mytych, 292 Minn. 248, 194 N.W.2d 276 (1972), the court emphasized that
the resolution of credibility issues between expert witnesses is uniquely a trial
court function:
This court's responsibility is not that of trying the facts again but of
making a rigorous review of the record to determine whether the evi-
dence, direct and circumstantial, viewed most favorably to support a
finding of guilt, was sufficient to permit the trial court to reach its
conclusion.
Id. at 252, 194 N.W.2d at 279.
241. In Bessemer City, the Court stated:
[When a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the tes-
timony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a co-
herent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic
evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually
never be clear error.
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findings of the trial court should not be disturbed.
Courts have advanced a variety of rationales for appellate
deference to trial court fact-finding, including judicial functional
specialization and restricting the trial of cases to one proceeding.242
Broadening the scope of appellate review demeans the role of trial
judges, decreases and postpones the finality of decision-making,
and dissipates scarce judicial resources.24 3
Applying these elementary principles of appellate review to
the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in D.FB. reveals that
Chief Justice Amdahl's substitution of his view of the facts for
those of Judge Ring was "clearly erroneous" both in fact and as a
matter of allocation of judicial roles. The court's entire analysis of
the facts is presented in the previously quoted paragraph,244 which
470 U.S. at 575.
In Amadeo v. Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771 (1988), the Court reaffirmed this position.
Although there is significant evidence in the record to support the
findings of fact favored by the Court of Appeals, there is also signifi-
cant evidence in the record to support the District Court's contrary
conclusion.... We frequently have emphasized that "[w]here there are
two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between
them cannot be clearly erroneous."
Id. at 1778 (quoting Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574).
242. The rationale for deference to the original finder of fact is not limited
to the superiority of the trial judge's position to make determinations
of credibility. The trial judge's major role is the determination of fact,
and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise. Duplica-
tion of the trial judge's efforts in the court of appeals would very
likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination
at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources. In addition, the par-
ties to a case on appeal have already been forced to concentrate their
energies and resources on persuading the trial judge that their account
of the facts is the correct one; requiring them to persuade three more
judges at the appellate level is requiring too much.... [T]he trial on
the merits should be "the 'main event'.., rather than a 'tryout on the
road.'"
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. at 574-75 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes 433 U.S. 72, 90
(1977)).
243. Professor Charles Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts,
41 Minn. L. Rev. 751 (1957), noted the deleterious consequences of expansive appel-
late review.
The principal consequences of broadening appellate review are two.
Such a course impairs the confidence of litigants and the public in the
decisions of the trial courts, and it multiplies the number of ap-
peals .... We may be sure that the broadened scope of appellate re-
view we have seen will mean an increase in the number of appeals....
It is literally marvelous that, at a time when the entire profession is
seeking ways to minimize congestion and delay in the courts, we
should set on a course which inevitably must increase congestion and
delay.... It is hard to believe that there has been any great public
dissatisfaction with the restricted appellate review which was tradi-
tional in this country.
Id. at 779-80.
244. See supra text accompanying note 227.
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simply adverts to the general substantive factors listed in the rules
and then concludes that "the state met its burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that D.F.B. is unamenable to treat-
ment in the juvenile court system .. "245
Applying the normal principles of appellate review demon-
strates the fundamental error of the court's decision in D.FB. Ini-
tially, there is the deference that appellate courts must pay to trial
courts' findings of fact. Moreover, the decision in D.F.B. was based
substantially on oral testimony by witnesses and on a dispute be-'
tween experts on the likelihood of Brom's being successfully
treated within three years. Where the record reasonably can sup-
port either result, it is inappropriate for an appellate court to sub-
stitute its view of the correct outcome for the equally apt result of
the original finder of fact. The court's action is especially trouble-
some where the state bears the burden of proof by more than the
civil "preponderance" of the evidence standard.246 Although the
supreme court may properly disagree with the trial court's find-
245. In re D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn. 1988). The court also observed that
Dr. Malmquist suggested that Brom's treatment "might be unsuccessful" and char-
acterized Dr. Gilbertson's testimony as "weak." Although Dr. Malmquist did not
testify that Brom definitely could be treated successfully in the time remaining as a
juvenile, contrary to the court's characterization, his testimony hardly established
by "clear and convincing evidence" that Brom could not be treated. Dr. Malmquist
simply could not predict to a degree of clinical certainty the amount of time re-
quired or the ultimate success of treatment. See supra notes 173-174 and accompa-
nying text.
Although the court may characterize Dr. Gilbertson's testimony in any manner
that it chooses to do so, any fair-minded review of the record does not reveal it to
be weak on the ultimate legal issue of Bromi's treatability as a juvenile. See supra
notes 175-183 and accompanying text.
Quite the contrary, while recognizing the inherent limitations of clinical prog-
noses, Dr. Gilbertson's testimony clearly and unequivocably supported Brom's posi-
tion that he was treatable as a juvenile. If Dr. Gilbertson's views were inconsistent
with the testimony of Dr. Malmquist, then it created a credibility issue that was
uniquely within the purview of the fact-finder to resolve. Because the prosecution
had the burden of proving that Brom was not treatable by "clear and convincing
evidence"-a heavier burden than the civil "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard-Chief Justice Amdahl's factual determination is especially difficult to ex-
plain. One can only conclude that he reached this result in a conclusory, result-
oriented fashion for reasons not based on the evidentiary record.
246. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. Moreover, the supreme court
has emphasized that waiver is a very limited exception to the otherwise exclusive
jurisdiction of juvenile courts. Thus, in In re K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1987),
the court held that a juvenile had no right to waive juvenile court jurisdiction in
order to obtain a jury trial as an incident of an adult criminal prosecution.
The legislature's clearly expressed intent is to provide only a limited
exception to the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
The exception in the statute permitting a reference to district court is
limited and circumscribed, and is to be granted only after the court
has made findings following the hearing provided in the statute.
Id. at 839.
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ings of fact and especially with the result, in order to conclude that
those findings were so "clearly erroneous" as to be an "abuse of
discretion," more than simple disagreement is necessary. Nowhere
in its opinion does the supreme court assert that Judge Ring's find-
ing, that the state had failed to carry its heavy burden of proof,
was clearly erroneous. Nor does the court say that Judge Ring's
conclusion that the state had failed to establish its case was mani-
festly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably
supported by the evidence as a whole. Obviously, it could not. As
defined by the legislature, the ultimate issue was a subjective,
clinical, and discretionary factual question for which there was am-
ple evidentiary support.
Because the ultimate statutory factual issue focused on char-
acteristics of the offender, i.e., whether Brom was treatable as a ju-
venile, it would be difficult for a judge's determination ever to be
"clearly erroneous" or an "abuse of discretion." No matter which
way he or she ruled, the determination would be within the
judge's discretion if a modicum of evidence supported that result.
The rationale for discretionary sentencing is that the trial judge is
in the best position to tailor the legal standards to the characteris-
tics of the offender. Within the range of legally authorized alter-
natives, such a discretionary decision is in practical effect neither
appealable nor reviewable.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the
highly discretionary and subjective nature of waiver/sentencing
decisions, emphasizing only the factual record necessary to sustain
any decision to waive or retain. 24 7 In part, the court's emphasis on
the sufficiency of the record to support a discretionary waiver deci-
sion reflects the legislative mandate that the primary focus of ju-
venile delinquency and waiver proceedings is on the offender
rather than the offense. 248
The supreme court in D.F.B. confronted the problem posed
by the legislature's continued emphasis on the characteristics of
the offender coupled with trial courts' virtually unrestricted dis-
cretion to make waiver decisions. The problem became critical
when a conscientious trial judge followed the legislature's mandate
in an extraordinarily difficult and troubling case. D.F.B. laid bare
247. Thus, Dahl simply represented the minimum evidentiary record necessary
to sustain a waiver decision-one that required more than simply proof of age and
offense. See supra notes 126-130 and accompanying text.
248. See, e.g., In re K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1987). The court has held con-
sistently that a juvenile cannot be referred solely because of the alleged offense.
See, e.g., In re K.P.H., 289 N.W.2d 722, 725 (Minn. 1980) (citing In re Dahl, 278
N.W.2d 316 (Minn. 1979)); In re R.D.W., 407 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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the fundamental sentencing tension between the principle of indi-
vidualized justice and the principle of offense. Unfortunately, the
supreme court's resolution of D.F.B. undermined the integrity of
the trial process and did violence to its own appellate function.
Although the court may be satisfied that it reached "the right re-
sult," it did so by misrepresenting the trial court factual record
and the legal issues before it.
In reaching its result, the supreme court may have concluded
that it was preferrable for one case-D.FB.-to be decided
"wrongly," i.e. contrary to the offender-oriented legislative man-
date, in order to avoid a precedent, such as that of the court of ap-
peals, that would create more problems for juveniles and for the
administration of the waiver process. Assuring that Brom was
tried as an adult would provide juvenile courts with the political
elbow room to continue exercising sentencing discretion for more
routine cases. Thus, the court's strategy supports discretionary, of-
fender-oriented sentencing over retributive, offense-based sentenc-
ing albeit at David Brom's expense. As a matter of sentencing
policy, the court may have concluded that, despite substantial indi-
vidual variations, the indeterminacy of discretionary sentencing is
likely to result in shorter sentences for most offenders, even
though occasional highly visible or career offenders may receive
disproportionately severe sentences. This trade-off between dis-
cretionary leniency for most juveniles, coupled with severity for a
few, is consistent with the view of the waiver process as a "sym-
bolic gesture" which requires occasional "sacrificial lambs" as a
strategy for maintaining juvenile court jurisdiction over the vast
majority of youths and deflecting more fundamental critiques of
juvenile justice administration.249
Unfortunately, the Minnesota Supreme Court's result-ori-
ented activism alleviated the political pressure on the legislature
to confront the sentencing policy contradictions inherent in the
statute and to declare explicitly the policy of the state.2 50 So long
249. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
250. Following the Minnesota Court of Appeals' decision in D.F.B., a state legis-
lator involved with the 1980 amendments to the juvenile waiver law stated that "he
felt that the appeals court decision is 'accurate in assessing what the legislative in-
tent was.'" Star Tribune, Oct. 19, 1988, at 4B, col. 1. He concluded that if the
court's decision "strips district court judges of discretion in referring juveniles ... I
have no problem with that." Id.
On other occasions, the supreme court has been more sensitive to the legisla-
ture's prerogatives in defining juvenile court jurisdiction. Thus, in In re K.A.A.,
410 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1987), the court attempted to implement
the legislature's perception of the public policy of the state.... Should
the legislature conclude that the public policy of this state no longer
requires the same degree of exclusivity of jurisdiction now lodged in
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as the legislature can rely on appellate courts to obfuscate clear
legislative language and misrepresent the contents of a trial rec-
ord, elected representatives have no incentive to make difficult
criminal policy decisions. When the policy choice is fundamental
and irreconcilable, however, such as the choice between offenders
and offenses as the basis for sentencing decisions, the legislature
has the sole responsibility to choose. When appellate courts an-
nounce public policy in such an area, their decisions inevitably re-
flect ad hoc political or other extraneous considerations which
detract both from their judicial role and the allocation of responsi-
bilities between the legislative and judicial branches. Moreover, as
the Brom case evidences, even after individual cases have been de-
cided, the underlying contradictions inherent in the law persist
and affect the deciding of subsequent cases as well.
C. In re J.L.B- Waiver of the Serious but Isolated
Juvenile Offender After Dahl and D.F.B.
Approximately two months after the supreme court decided
D.FB., the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered yet another
case involving a serious offense by an otherwise unexceptional
youth, In re J.L.B.251 J.L.B., who was seventeen at the time of his
offense but nineteen by the time his case was decided, allegedly
murdered or aided the suicide of his girlfriend, R.C., who was six
and one-half months pregnant at the time of her death.252 Like
Dahl and Brom before him, J.L.B. apparently had no prior delin-
quency involvements or previous treatment as a juvenile.253
the juvenile courts, it, of course, is free, by amendment to the statute,
to make provisions [for juveniles to opt out of the juvenile system]....
The ultimate decision involves difficult social policy choices particu-
larly within the province of the legislature.
Id. at 840.
251. 435 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
One week prior to its J.L.B. decision, the court of appeals affirmed the referral
of another youth who participated in a gang assault that led to the death of its vic-
tim. In re T.L.C., 435 N.W.2d 581 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). T.L.C. was a more "typi-
cal" waiver case: a juvenile with a poor academic record, excessive absences, and
persistent behavioral problems in school, id. at 582; at least two years of active in-
volvement in a juvenile gang in Milwaukee prior to moving to Minneapolis, id.; a
prior conviction for participating in a gang assault and robbery of another victim,
id.; and psychological resistance to acknowledging his culpability or expressing re-
morse for his present offense. Id. T.L.C. was one of three youths who attacked an-
other youth at school and "sat on the victim's head while the primary attacker
dropped onto the victim's abdomen with his knee from a standing position" causing
internal injuries and death. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
waiver decision as not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. Id. at 584.
252. J.LB., 435 N.W,2d at 596.
253. Id. at 602. Judge Crippen, dissenting, noted:
The evidence shows that appellant's current offense, if it occurred, is
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Although J.L.B.'s offenses created a prima facie case for waiver,
sufficient evidence of his suitability for treatment as a juvenile was
introduced to rebut the presumption for waiver.254 As indicated
above, once the prima facie case was rebutted, the decision to
waive was discretionary under the "totality of the circumstances."
A somewhat chastened court of appeals acknowledged the
continuing vitality of Dahl after D.FB.-proof of age and offense
alone is not a sufficient basis to justify transfer.255 The trial record
included testimony by friends of both J.L.B. and the victim, and
expert testimony of a psychiatrist and psychologists who evaluated
him. They concluded that J.L.B. did not have a mental illness and
was not a danger to society. 25 6 The trial court decided to waive
J.L.B. on the ground that retaining him as a juvenile would consti-
tute a threat to public safety. 257 In the face of an ambiguous rec-
ord, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's waiver decision
on the grounds that it was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of its
"broad discretion." 25 8
Although J.L.B. presents a seemingly straightforward waiver
case--an older juvenile charged with a very serious offense-even
after D.FB. 's clarification, the Minnesota Court of Appeals could
not agree on either its rationale or result. While the majority
voted to affirm the waiver, Judge Crippen disagreed in a strong
dissent.25 9 Judge Crippen noted that Dahl and D.F.B. require the
an isolated delinquent act in the life of an intelligent high school
youth who is active in extracurricular sports activities, cycling, reading
and personal hobbies, and whose worst performance problem has been
the absence of academic achievements to the high level of his ability.
Id. (Crippen, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 598.
255. Id. at 599. The court of appeals stated:
In determining if the statutory test for reference has been met, the
court must consider all of the relevant circumstances and not just age
or seriousness of the offense.... Because evidence of the offense alone
is not sufficient to justify reference, it is necessary to examine non-of-
fense related factors. We recognize the continued validity of the mul-
tifactor analysis enunciated in [Dahl].
Id. (citations omitted).
Despite its obligatory homage to Dahl and D.F.B., however, the court of ap-
peals appears unwilling to relinquish the commitment to offense-based decision-
making it put forth in its version of D.F.B. See text accompanying supra note 209.
After quoting from the supreme court's decision, see text accompanying supra note
227, the court concluded "We believe Dahl has been modified in accordance with
the above statement." J.LB., 435 N.W.2d at 599.
256. Id. at 597.
257. Id. at 599. "Although J.L.B.'s experts stated that they did not believe J.L.B.
to be dangerous, the trial court believed that J.L.B. managed to conceal dangerous
aspects of his personality from the experts." Id.
258. Id. at 599.
259. Id. at 600-04 (Crippen, J., dissenting).
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state to prove a juvenile's threat to public safety with evidence
other than simply the youth's age and the present offense, which is
all that the trial court relied on in J.L.B. 260 Indeed, the trial judge
asserted "[iln any homicide case . . . the criminal justice system
must respond strongly and punitively.' "261 Although the trial
judge's opinion that certain offenses deserve adult prosecution may
reflect a proper social policy, Judge Crippen noted that the pre-
dominance of the offense is not the policy declared by the legisla-
ture which retains its primary focus on the offender.262
Looking beyond the offense with which J.L.B. was charged,
Judge Crippen found the record devoid of evidence that he was
dangerous or a threat to public safety.263 He also found that the
state had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
260. Id. at 600. Judge Crippen presented the trial court's decision which he con-
tended directly contradicted the rulings in Dahl and D.F.B.:
The trial court concluded: This court remains of the opinion that proof
that the juvenile defendant is a dangerous person is no longer re-
quired Regardless of whether the juvenile is likely to commit future
crimes, the public safety is not served unless, in the absence of such
mitigating facts as would justify retention of juvenile jurisdiction, se-
rious criminal behavior is effectively punished with Yust desserts
[sic].' The public safety further requires that Court decisions be consis-
tent with a generally held impression by the public that serious crimi-
nal activity will surely result in serious punishment
Id. (emphasis added).
261. Id.
262. Judge Crippen's review of the 1980 amendments of the waiver statute con-
cluded: "This amendment demonstrates the legislature's apparent ratification of the
policies underlying the juvenile court system and the proposition that reference
should be the exception and not the rule." Id. at 601 (citing Feld, Dismantling the
"Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 206).
263. Judge Crippen noted:
Looking beyond the current offense, the record here includes remark-
ably meager evidence, if any at all, that appellant is personally danger-
ous. The record contains evidence on the dangerousness of appellant's
conduct in the course of his alleged unlawful conduct, together with a
remark before the incident about being able to kill someone or killing
the young woman who later committed suicide. Appellant lied when
questioned about the offense; if this is considered as unrelated to the
offense, there is no evidence it is germane to dangerousness. Other-
wise, the record is simply void of evidence that appellant endangers
the public safety. Undisputed expert testimony indicates that appel-
lant is not an aggressive or a dangerous person. According to the
court-appointed psychologist, testing suggests that appellant's level of
emotional control is about normal.
Observing an inference of dangerousness solely from appellant's
offense, the trial court in its memorandum expressed a belief that ap-
pellant "likely" had "managed to conceal part of his personality from
the experts, the dangerous underside ...that must have risen to the
surface and influenced his behavior" when the alleged offense oc-
curred. This conclusion is openly shaped by the offense and is not sup-
ported by the evidence.
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J.L.B. was unsuitable for treatment.264 In short, Judge Crippen
concluded, the trial judge waived J.L.B. on the basis of his age and
the seriousness of his offense in contravention of Dahl.
Judge Crippen concluded his opinion with an examination of
the "state of current Minnesota reference law."265 While noting
the amended purpose clause and the prima facie case strategy, he
concluded that the waiver decision generally remains one of judi-
cial discretion under the "totality of the circumstances" and that
reference remains the exception and not the rule .... [Ilt is
significant that the 1980 Minnesota Legislature openly rejected
the notion that certain offenses are cause per se for reference,
choosing instead to adopt a rebuttable prima facie infer-
ence .... It must be observed, in sum, that the juvenile court
act provides for significant obstacles to reference, both in
terms of procedures and standards.... It is evident that the
legislature defers to the body of opinion, sometimes disputed,
that incarcerating young people in adult prisons for long terms
is not a worthwhile correctional policy, especially when this
practice includes young people who are not clearly dangerous
or whose condition does not otherwise invite adult
imprisonment. 266
Judge Crippen asserted that fidelity to the legislative mandate re-
quired reversal of the trial court's decision to waive J.L.B.
Like the supreme court in Dahl a decade earlier, Judge Crip-
pen invited the legislature "to grapple with the issue of corrections
policy for young offenders." 267 According to Judge Crippen, the
imperative to waive serious but isolated young offenders arises be-
cause juvenile court judges lack the necessary tools to control such
youths as juveniles for a substantial period of time. Prior to 1975,
when the jurisdictional limits were reduced to twenty-one, Minne-
sota's Youth Conservation Commission retained jurisdiction over
young offenders until they attained the age of twenty-five.268 In
1982, the maximum age of juvenile court dispositional authority
was reduced further from twenty-one to nineteen.269 To the ex-
tent that the number of years remaining within juvenile court ju-
risdiction is one of the primary factors influencing judicial waiver
decisions,27 0 the reduction in the maximum age of disposition in-
264. Id. at 602.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 602-03 (citing Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5;
Feld, Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 520-28).
267. Id. at 603.
268. Id.
269. Id. The problem of "older" juveniles and the jurisdictional limitations on
juvenile courts has arisen in other cases. See, e.g., In re C.A.N., 370 N.W.2d 438
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
270. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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creases the pressure upon judges confronting youths charged with
serious offenses to transfer them to criminal courts where longer
sentences are available. 271
In lieu of increasing the sentencing authority of juvenile
courts, Judge Crippen asserted that if offense-based waiver is to be
the law of the state, then only the legislature can provide for it.
He correctly recognized that it is the legislature's responsibility to
formulate sentencing policy and that, as long as it avoids that re-
sponsibility, juvenile courts will continue asking unanswerable
questions. 272
[I]f purely offense-based reference is appropriate, if Dahl is to
be ignored, the legislature must so determine. With that deci-
sion, and grappling with conflicting views on sentencing of
young offenders, the legislature should decide whether a
young defendant, especially in a case of a serious but isolated
crime, should be sentenced in adult court to a different term
and a different facility than other defendants.273
Judge Crippen cautioned, however, that legislatively endorsing of-
fense-based sentencing in juvenile courts, either for purposes of
waiver or for juvenile dispositions, contradicts the "therapeutic"
nature of juvenile courts that justifies the uses of many procedures
which are less adequate than those required for the criminal
process. 274
In Judge Crippen's opinion, the fundamental sentencing pol-
icy issue that the legislature avoided in the aftermath of Dahl re-
271. According to Judge Crippen, legislatively increasing the dispositional au-
thority of juvenile court would alleviate considerably the pressures to waive. "If an
adequate alternative is developed for serious young offenders, the judiciary will be
duly freed from the absurd choices it now faces in dealing with those who are not
habitually delinquent but who have committed a serious offense." In re J.L.B., 435
N.W.2d 595, 604 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (Crippen, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 603-04. See generally Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra
note 5.
273. J.LB., 435 N.W.2d at 604.
274. Id.
Finally, it should be observed that there are constitutional questions
looming in the wake of loose permission for references based solely on
the circumstances of an offense and the age of an offender. First, of-
fense-based references enlarge the predominance of a punishment
standard in determining juvenile court dispositions, and the weight of
the demand that persons before this court have further procedural
safeguards, including the right to trial by jury.
Id.; see also In re D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (Crippen, J.,
dissenting) (decrying use of offense-based sentencing practices in juvenile courts
without criminal procedural safeguards). See generally Feld, Principle of Offense,
supra note 6, at 504-11 (strong nationwide trend toward adopting offense-based
waiver legislation); Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra note 14, at 851-79 (in-
creased emphasis on offense-based sentencing within juvenile courts); Feld,
Criminalizing Juvenile Justice, supra note 8, at 167-79 (procedural deficiencies of
juvenile courts that are increasingly punitive).
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mains-the choice between sentences based on considerations of
the offender and those of the offense.275 Judge Crippen's proposed
solution is to increase the sentencing authority of juvenile courts
in order to avoid waiving serious but isolated young offenders for
adult prosecution. 276 Some commentators dispute the wisdom of
expanding the sanctioning power of a juvenile court which is pro-
cedurally inadequate to its present adjudicative role,2 7 7 and pro-
pose, instead, that serious offenses should be dealt with exclusively
in criminal courts.278 Ultimately, however, these sentencing policy
disputes can be addressed only by the legislature.
V. Conclusion: Suggestions for the Legislature
The case of David F. Brom, In re D.FB., dramatically illus-
trates the fundamental tension in sentencing policies between an
emphasis on the characteristics of the offender and a consideration
of the seriousness of the offense. If one believes in the "rehabilita-
tive ideal"-the premise that juvenile courts exist to serve the
"best interests" of the young offender-then David Brom is a
likely candidate for successful therapeutic intervention and should
appropriately be tried as a juvenile rather than as an adult. In a
275. J.LB., 435 N.W.2d at 604.
276. Id. at 603-04.
277. See, e.g., Zimring, supra note 46, who surveys alternative sentencing policies
toward serious young offenders and rejects proposals to increase the punishment
and incapacitative powers of juvenile courts.
Increasing the punishment power of juvenile courts also puts substan-
tial pressure on their usual procedures for fact-finding. The informal-
ity, nonentitlement to trial by jury, and discretionary character of the
juvenile justice system have been defended from constitutional attack
on the grounds that the primary mission of the juvenile court is not to
punish but to serve the young people who appear before it. This de-
fense of the system troubles many who regard the disposition of juve-
nile cases as being motivated, at least in part, by the traditional
purposes of punishment. The lack of traditional legal safeguards in ju-
venile courts -becomes far more questionable when the court
"designates" its clients as "felons" and then locks them away for peri-
ods of time that can only be ascribed to retributive, incapacitative, and
deterrent agendas. The processes of contemporary juvenile justice are
too frail to be associated with drastic sanctions; a substantial argu-
ment can be made that the coupling of severe sanctions with proce-
dural informality is unconstitutional.
Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
On the procedural deficiencies of the juvenile court, see Feld, Criminalizing
Juvenile Justice, supra note 8, at 167-272; Feld, In re Gault Revisited, supra note
218, at 401 (in half the states surveyed, a majority of juveniles appeared in delin-
quency proceedings without counsel); Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 83, at 1217-
23 (routine denial of counsel in delinquency proceedings in most counties in
Minnesota).
278. See Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 612-16; Feld,
Principle of Offense, supra note 6, at 519-33.
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case like Brom's, however, emphasizing the treatment needs of the
offender simultaneously deprecates the seriousness of the crimes
he allegedly committed.
Under the prevailing offender-oriented waiver legislation, a
juvenile court judge is required to make an individualized assess-
ment of a youth's "amenability to treatment" or "dangerousness,"
even though such an inquiry poses inherently unanswerable ques-
tions.279 Despite the Dahl-inspired amendments, the Minnesota
legislature retained its basic commitment to individualized, of-
fender-oriented waiver determinations. Pursuant to that legislative
mandate, Judge Gerard Ring did exactly what the legislature and
previous court opinions instructed-indeed required-him to do.
He conducted an extensive hearing on Brom's "amenability" or
"dangerousness." He concluded that despite the extraordinary se-
riousness of Brom's crimes, the prosecution had failed to establish
by "clear and convincing evidence" that Brom could not be treated
successfully or that he posed a threat to the community. In short,
after considering all of the non-exclusive factors identified by stat-
ute, court rules, and prior opinions, Judge Ring exercised his sen-
tencing discretion, in a very close case, in favor of the offender
rather than the offense.
Unfortunately for Judge Ring, he took his judicial obligation
to follow the law, as defined by the legislature, too seriously. As a
result of his exercise of discretion, two appellate courts found it
necessary to overrule him-one as a matter of law and the second
as a question of fact. The court of appeals' decision to reverse
Judge Ring, as a matter of law, had scant support in the statute on
its face or as previously interpreted. The opinion potentially
raised more problems than it purported to resolve.280 The court of
appeals' opinion did, however, have the virtue of being consistent
with the role of appellate courts to interpret the law and to apply
it to the facts found by the trial court. By contrast, the Minnesota
Supreme Court simply substituted its construction of the facts for
those of the trial judge who actually heard the matter. In so doing,
the supreme court violated its appellate functions and disregarded
the factual record of the proceeding.281 In both instances, the
courts' actions were compelled by their perceptions of the serious-
ness of the offense, its impact on the community, and the political
and public outrage that followed Judge Ring's decision. Although
the courts' concern about an inadequate response to a serious
279. See Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 613.
280. See supra notes 215-218 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 227-250 and accompanying text.
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crime is certainly understandable, their elevation of the principle
of the offense over consideration of the offender reflects politically
motivated judicial activism rather than fealty to the legislative
mandate.
D.FB. illustrates one set of problems associated with judicial
waiver practices. What should be the relative emphasis on the of-
fender or the offense in the context of the youth who commits a
serious but isolated offense? How can appellate courts control
trial court sentencing discretion under a broad legislative mandate
that lacks any meaningful substantive standards?
Once waiver is viewed as a sentencing decision, the lack of
objective substantive guidelines remits the transfer decision to
every judge in every county in the state with highly variable and
unpredictable outcomes. There are two crucial consequences of
the exercise of discretion under such circumstances. First, there
does not appear to be much, if any, basis by which to distinguish
the few juveniles who are waived from the vast majority of simi-
larly-situated offenders who are retained. As gauged by their pres-
ent offenses, prior records, and previous sentences, waived
juveniles, as a group, constitute a more serious class of offenders
than the vast bulk of youths who are retained (Table 2). This sta-
tistic, however, obscures the very important reality that far more
juveniles charged with similar offenses and with similar prior
records are retained as juveniles than are waived as adults (Table
3). Multivariate analyses identify very few statistically significant
variables and those few variables explain very little of the variance
in this very crucial sentencing decision, only 3.1% (Table 6). Sta-
tistically, waiver decision-making appears to be almost random.
Legally, such randomness constitutes arbitrary and capricious deci-
sion-making.
The second empirical reality of waiver decision-making is
that venue is as important as the charged offense for purposes of
determining adulthood. In the urban counties the administration
of the waiver statute appears to be consistent with the legislation.
By contrast, a much greater percentage of rural youths are waived
to criminal courts for much less serious offenses and with less ex-
tensive prior juvenile court interventions. Although waived rural
juveniles may appear to be sophisticated relative to other rural
juveniles, they are less serious offenders than their urban or sub-
urban cousins. This "justice by geography" emerges under a law of
general applicability and raises very troubling questions about the
even-handed administration of justice with respect to the most im-
portant sentencing decision made by juvenile courts.
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In light of the continuing problems posed both by the serious
but isolated offender-Dahl, D.F.B., J.B.L.--and the exercise of
waiver discretion in general, it is time for the legislature to address
the underlying sentencing premises of the transfer legislation. It
is uniquely the legislature's obligation to address issues of sentenc-
ing policy and public safety. It is irresponsible simply to declare a
vague, amorphous, indeed contradictory policy, and then stand by
as courts continue to flounder in the morass created by the lack of
legislative guidance.
Throughout, this article has identified two primary and inter-
related problems posed by judicial waiver practices: the highly dis-
cretionary idiosyncratic nature of this individualized sentencing
decision, and the lack of integration between the criteria for re-
moval of offenders from the juvenile court and the sentencing
practices in adult criminal courts. Both problems stem from indi-
vidualized judicial sentencing discretion.
On the basis of the available social science research about the
development of delinquent careers, discretionary waiver practices,
and juvenile and adult court sentencing practices, it appears that
either of two alternatives are preferable to continuing the present
practice. Both strategies use offense criteria-seriousness and per-
sistence-to structure the waiver determination. One approach-
presumption/burden shifting-uses offense criteria to create a pre-
sumption for waiver and shifts the burden of proof to the juvenile
to affirmatively demonstrate why he or she should be retained as a
juvenile, i.e., is amenable to treatment and poses no threat to the
public. This approach is used in California.28 2 In the face of the
inherent uncertainty of clinical evaluations, placing the burden of
production and the risk of nonpersuasion on youths charged with
serious offenses is preferable to placing those burdens on the
state.28 3 As Judge Ring noted in his opinion, the ultimate outcome
of the case hinged on who bore the burden of persuasion-had the
282. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(c) (West Supp. 1989).
283. Shifting the burdens of proof and persuasion to the juvenile gives greater
effect to the legislative policies that were reflected in the now-discredited prima fa-
cie case or presumption strategy.
Placing the burden of persuasion on a youth to prove amenability and
nondangerousness would emphasize the policies of social defense and
public safety in light of the uncertainty of the issues being determined.
In many cases, a court cannot reliably determine whether a youth is
amenable or dangerous. In these ambiguous cases the decision
whether or not to waive is determined by which party bears the bur-
den of persuasion. The legislative policies that justify creating a rebut-
table presumption also justify placing the burden of persuasion on the
juvenile rather than on the state.
Feld, Dismantling The "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 215.
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risk of nonpersuasion rested with Brom, Ring would have certified
him.28 4 The second strategy, legislative waiver, excludes certain
categories of offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction. Offense ex-
clusion, a form of mandatory sentencing, provides a rational, non-
discretionary, and easily administered method for deciding which
youths should be prosecuted as adults.28 5 A legislative waiver sys-
tem excludes from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court those rela-
tively few juveniles whose commission of serious offenses and
persistent delinquent activity mandate adult prosecution.
By focusing on the seriousness and/or persistence of a youth's
delinquent career, either by presumption/burden-shifting or exclu-
sion, a legislature can differentiate between the hard-core offend-
ers and the vast majority of youths properly handled within the
juvenile court. By stressing the more objective factors-the pres-
ent offense and prior record-rather than subjective, impressionis-
tic clinical factors, juveniles can be differentiated on bases that
avoid many of th*e dangers of discretion and discrimination inher-
ent in unstructured judicial sorting. Focusing on offenses would
also reduce the "justice by geography" that occurs under a discre-
tionary regime.
Ultimately, the legislature must make value judgments about
the specific combinations of present offenses and prior records that
warrant shifting the risk of non-persuasion or automatically exlud-
ing juveniles. Although persistence is the most reliable basis for
differentiating chronic offenders from their less sophisticated
counterparts, the seriousness of a youth's misconduct may not al-
ways allow the luxury of extensive recidivism. The primary justi-
fication for waiver advanced in this article is the need for
minimum terms of confinement that are in excess of the maxi-
mum terms available within the juvenile court, i.e., sentences in
excess of about three years. Effectively, this means focusing on the
most serious offenses against the person committed by older
juveniles who also have a prior record of offending. Legislative
definition of the criteria for burden-shifting or exclusion can bet-
ter integrate sentencing practices and secure social defense when
youths make the transition from juvenile to adult courts.
Age. The empirical data reviewed in this article suggest that
waiver is almost exclusively the province of juveniles aged sixteen
or older (Table 4).286 A juvenile's age in relation to the maximum
284. See supra text accompanying note 160.
285. See Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 613; Feld, Delin-
quent Careers and Criminal Policy, supra note 7, at 208-10.
286. In an earlier empirical study of waiver in Minnesota, nearly ninety
percent of the youths from whom adult reference was sought were six-
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age of juvenile court jurisdiction is also a primary variable affect-
ing waiver in other studies as well.28 7 Sixteen, therefore, should
be the minimum age for presumptive or automatic adult prosecu-
tion for most offenses. For those youths less than sixteen years of
age, at least three years of juvenile court jurisdiction remain.
Present Offense. Although most waived juveniles are
charged with felony conduct (Tables 2-3), the bulk of them are
charged with felony offenses against property, such as burglary.
Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, youths charged with
felony property offenses, even with the maximum juvenile crimi-
nal history score, are unlikely to be sentenced to prison.288 Thus,
for purposes of emphasizing current seriousness, the legislature
should shift the burden or exclude only those youths, aged sixteen
or older, charged with felony offenses against the person of sever-
ity level VIII-X,289 because it is only for those offenses that the
sentencing guidelines would result consistently in longer terms of
adult confinement than could be imposed within the juvenile
court. Consistently with the sentencing guidelines "just deserts"
emphasis, focusing exclusively on those charged with the most se-
rious felony offenses against the person would better integrate the
juvenile waiver and adult sentencing practices to avoid the "pun-
ishment gap" and reduce the geographic disparities currently asso-
ciated with waiver.29 o
Prior Record. A record of persistence provides the best evi-
teen or older and more than seventy percent were seventeen or eight-
een at the time of their reference hearing. This heavy weighting
toward the older end of the juvenile client spectrum is consistent with
studies of waiver practices in other jurisdictions.
Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 5, at 574.
287. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
288. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Minnesota Sentencing Guide-
lines & Commentary IV (rev. ed. 1988), reprinted in Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244 app.
(West Supp. 1989). Most of the research on waiver reports that the majority of
transferred youths are not charged with serious offenses against the person and
consequently receive probationary sentences as adults. See supra notes 77-80 and
accompanying text.
289. Severity level VIII-X offenses-the most serious offenses under the Minne-
sota Sentencing Guidelines-include murder, first degree criminal sexual conduct,
first degree assault, and aggravated robbery. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Comm'n, Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines & Commentary IV (rev. ed. 1988), re-
printed in Minn. Stat. § 244 app. (West Supp. 1989).
290. The IJA-ABA Standards Relating to Transfer Between Courts emphasize
the seriousness of the present offense and the prior record as the sole basis for
waiver: "Waiver is appropriate only when the juvenile is accused of a serious class
one juvenile offense [such as murder, rape, and armed robbery], has demonstrated a
propensity for violent acts against other persons and, on the basis of personal back-
ground, appears unlikely to benefit from any disposition available to the juvenile
court." Institute of Judicial Admin.-ABA Joint Comm'n on Juvenile Justice Stan-
dards, Standards Relating to Transfer Between Courts 37 (1980).
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dence of a juvenile's commitment to a delinquent career. For all
but the most serious offenses, a significant prior record should be
required to identify the persistent juvenile offenders who ulti-
mately pose a serious threat to the community.291 Evidence of re-
peated youthful misconduct should be considered for sentencing
purposes, even if the current offense is not a serious felony against
the person. Again, however, it is important to emphasize the rela-
tionship between criteria for juvenile divestiture and for adult in-
carceration. Against the backdrop of the sentencing guidelines,
only a substantial criminal history score will result in the incarcer-
ation of a felony property offender for a longer term than that
available to juvenile courts and it is only under these circum-
stances that waiver should occur. The legislature must work back-
wards from what the probable adult sentence would be for the
particular offense or offender.
The legislature should also reconsider the sentencing guide-
lines' limitation of the juvenile component of the adult criminal
history score. By limiting juvenile felony convictions to a maxi-
mum of one point, the guidelines may contribute to the "punish-
ment gap." 292 Extensive reliance on a juvenile's prior convictions
291. The IJA-ABA Standards Relating to Transfer Between Courts emphasize a
"prior record of adjudicated delinquency involving the infliction or threat of signifi-
cant bodily injury" for all but the most serious offenses. The Standards' rationale
for requiring prior adjudications is that
[t]he presumption in favor of juvenile court jurisdiction is strong.
Only juveniles who pose genuine threats to community safety should
be waived and exposed to the greater sanctions of the criminal court.
A prior record of violent acts is evidence of that threat. Prior records
of property offenses, minor violent offenses, or alleged but unproven
serious violent offenses do not evidence that threat.
Id. at 39.
292. An earlier article questioned the wisdom of disregarding a juvenile's entire
juvenile record.
The failure of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission to in-
tegrate fully the juvenile and adult records for sentencing purposes
perpetuates the gap in intervention exactly at the peak of chronic and
serious activity. Except for youths who are imprisoned as adults solely
on the basis of a present offense against the person, the inclusion of
the juvenile criminal history will not result in the presumptive incar-
ceration of a chronic young burglar or thief until he or she has com-
mitted at least two additional adult felonies, and even then only if
those convictions occur before the age of twenty-one.... Moreover,
under the sentencing guidelines a juvenile with only two juvenile fel-
ony convictions is treated the same way as a juvenile with ten felony
convictions, even though persistence is the most reliable indicator of
probable recidivism and seriousness.
Feld, Dismantling the "Rehabilitative Ideal," supra note 7, at 236-37.
During the 1989 Minnesota legislative session, a bill was introduced to modify
the way in which juvenile points are computed in the sentencing guidelines and to
eliminate the one-point maximum limit placed on juvenile offender's criminal his-
tory score. See Minn. H.F. 726, 76th Leg. (1989).
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to enhance subsequent adult sentences, however, strongly impli-
cates the quality of routine procedural justice in juvenile courts,
because many juveniles' prior convictions were obtained without
the assistance of counsel.293
Serious But Isolated Young Offenders. What if Dahl, Brom,
or J.B.L. were fifteen or fourteen years of age, and charged with
the same crimes? Should they be treated as juveniles or as adults?
The killing of another human being without justification or excuse
is the most serious offense in the criminal code,294 and treating
juveniles who commit murder as a separate class of extraordina-
rily serious offenders seems appropriate.29 5 Regardless of the
youthfulness of the perpetrator, these most serious crimes chal-
lenge the offender-oriented premises of the juvenile court. Absent
some other defense, youths fourteen years of age or older who
"know right from wrong" are criminally responsible.29 6 Whether
293. See Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 83, at 1335-37. Many unrepresented
juveniles, including those charged with felony offenses, are routinely adjudicated
delinquent and removed from their homes or incarcerated. Although including a
juvenile's prior record of delinquency in the adult sentencing schema is a rational
sentencing policy, "both juvenile and adult sentencing authorities must confront
the reality of the quality of adjudications in juvenile courts." Id. at 1336. Both fed-
eral and state cases have condemned the enhancement of a defendant's current sen-
tence on the basis of prior convictions where the defendant was unrepresented.
See, e.g., Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S.
443 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967); State v. Edmison, 379 N.W.2d 85
(Minn. 1985); State v. Norstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1983).
If juvenile adjudications are to be used to enhance sentences for
juveniles as juveniles or as adults, then a mechanism must be devel-
oped to assure that only constitutionally obtained prior convictions are
considered.... Anything less [than automatic mandatory appointment
of counsel in all cases] will subject a juvenile or young adult's sentence
to direct or collateral attack, produce additional appeals, and impose a
wasteful and time-consuming burden on the prosecution to establish
the validity of prior convictions.
Feld, Right to Counsel, supra note 83, at 1336-37.
294. The authorized penalties for murder are significantly greater than those for
any other offense, ranging from 25 years to life imprisonment-murder in the first
degree, Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (1988) (life imprisonment); murder in the second de-
gree, id. § 609.19 (40 years); murder in the third degree, id. § 609.195 (25 years).
Under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, conviction for intentional homicide
carries a presumptive sentence of 216 months. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines
Comm'n, Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines & Commentary IV (rev. ed. 1988), re-
printed in Minn. Stat. Ann. § 244 app. (West Supp. 1989).
295. Many jurisdictions treat murder as a special class and even states employing
judicial waiver may legislatively exclude juvenile murderers. See Feld, Principle of
Offense, supra note 6, at 504-11.
296. Minn. Stat. § 609.05 (1988); see, e.g., Feld, Punishment, Treatment, supra
note 14, which notes:
Psychological research concerning legal socialization indicates that
young people move through developmental stages of cognitive func-
tioning with respect to legal reasoning, internalization of social and
legal expectations, and ethical decisionmaking. This developmental se-
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those young juveniles charged with the most serious crimes should
be tried as adults requires the legislature to make an explicit value
choice between an emphasis on the offender and on the offense,
and about the quantity and quality of youthful deviance that will
be tolerated before the more punitive responses of the criminal
law are invoked. These issues of public policy and safety should be
debated and decided openly in the political arena by democrati-
cally elected legislators rather than behind closed doors on an idio-
syncratic basis by individual judges.297
The case of David Brom is a tragedy for everyone associated
quence and the changes in cognitive processes are strikingly parallel to
the imputations of responsibility associated with the common-law in-
fancy defense. Developmental psychology research indicates that indi-
viduals acquire most of the legal and moral values and reasoning
capacity that will guide their behavior through later life by the age of
fourteen.
If a youth fourteen years of age or older knows "right from
wrong," that is, possesses the requisite mens rea, then the courts may
find the juvenile as criminally responsible as any adult offender facing
the same charges. In the mens rea-as-capacity formulation, if one is
criminally responsible for making blameworthy choices, then one de-
serves the same punishment as any other criminal actor making com-
parable choices.
Id. at 898-99.
The only limitation on the criminal responsibility of young juveniles may be
with respect to eligibility for the death penalty. The Supreme Court in Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988), considered whether the execution of an of-
fender for a heinous murder committed when he was 15 years old violated the
eighth amendment prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments." A plurality of
the Thompson Court emphasized the youthfulness of the offender as a mitigating
factor at sentencing and concluded that "[t]here is also broad agreement on the
proposition that adolescents as a class are less mature and responsible than adults."
Id. at 2698. Even though Thompson was found to be responsible for his crime, the
Court concluded that he could not be punished as severely as an adult, simply be-
cause of his age. "[T]he Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpa-
bility should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime
committed by an adult." Id.
In Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989), a plurality of the Court upheld
the death penalty for capital crimes committed by juveniles who were 16 and 17.
The plurality noted that "the common law set the rebuttable presumption of inca-
pacity to commit felonies .. .at the age of 14." Id. at 2971. The Stanford dissent
did not dispute that young juveniles could be criminally responsible, but only
whether their culpability was sufficiently blameworthy to warrant the imposition
of capital punishment. Id. at 2989-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Juveniles very gen-
erally lack that degree of blameworthiness that is, in my view, a constitutional pre-
requisite for the imposition of capital punishment .. " Id. at 2992.
297. During the 1989 Minnesota legislative session, several bills excluding from
juvenile court jurisdiction any youth aged 14 or older charged with murder or man-
slaughter were introduced. See Minn. H.F. 3, 76th Leg. (1989); Minn. H.F. 82, 76th
Leg. (1989); Minn. S.F. 90, 76th Leg. (1989). Unfortunately, the political impetus to
frontally consider the relative emphasis on the offense and the offender was
aborted by the appellate courts' activism in D.F.B. See supra note 250 and accompa-
nying text.
1989] BAD LAW MAKES HARD CASES
with it.298 It also demonstrates the inherent unworkability of Min-
nesota's legislative response to serious but isolated young offend-
ers. After more than a decade, it is abundantly clear that
Minnesota's judicial waiver legislation is fundamentally flawed,
not only in its implementation but in its basic assumptions. Until
the legislature confronts he inherent sentencing contradiction in
the law, it will perpetuate the inconsistent and discriminatory ap-
plications of judicial sentencing discretion, contribute to invidious
"justice by geography" for the most severe sanction available in ju-
venile courts, promote ad hoc judicial activism by appellate courts
attempting to constrain "inappropriate" exercises of discretion,
and leave unresolved the most important sentencing policy issue in
juvenile justice. Continued legislative default disserves juvenile
and appellate courts, youthful offenders and the public, and paves
the way for yet another recurrence of the inevitable problems
posed by cases like Dahl, D.FB., and J.B.L.
298. As a result of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision that Brom should be
tried as an adult, an Olmsted County Grand Jury indicted him on four counts of
first degree murder. Brom was arraigned on January 25, 1989, his bail was set at
$500,000, and he was remanded to the Olmsted County Jail. Star Tribune, Jan. 26,
1989, at 13A, col. 2. The selection of jurors for his trial began on September 18,
1989. Star Tribune, Sept. 19, 1989, at 3B, col. 3. On September 20, 1989, Brom's at-
torney filed notice of intent to raise an insanity defense. Under Minnesota proce-
dure, an insanity defense entails a bifurcated hearing in which the jury first decides
whether the defendant committed the crime and then decides in a separate pro-
ceeding whether the defendant lacked criminal responsibility. Minn. R. Crim. P.
20.02. The jury was empanelled on September 26, 1989. Star Tribune, Sept. 27,
1989, at 1B, col. 1. The guilt phase of Brom's trial required four days of testimony,
following which the jury returned a verdict of guilty on October 3, 1989, Brom's
18th birthday. Star Tribune, Oct. 4, 1989, at 1A, col. 1. After the determination of
guilt, Brom and the prosecution introduced evidence bearing on his mental illness.
The Olmsted County jury of seven men and five women deliberated for 22 hours
over three days before deciding on October 15, 1989, that Brom was sane at the time
he murdered his family. Star Tribune, Oct. 16, 1989, at 1A, col. 1. Under the appli-
cable Minnesota law, a conviction of first degree murder carries an automatic sen-
tence of life in prison with parole eligibility after a minimum of 17 1/2 years. On
October 16, 1989, Olmsted County Judge Ancy Morse repeated her concerns that
Minnesota's M'Naghten standard of criminal insanity was rigid and narrow as ap-
plied to a "mentally ill boy driven to despair by a pathetically sick mind." Star
Tribune, Oct. 17, 1989, at 1A, col. 1. Despite the "emotional agony" she exper-
ienced, Judge Morse sentenced Brom to three consecutive life sentences, meaning
that he must serve a minimum of 52 1/2 years before he would be eligible for pa-
role consideration. Id. The sentence imposed was more than twenty times longer
than that which he could have received had he been tried as a juvenile.

